This case explores TecSalud's response to COVID-19 between March 2020 and January 2021. TecSalud was the Healthcare System of the Instituto Tecnologico de Monterrey. The case focuses on hospital management, but it can also be used to teach crisis management, with potential applications in other industries. The narrative highlights the leaders' challenges, critical decisions, and actions to address the pandemic, emphasizing the importance of considering key stakeholders to manage a crisis effectively. At the onset, TecSalud established a response team (the bunker) to address the pandemic. The team identified four priorities: minimize disease transmission; protect patients, healthcare staff, employees, and students; keep the healthcare system functioning; and reduce morbidity and mortality. San Jose Hospital (HSJ) was designated as TecSalud's exclusive COVID-19 treatment hospital. The case focuses on two pivotal moments when difficult decisions had to be made. In May 2020, HSJ had been operating for eight weeks with an occupancy rate of 14%, resulting in significant financial losses. The bunker leader and TecSalud's president, Guillermo Torre, decided with his team not to change course despite the risks and resistance from key stakeholders. In January 2021, at the peak of the second wave of infections in the state of Nuevo Leon, Torre, and the bunker members considered closing HSJ's doors to new COVID-19 patients because demand had exceeded the hospital's operational capacity; staffing was inadequate, personnel were exhausted and dissatisfied, and many resigned. Representatives from intensive care, medical management, nursing, and HSJ operations argued that quality of care couldn't be guaranteed, putting patients at risk. However, others argued that closing admissions to HSJ would deny care to patients with no other healthcare alternative. The case concluded on January 25, 2021, when Torre and the response team met to decide the course of action for COVID-19 patients.
The case focuses on Faan van der Walt (as protagonist), his brother Dirk, and WeBuyCars, a large second-hand car dealership in South Africa, which has become a dominant player in the market through the exploitation of blue ocean principles. WBC is a secondhand car dealership in South Africa that was established by two brothers in 2001. The company managed to thrive in an otherwise unattractive industry by firstly focusing on the space between two markets (na- mely private sellers of vehicles and dealerships), and, later on, expanding into complimentary activities and markets. By introducing activities that added value for customers and by removing transaction costs for customers, WBC created a blue ocean market for three different customer segments: sellers of cars, private buyers of cars, and dealerships that buy cars. WBC has been tremendously successful in the South African used car market; it has an extremely powerful and trusted brand and commands an 8% share. Since its establishment in 2001, WBC has grown on average by 50 to 60% per annum for the last 19 years.
The case describes the journey of Ecoflora until 2020. In 2004, the company began to focus on innovation after one of its principal customers became a direct competitor, and produced own-brand products for a niche market. Ecoflora was able to become a biotechnology innovator in an emerging country (Colombia) by intelligently leveraging the region's science and technology ecosystem, and by systematizing its R&D+I process. Althoug this hybrid company created an inclusive supply chain, management quickly found out that company commitment to this supply chain would be conditioned by the need to expand output and meet increasing demand. Ecoflora's success would depend on increasing international sales-not only to capture financial value, but also to catalyze positive social and environmental change.
The case describes the experience of Lucchetti, a company owned by the Chilean holding group Quiñenco, in its first years of operation in Peru. It begins by describing the origin and positioning of the holding company (controlled by the Luksic family) and of its subsidiary Lucchetti, and it provides context about the country and pasta industry in the target market. On the one hand, en- tering the Peruvian pasta market generated a number of effects that were not hard to anticipate: despite price slashing by the competition, Lucchetti products gained market share. In short, the company anticipated market dynamics and the business plan seemed to evolve according to plan. However, the case also describes a series of initial setbacks in the acquisition of construction licenses, which appear to have been "off the radar" in Lucchetti's early analysis. Far from being resolved, these problems increased in intensity and complexity as weeks passed. The case concludes with Lucchetti's top management facing a difficult situation: the firm needed to put its production capacity into operation in Peru to make the venture economically viable, but regulatory entanglements prevented Lucchetti from starting production in its Lima manufacturing plant.
