Neeraj Gupta, Principal Investment Officer at the International Finance Corporation (IFC), led the IFC team tasked with assisting the Indian government to structure water sanitation Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects along the Ganga River. India depends heavily on the river to support its agriculture and manufacturing sectors. Additionally, the river also held religious significance for Hindus. However, inadequate sewage treatment infrastructure had caused the river to become severely polluted. In the past, initiatives launched by the Government of India to clean up the river had been unsuccessful. In August 2011, the National Mission for Clean Ganga (NMCG) was established to help states reduce pollution and implement environmentally sustainable development. However, the lack of expertise and financing made progress slow and external support and advice from the World Bank and IFC was sought. In 2015, a team from the World Bank Group consulted with various stakeholders to understand the problems faced. This time, instead of using the traditional Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) Model, Gupta introduced the Hybrid Annuity Model (HAM) PPP model to address the concerns of both the government and private sector investors. The PPP structure would allow the government to save on the capital outlay as well as engage private sector expertise. The HAM structure allowed for sharing of risks between the private sector partners and the government. The HAM model was successfully trialled in a few pilot projects and Gupta hoped that it would pave the way for more similar projects along the river.

BHP, the Australian mining company that also diversified into ship chartering, has an important mission statement: "BHP's purpose is to bring people and resources together to build a better world." Rashpal Bhatti (Bhatti) Vice President of BHP's Maritime and Supply Chain Excellence (MSCE) arm endeavoured to bring this purpose to life. The case discusses BHP's efforts to reduce emissions from its chartering business by transitioning from pollutive conventional fuels to alternative fuels. Maritime transport was the backbone of the global economy. It accounted for 75% of global freight activity, with nearly 80% of globally transported goods being transported by sea, and yet it utilised only one-fifth of the energy or 225 million tonnes of oil equivalent. This made it economical to transport large volumes and weights across vast distances which led to maritime trade doubling between 1990 and 2020. Unfortunately, as maritime trade grew, so did the demand for energy-dense, inexpensive, highly pollutive fossil fuels. To reduce emissions, many in the maritime ecosystem, including BHP, explored the use of alternative fuels. Recognising that the use of alternative fuels involved convincing multiple stakeholders, first, Bhatti secured buy-in from his colleagues and team. Then, the team measured ship emissions and did not charter ships that had poor emission ratings. Next, their research found that Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) produced 30% emission abatements and was the most feasible. Finally, BHP ran tenders for LNG-fuelled ships and for LNG bunker fuel supply. The efforts paid off, and in February 2022, Mt. Tourmaline was delivered to Singapore's Jurong Port for its first LNG bunkering. Bhatti realised the entire endeavour was successful not only because of LNG fuel innovations but also due to the efforts put forward by stakeholders in the maritime industry, such as vessel owners, regulatory authorities, ship charterers and fuel suppliers.

Shantanu Bhattacharya, Professor of Operations Management at Singapore Management University (SMU), observed how waste in Singapore was incinerated before it was poured into the country's only landfill. The government wanted to maximise the country's limited land resources by using waste-to-energy (WTE) plants that would decrease the volume of waste that was deposited in landfills. Additionally, the heat generated could be used to generate electricity. In 2005, Keppel Seghers was awarded a public-private partnership (PPP) contract to develop the country's fifth WTE plant. This would be the first incineration plant in Singapore to employ technology from a local company. The PPP structure would allow the government to save on the capital outlay and capitalise on private sector expertise. Keppel Seghers would have to ensure that it would be able to provide sufficient incineration capacity. Bhattacharya supported the waste management strategy but knew the landfill had a limited lifespan. He hoped to study more innovative waste management solutions in the future.

It was April 2021, and Widjaja Suki, Director of Business Development at NetLink Trust (NLT), was contemplating on his firm's future growth and revenue prospects. NLT was the sole broadband fibre infrastructure provider in Singapore for the residential segment, and had played a key role in the country's Smart Nation initiative towards a digitally-led economy. The firm had relied on a regulatory asset base (RAB) funding model to finance its infrastructure, operations and services. However, it faced stiff competition in the non-residential segment, where telecom players with their own fibre were able to provide broadband services. As of 2020, NLT held an overwhelmingly dominant 91% share of the residential segment, but a far lower 35% share of the non-residential segment. While NLT was the only approved player for the residential market, its share in the segment was not 100%, as some of the residential customers from economically weaker sections had yet not availed broadband services. With limited growth prospects in residential and other segments, what growth strategies could NLT adopt in the coming years? How could the firm expand its business to drive more revenue? Was the RAB framework effective in delivering long-term sustainability for the firm?

In November 2020, infrastructure investment and development company InfraCo Asia Pte Ltd, investment management firm Gemcorp Capital, and Finnish development financier Finnfund's OP Finnfund Global Impact Fund I jointly financed the Indonesia Rural Wireless Broadband (IRWB) project through a senior debt facility of US$75 million. The IRWB project is expected to expand the fixed wireless broadband network of borrower Net1 Indonesia by installing 1,500 base transceiver stations (BTS) across the country, up almost five times from the existing figure of 357 BTS before the expansion commenced. The project would cover several provinces, including nine that are considered the least developed in Indonesia. It is estimated that 300,000 households, particularly those that fell between the fourth and last (i.e., poorest) quintile of the population, would benefit from the project. In deciding whether to proceed with financing the project, InfraCo Asia, which is funded by the foreign ministries of the UK, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Australia, had to take into consideration several factors: risk management, commercial viability, technology, due diligence, business model, and development impact (DI). The case examines how InfraCo Asia ensured that the decision to finance the IRWB project is a well-considered one, such that the project has a fair chance of being commercially viable while also achieving considerable DI.

