This 2014 case discusses the U.S. nonprofit organization B Lab and its mission to support and help drive investment capital toward private enterprises that 1) aim to provide social and environmental benefits, and 2) are accountable to stakeholders (such as employees and their community) in addition to their equity investors. B Lab created robust tools for assessing the impact of these enterprises so that the social and environmental Return on Investment could be measured and evaluated in a consistent, comparable and transparent fashion. The tools were based on a 200-point assessment scheme called the B Impact Assessment. In addition, B Lab created a certification called "B Corp," which identified companies that considered diverse stakeholder interest in its definition of corporate and fiduciary responsibility. B Lab also created and championed a new legal form, the Benefit organization, which supported those organizations. Through these activities, B Lab played an important role in the relatively new practice of impact investing, which seeks to generate positive social or environmental value alongside financial returns. In 2014 the eight-year-old company was at a strategic crossroads. Many organizations found the B Lab assessment process to be burdensome, and the investment markets were showing a lack of interest, if not resistance to, using B Lab's measurement systems. Many market participants wanted to focus only on specific parts of B Lab's assessment, or wanted more customized tools to suit data collection for their own existing metrics. However, enabling investors to do that would make it harder for B Lab to create common standards - a key part of the organization's mission. B Lab's leaders were grappling with the issue of how far to go to meet the market with highly customized products and services that investors were demanding, versus how much B Lab should lead the market to a higher bar for measuring impact.
Since its founding in 1980, Ashoka: Innovators for the Public had supported the work of over 3,000 of the world's most visionary social entrepreneurs; men and women who, in Ashoka founder Bill Drayton's words, are tireless pioneers of "system-changing solutions that advance the world's most urgent social problems." Through these efforts, Ashoka was also widely credited with building the larger field of social entrepreneurship. And yet, just at the moment when Ashoka's dynamism had propelled social entrepreneurship into the mainstream, Drayton and his colleagues embraced an even more expansive view of social change. According to this new vision, everyone in society, not only the most path-breaking social entrepreneurs, could and should be "changemakers" (the EACH vision). Drayton believed that this shift was such a "fundamental change, that it affects everything;" the revolution went far beyond Ashoka, to include not only the basic architecture of organizations -a move from walled hierarchies to teams of teams- but also the generative sources of knowledge and information which could be open sourced and widely shared. This case traces the evolution of Ashoka's mission and vision for social change, and the programmatic and organizational changes required to accommodate the EACH worldview.
Outlines the recent development of legal principles regarding sexual harassment, including procedures in the United States and state courts, what circumstances constitute harassment, the resolution of these conflicts and the resulting consequences for the individuals involved and the organizations in which those individuals work.
Explores the legal and ethical responsibilities of a manager who believes that he has heard of a serious instance of sexual harassment, but who has been implored by the victim not to report it. Discussion can focus on the immediate problem or be expanded to a broader analysis of the difficult choices involved in crafting organizational policies governing conduct, as well as effective procedures for reviewing apparent infractions.
In 1987, Komatsu Ltd., looking to expand its presence in the U.S. earth-moving equipment (EME) industry, enters into a 50-50 joint venture with Dresser. The management of the Komatsu Dresser joint venture faces difficulty in bringing the two halves together. The rift between the dealership networks of the two parent companies reflects dissension within the organization. Even as management is trying to come to grips with the internal problems, the industry confronts a severe recession. A rewritten version of earlier cases.
The saga of Disney's efforts to build a theme park in Manassas, Va. in the early 1990s is told. Disney's strategy against the various opponents of the project is presented.
Disney's first foray into an urban environment, is the restoration and development of the landmark New Amsterdam Theater in New York's Times Square. Disney must negotiate with the city, state, and various nonprofit organizations focused on the redevelopment of Times Square.
Walt Disney is contemplating sites for a new theme park, building on the success of Disneyland in Anaheim. The focus is on Disney's strategy for land negotiation and acquisition, which is informed by his experience with the Anaheim park.
Vermeer engineers work at the breakneck pace of "Internet time" to develop the next version of their software product, winning accolades from Microsoft management. Even before this version ships, however, they are faced with another punishing development schedule for the next release, leading some to question the development process and the pressure it imposes on the developers.
The Vermeer team is pleasantly surprised by the benefits and hospitality that their new surroundings offer. Their happiness is tempered, however, by discomfort with some elements of the "Microsoft Way." As the Vermeer engineers embark on a punishing schedule for the next release of their product, the Microsoft executives wonder whether the Vermeer team will be able to deliver on its promise.
Microsoft has acquired Vermeer, and Vermeer executives are both excited and concerned as they prepare to move to Redmond. Even though the acquisition has been financially rewarding, the Vermeer engineers worry how well they will adapt to their new home. Meanwhile, Chris Peters, their new boss, is trying to ensure a smooth integration of the Vermeer team into the Microsoft organization.
The success of the Vermeer software offering suddenly transforms the start-up into a sought after company. After arduous negotiations, Vermeer management is faced with the choice of continuing as an independent company or being acquired by Microsoft or Netscape.
The Vermeer team works day and night to develop its software offering, unforeseen difficulties and internal tensions notwithstanding. In less than a year, the product is ready. The Vermeer team waits anxiously for the market to pronounce its verdict.
The case opens with a discussion of the evolution of the private branch exchange industry in the 1970s and 1980s. It follows the path of Rolm from an independent company to an IBM acquisition and its problem as an IBM division. Then describes Siemens' growing interest in the U.S. PBX market. At the end IBM and Siemens are negotiating over Rolm's future.