Starting in 2001, Inditex's Sustainability Department promoted with the Group's business units a unique chain that remained largely unknown to the general public: for&from. This labor inclusion project for people with mental disorders hinged on the creation of stores in collaboration with social organizations, following a franchising scheme. Inditex made an initial investment on these stores that maintained the image and quality that characterized the Group's chains. Inditex's brands sold their excess inventory at discount prices to these social enterprises, which, in turn, marketed them at outlet prices. The project intended to build an optimal support ecosystem for people with special needs, so that they would learn about retailing jobs, strengthen their self-esteem, and eventually manage to integrate themselves into society. This scheme relied on long-term partnerships with social organizations, with which Inditex built a hybrid value chain. By 2017, the program featured 13 stores in nine towns, with over 150 mentally-challenged employees, and it engaged five social organizations -namely, Fundación Privada el Molà d'en Puigvert ("Molà Foundation"), Moltacte, Cogami, APSA, and Fundación Prodis ("Prodis Foundation)- as well as five Inditex chains -Massimo Dutti, Bershka, Stradivarius, Oysho, Pull&Bear, and Tempe (a footwear and accessory manufacturer that supplied all chains). In the ensuing years, the program grew gradually, and by 2017 Inditex realized that it needed to assess options and make critical decisions about the social venture's future. Would it prove wiser to take this program online? Should Inditex carry this scheme to other countries? Did it make more sense to expand further in Spain first? How was the program's actual impact measured? Would it be best to create multi-brand outlets? Many questions filled program heads' minds at this juncture.
The Austrian Republic School, an elementary public school in Chile, faced a severe crisis. Despite its management team and faculty's effort, the school's absenteeism and dropout rates kept rising. The solutions tried had failed to engage students and to secure their families' support. The absenteeism issue proved particularly acute for the vulnerable population served by this school and had called the attention of Chile's Education Ministry. This scenario was compounded by a financial distress: the school lacked the necessary resources to provide the additional support required by this population, such as psychological and social counseling or family engagement activities.Against such a complex backdrop, Luis Lacourt, the school's principal, caught a glimpse of a light at the end of the tunnel: a means to mitigate this problem. Chile's SEP Act offered grants to schools working with "priority" students coming from underprivileged social and financial backgrounds. Yet, access to these subsidies depended on good attendance rates. It was a catch-22-like problem: the SEP Act would enable the school to access the resources required to work on its problems, but the school would not qualify for this funding if it didn't show improvements in its key metrics. How should the school go about it? What could it do to engage families in order to lower dropout and absenteeism rate.
Papinotas is an app that allows schools to communicate with their students' parents through text messages. This social enterprise is supported by Socialab (a social innovation hub sponsored by the renowned NPO TECHO), and was created with the mission to improve Chilean and Latin American education by facilitating communication and involvement between families and educational institutions.
This case study discusses Magic: the Gathering (Magic), a collectible card game that is owned by Wizards of the Coast (Wizards), a subsidiary of Hasbro. In particular, it focuses on how Wizards manages the Magic player community and its need to learn how to respond to various kinds of consumer-generated content (CGC) created by players. Magic is a collectible card game that has seen tremendous growth since its inception in 1993. By 2015 it had 20 million players worldwide and generated annual revenue of $200 million USD. Its primary revenue stream comes from selling sealed packs of Magic cards, and it releases a new set every three months. There are various types of packs available; each contains about 15 cards. Players must use these cards to construct a 60-card deck, which they use to play head-to-head against an opponent's deck. The case study describes in detail how Wizards interacts with its community. Predominantly, the company uses social media to release news, gather feedback, and respond to issues. Particularly noteworthy are how Wizards uses Spoiler Season to increase the anticipation for new card sets, and Friday Night Magic, casual tournaments at local game stores to connect players with vendors. The player community is very diverse, both in terms of age (roughly from 12 to 45 years old) and level of engagement (from occasional/casual to tournament-level, competitive players). In addition, Magic players are drawn to the game for a variety of reasons, which is illustrated by the three player types (or personas) Timmy, Johnny and Spike. This diversity is important for Wizards to keep in mind when the company develops new products, promotes its products, organizes events, and interacts with the community.
ESSA is a Colombian electricity utility company. Its origins date back to the late nineteenth century in the Department of Santander. Its history and evolution comprise various stages. After a first State-owned phase managed by Colombian government, the regional business group Empresas PuÌblicas de MedelliÌn (EPM for its acronym in Spanish) acquired ESSA. EPM was characterized by a sound and successful corporate governance model. ESSA has always showed a deep-rooted sense of attachment to its local community (Santander), has therefore played an influential role and has had major engagement in the development of the Department of Santander. Its acquisition by a group from another Colombian region, Antioquia, confronts ESSA with a series of corporate governance dilemmas, visibly affecting daily management. The case offers the possibility of analyzing and discussing the decisions a general manager must make and the risks he must run when his personal criterion diverges from those of majority shareholders and the perceived interests of his stakeholders (critical dimension in a public utility company). Carlos Alberto GoÌmez, General Manager at ESSA (the leading character in this case), must analyze the outcome of a bidding process methodology he believes in, yet does not have the approval and full support from the parent company, EPM. He will also need to assess how to obtain financial support from ESSA to sustain and recover a regional icon: the Santander Theatre. The decision is not autonomous, as he must seek the approval from its parent headquarter located in a different department.