Set in July 2020, this case talks about a solar park public-private partnership (PPP) project in Madhya Pradesh, India. Manu Srivastava, Chairperson of Rewa Ultra-Mega Solar Limited (RUMSL), and his team had decided to go ahead with the project without the support of viability gap funding (VGF). However, the project faced a setback when the central government lowered the solar VGF tariff by 10%, forcing RUMSL to look for innovative ways of attracting lower bids. After consultations with solar developers and potential financiers, Srivastava and his team introduced many de-risking measures like payment security mechanisms, land availability guarantee, project termination and grid unavailability compensation and tax-change risk coverage clauses in the power purchase agreement. The team also implemented innovative features like an optimum scheduling mechanism (to attract a high credit off-taker) and a data room with updates on land and internal evacuation infrastructure availability before the start of the bidding process. The overall strategy was to avoid the 'Goldilocks syndrome' and create a perfect balance between risks being transferred and known risks being accommodated. An e-reverse auction was used for the bidding process. The final tariff achieved was 40% less than the VGF tariff. RUMSL's nuts and bolts approach of process innovation motivated the central government to shift its focus from VGF to scalable market-based financing models. A "Standard Bidding Guidelines" for solar projects was introduced by the government, incorporating many features of the Rewa project.

PUB, Singapore's National Water Agency, is one of the heaviest users of the Public Private Partnership (PPP) model in the public sector. As of 2020, it had awarded seven PPP contracts for a total of five desalination and three NEWater plants. Among the key features of PUB's PPP projects were the adoption of the Design, Build, Own and Operate (DBOO) project structure; a 25-year concession period; and small-sized project teams. The main benefits which arose from these PPP projects were value for money, the introduction of new technologies and knowledge transfers, the expansion of Singapore's private water industry, and the blossoming of Singapore into a hydro hub. However, despite letting the private sector have a hand in running the water plants, PUB was of the view that its own officers had to obtain these companies' expertise, so that it could evaluate whether they were technically competent, and, in the event of a default, step in to manage the plants. To further mitigate against risks to Singapore's water supply, PUB also carried out regular operations audits, and engaged the plants' senior management regularly.

Set in January 2019, the case follows Andreas Sohmen-Pao, Executive Chairman of the BW Group, as he reflects on a fruitful year that passed and looks forward to an exciting and equally challenging year in 2019. BW, a global maritime group operating in the oil tanker, gas carrier and offshore floating infrastructure sectors, was a third-generation family-run business. Established in 2005, BW was the result of a merger of two long-standing shipping firms - Bergesen from Norway and World-Wide Shipping in Hong Kong (the latter was founded by Andreas' grandfather, Sir Yue-Kong Pao). Like many of the preceding years, BW had its share of highs and lows in 2018 too. The highlight was the successful acquisition of Hafnia Tankers by BW Tankers, a BW Group subsidiary. The eventual merger of the two would elevate BW Tankers to become the market leader in product tanker shipping with the largest commercially-managed fleet of more than 150 vessels. However, over the past few years, the tanker market as a whole had sunk into the trough of the shipping cycle. Demand for tanker chartering was unable to keep pace with faster growth in fleet capacity, forcing tanker companies to lower freight rates and leading to depressed earnings. The shipping business was widely perceived to be risky. There were not only short-term market cycles to contend with, new and longer-term challenges surfaced every now and then - such as environmental sustainability concerns (specifically the IMO2020 regulation on curbing ships' sulphur emissions), as well as opportunities and threats from technology (e.g., blockchain, artificial intelligence and cyber-attacks). Diversification had successfully enabled BW to weather challenges in the past, and its current strategy was to actively invest in diversifying and scaling up across multiple shipping segments. Andreas had to chart the way forward for BW in the coming years - how could he best navigate the oncoming headwinds?

In April 2010, the chief executive officer (CEO) of Steelworks, a Singapore-based metals company recently acquired by an Indian conglomerate, embarked on a plan to realign the organization's structure and processes across its subsidiaries. However, he had difficulty getting the long-serving general manager of a plant in China to sign off on the current year’s audited financial statements. This led to a tense and bizarre confrontation between the CEO and the regional general manager. The restructuring project was taking autonomy from regional unit heads. Was that the problem? Was Steelworks mismanaging its subsidiaries? Had the general manager of the Chinese plant, a Singaporean expatriate, been seconded to China for too long? It was unclear how a member of the senior management team who had been with Steelworks for his entire career could behave this way and jeopardize his position. What could the CEO have done differently?

In April 2010, the chief executive officer (CEO) of Steelworks, a Singapore-based metals company recently acquired by an Indian conglomerate, embarked on a plan to realign the organization's structure and processes across its subsidiaries. However, he had difficulty getting the long-serving general manager of a plant in China to sign off on the current year's audited financial statements. This led to a tense and bizarre confrontation between the CEO and the regional general manager. The restructuring project was taking autonomy from regional unit heads. Was that the problem? Was Steelworks mismanaging its subsidiaries? Had the general manager of the Chinese plant, a Singaporean expatriate, been seconded to China for too long? It was unclear how a member of the senior management team who had been with Steelworks for his entire career could behave this way and jeopardize his position. What could the CEO have done differently?