Key topics include team design, team management, job design, employee empowerment, implementing change, and high performance workforces. In 2004, John Amasi, the director of production for a manufacturer of plastic pipe, introduced the concept of self-directed teams into a newly rehabbed plant in Corpus Christi, Texas. This was a major departure for RL Wolfe, whose other plants were unionized and rigidly hierarchical. By 2007, Corpus Christi is significantly outperforming the other plants in productivity, and Amasi tours the plant to identify remaining barriers to even higher productivity. Although the tour makes clear that many things are going right, it also reveals specific elements of the SDT concept that are not working optimally; some of these are communicated from the perspective of the workers themselves. At the end of the case, as Amasi sketches out ideas for increasing productivity at Corpus Christi, he also considers how he can persuade the unionized workforces at the other Wolfe plants to accept the SDT model.
CEO Jim Billings wants to attract energetic, entrepreneurial talent to Stone Finch, Inc., which comprises an older division that fabricates products like piping and tanks for water and wastewater processing plants, and a much newer division that develops biochemical solutions associated with water purification. To accelerate the company's growth, Billings sets up subsidiaries to create cutting-edge technologies that can be brought to market by the biochemical solutions division. After a few years the subsidiaries have indeed produced innovative products and driven growth; however, problems are surfacing. Much of the investment in the subsidiaries has come from the old manufacturing-based "cash cow" division, which is now suffering from turnover, loss of morale, and loss of competitive position. Moreover, the solutions division -- which has absorbed numerous employees who became wealthy by developing successful subsidiaries -- is plagued by increasing polarization between the "haves" and the "have-nots."
In May 2007, the Engstrom Auto Mirrors plant, a relatively small supplier based in Indiana, faces a crisis. The business was in the second year of a downturn. Sales had started to decline in 2005; a year later, plant manager Ron Bent had been forced to lay off more than 20 percent of the work force. Plant productivity was dropping, employee morale was low, and product-quality issues had begun to surface. Relationships with key customers were at risk. Downturns were not new at Engstrom. When the plant had reached a similar crisis point years earlier, the institution of a Scanlon Plan, a company-wide employee incentive program, had proven critical in building morale, increasing productivity and product quality, and leading Engstrom into a turnaround. For several subsequent years, Engstrom workers had received regular Scanlon pay bonuses. But the bonuses had stopped in 2006, and now Ron Bent must determine how to get the plant back on track. Should he revise the Scanlon setup? Remove Scanlon and try another plan? Identify and change other organizational factors that may be sabotaging Scanlon?
Alex Sander is a new product manager whose drive and talents are attractive to management, but whose intolerant style has alienated employees. This tension is presented against the backdrop of a 360° performance review process. Sander works in the Toiletries Division of Landon Care Products, which has recently been acquired by a European beauty company. Sander is leading the launch of a European skin care product into the U.S. market, which requires working with a multinational product development team. Sander's interactions with peers and direct reports in the case paint a picture of a tough, inflexible high achiever who uses temper as a management tool. At the end of the day, Sander's supervisor Sam Glass will provide Sander with 360° performance feedback-the first time this process has been used at Landon. Sander remains skeptical about the value of the process and feedback, and of a long-term fit with the organization. On the other hand, Glass has a very high personal interest in keeping Sander at the company, but wonders how the organization can best develop and manage this star performer.
Explores the success factors leading to the company's rise to the number three ranking in the aggressively competitive toy industry. LeapFrog has made the strategic decision to expand beyond the toy industry and enter the educational technology and services industry. While leveraging core capabilities and product platforms, this new industry requires that executives define a new business model. Senior executives face a number of challenges in implementing the new business and in sustaining the company's growth.
Ford Motor Co., General Motors, and DaimlerChrysler--the three original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) that dominated the automotive industry throughout the 20th century--launched Covisint in February 2000 as an industry supply chain exchange that would drive out cost and help manage the complex communications within the rigidly hierarchical industry. The Big 3 sourced entire components of cars from large Tier 1 suppliers. By limiting the number of partners and using online technologies to support collaboration and performance tracking, as well as drive out costs from the supply chain, the OEMs hoped that cycle times could be shortened and they could finally achieve a build-to-order car. A successful exchange that united the industry was vital to this vision. Covisint was founded with "borrowed" Bid 3 employees and over $250 million in funding from the OEMs. Its business model morphed several times as it raced to bring products to market and to meet the demands of its founders. The start-up burned through six CEOs in three years and now Bob Paul is considering whether to take on the CEO hot seat.
Describes IBM's decade of transformation. Provides background on the company's history and the factors that led to its near death in the early 1990s and to its remarkable turnaround during Lou Gerstner's reign as CEO. A rewritten version of an earlier case.
Slingshot Technology Inc. (STI) is a privately held software start-up founded in 1995 focused on identifying emerging spaces in the IT services industry and partnering with vendors selling promising but unproven technologies in those spaces. The vendors used STI to extend their system development and integration capabilities to deliver on aggressive deadlines, STI gained a steady stream of consulting and engineering work plus opportunities to identify and meet follow-on needs of the vendors' Fortune 1000 customers. Four years after the company was founded with $1,000, revenue had exploded to $1.9 million on the basis of partnerships with enterprise applications development and enterprise application integration vendors. In late 1998, the founder was pondering how to set up an innovative "software factory" to complement the consulting side of the business while ensuring that STI's knowledge assets and intellectual property were protected.
Slingshot Technology Inc. (STI) is a privately held software start-up founded in 1995 focused on identifying emerging spaces in the IT services industry and partnering with vendors selling promising but unproven technologies in those spaces. The vendors used STI to extend their system development and integration capabilities to deliver on aggressive deadlines, STI gained a steady stream of consulting and engineering work plus opportunities to identify and meet follow-on needs of the vendors' Fortune 1000 customers. Four years after the company was founded with $1,000, revenue had exploded to $1.9 million on the basis of partnerships with enterprise applications development and enterprise application integration vendors. In late 1998, the founder was pondering how to set up an innovative "software factory" to complement the consulting side of the business while ensuring that STI's knowledge assets and intellectual property were protected.
Slingshot Technology Inc. (STI) is a privately held software start-up founded in 1995 focused on identifying emerging spaces in the IT services industry and partnering with vendors selling promising but unproven technologies in those spaces. The vendors used STI to extend their system development and integration capabilities to deliver on aggressive deadlines, STI gained a steady stream of consulting and engineering work plus opportunities to identify and meet follow-on needs of the vendors' Fortune 1000 customers. Four years after the company was founded with $1,000, revenue had exploded to $1.9 million on the basis of partnerships with enterprise applications development and enterprise application integration vendors. In late 1998, the founder was pondering how to set up an innovative "software factory" to complement the consulting side of the business while ensuring that STI's knowledge assets and intellectual property were protected.
Set in Brazil during the period of telecommunication's privatization, CEO Manoel Amorim must define a sustainable strategy and build capabilities in his organization.
This case depicts the history of an unusual brand in the "super premium" segment of the vodka market. The top-of-line positioning is supported with creative advertising, narrow distribution, point-of-purchase advertising, and expensive advertising production. Absolut has used very expensive inserts as advertisements in print vehicles during the Christmas season. The last inserts described in the case cost approximately $1 each to manufacture and distribute via the media vehicle (The New Yorker). The case asks students to decide whether such expensive advertising should be continued and, if so, how. The societal effects of advertising alcoholic beverages and the implications of pursuing such exclusive positioning strategies may also be explored.