AMICHOCÓ Foundation was a private non-profit organization operating since 1996 in the Colombian department of Chocó, one of the poorest in the country and characterized by being largely inhabited by ethnic minorities of African origin and enjoying one of the highest levels of biodiversity in the world. The Foundation implemented productive projects that help improve the living conditions in communities within a framework of social and environmental sustainability. In this line, in 2000, the Foundation encouraged the creation of Oro Verde Corporation (hereinafter, OVC), a cross-sector alliance involving, in addition to AMICHOCÓ, three local social organizations. OVC developed the Green Gold program that considered conventional small- scale mining as a productive alternative that could be integrated to specific market niches. The case depicts the overall situation of Chocó department and the importance of the mining industry to its economy. It also describes OVC's inception and the role played by AMICHOCÓ in its creation, and provides a detailed account of the Green Gold program, with an emphasis on its value proposition: a business model that articulated traditional gold production in Chocó with green international markets. In addition, it recounts the concerns expressed by community representatives with regard to the model's efficiency and its capacity to create economic value. These concerns raised the possibility of building alliances with medium-scale private mechanized mining companies in order to enhance the model's economic impact. Exhibits provide information on the characteristics of Chocó department, social and environmental impacts of medium-scale mining, environmental conservation criteria governing the Green Gold model, and estimated economic results for conventional mining and mechanized mining operations.
Wok is a restaurant chain founded in BogotaÌ in 1998. By 2011, Wok was on its path to becoming the first "green" restaurant chain in Colombia, following its strategic decision to integrally incorporate social and environmental dimensions into its value chain. At that point, consolidating its position as the leader in sustainability required more than philanthropic decisions from senior managers. How far should that transition progress? To what extent could Wok mobilize industry players without jeopardizing its competitive positioning? Did transition benefits outweigh costs? Were the risks worthwhile?
Chile's largest wine producer faces a price versus value positioning problem. Its highest quality wines are not priced competitively at retail because "Made in Chile" connotes great value and low price.
Engaging local stakeholders and building strong relations has become a strategic imperative for multinational firms in the often politically charged mining, oil, and gas sectors. For BHP Billiton, the world's second largest mining company, its Tintaya copper mine in Peru has long been a source of intense conflict. The mine--which was owned and managed first by the Peruvian state, and later by BHP Billiton--stands on land expropriated from local subsistence farmers. In 2000, to contest this loss of land, mining-related environmental degradation, and allegations of human rights abuses, a coalition of five indigenous communities forged an alliance with a group of domestic and international NGOs (nongovernmental organizations) to build their case against BHP Billiton and pursue it directly with the company's Australian headquarters. The outcome of these efforts was the inception of a unique corporate-community negotiation process known as the Tintaya Dialogue Table. In December 2004, after three years of negotiation, BHP Billiton and the five communities signed an agreement compensating families for lost land and livelihoods, and establishing a local environmental monitoring team and community development fund. However, just as the company resolves one conflict, another group of local stakeholders emerges with new demands--demands that this time the company may not be able to meet. The conflict with this new group culminates in a violent takeover of the mine in May 2005, whereupon BHP Billiton staff are forced to shut down operations, abandon the mine site, and devise a new strategy for winning back local support.
In just a few years the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) made impressive progress toward its mission of promoting "environmentally appropriate, socially beneficial, and economically viable management of the world's forests." By 2001, 25.5 million hectares of forests in 66 countries had been certified as meeting FSC's standards for sustainable forestry. With members in 59 countries, the FSC had managed to bring forestry's mainstream close to its viewpoint, with 80% of the industry recognizing the need for third-party certification. However, by mid-2002, the formula that had brought success to the organization as a small start-up was proving inadequate to sustain the healthy growth of a global, mature, multistakeholder organization. Its management and staff were finding themselves lacking critical skills to take the organization to the next level. Some of its governing structures were paralyzing it. Serious imbalances between supply and demand of certified wood were threatening to break the organization. Moreover, competing certification schemes backed by powerful business groups were moving swiftly to capitalize on those imbalances and displace FSC as the global standard of choice for certification. Finally, the organization also suffered from a chronic financial weakness. In that context, Heiko Liedeker, FSC's executive director, is compelled to rethink the organization.