Legal policy has a long history of protecting confidentiality of negotiations that are designed to produce settlement. However, within the past several decades there has been a significant push toward openness. Compelling arguments support confidentiality: It helps promote candid discussion when sensitive material is involved and may make settlements possible. On the other hand, ethical concern where public health and safety are involved has prompted some states to pass laws requiring the disclosure of settlement agreements or to revise their procedures governing confidentiality of discovery, protective orders, and sealing of litigation records. This case summarizes the legal and ethical debate. It identifies the major issues surrounding confidentiality in settlement negotiations and illustrates them with several examples.
This case highlights an application of current thoughts in complexity science to negotiation theory. It emphasizes a provocative approach that questions much of traditional negotiation research thus far. The case explains the roots of complexity science and some broad ideas and definitions, such as linearity versus nonlinearity, feedback loops, and chaos. It turns to a subset of complexity science--the study of complex adaptive systems. These systems have interactive feedback loops and critical junctures that affect the future course of the system. Also, they are highly adaptive and creative. Negotiations are complex, adaptive systems and should be studied at the micro, interactional scale. Five key lessons are drawn: 1) seemingly simple negotiations can take surprisingly different paths; 2) situations that appear complex may be driven by only a few key factors; 3) large patterns are often reflected in small ones; 4) complex adaptive systems, like negotiation, are not utterly random, yet neither do they have a fixed equilibrium; and 5) creativity is spawned at the chaotic edge.
In 1997, MIT freshman Scott Kruger died from alcohol poisoning after a ritual fraternity ceremony. His death sparked national controversy over the responsibility of universities for their students. For his parents, though, the pain was personal and almost solely directed at the leadership of MIT. In such an emotionally charged situation, it is remarkable that the lawyers on both sides came to a settlement.
Military metaphors are commonplace in business writing about strategy, but they are rarely used in the negotiation literature. This case takes the Marine Corps philosophy of warfighting and compares it with the tactics and techniques of effective negotiators. Some of the characteristics of war--such as friction, imperfect information and communication, fluidity, and disorder--are also parts of negotiations. Likewise, some of the techniques military strategists use, like exploiting gaps in the enemy's lines and using boldness and speed to surprise the enemy, can also work for negotiators. Most critically, however, this case applies the notion of complexity to both warfare and negotiation and introduces students to the ideas of continual adaptation and dynamic responses to changing environments.
This case presents a transcript of two professional negotiators of the Discount and Hawkins real estate negotiations. It highlights the challenges of creating value for both sides in the deal and provides a glimpse of how one set of professionals structured an agreement.
GE's chief litigation counsel sought to rationalize litigation flow by viewing it as a manufacturing process. By applying the principles of Six Sigma, P.D. Villareal created an Early Dispute Resolution (EDR) system that enabled both lawyers and managers to work together to address potential disputes early and efficiently. Though the savings in time and energy were tremendous and obvious, evaluating the financial savings proved trickier. Also on the horizon was the challenge of spreading the program throughout the enormous GE global organization.
Early Dispute Resolution (EDR) has proved successful at GE. Yet, when Michael McIlwrath, new counsel at an Italian subsidiary, attempted to translate it to his company, problems arose. He had to gain internal acceptance, and explain the concept of early mediation to a European culture not accustomed to the practice. This case examines the successes and challenges of translating an American dispute resolution program to an overseas context and explores four studies of litigation cases facing McIlwrath.
Discusses U.S. and Japanese innovation systems. Illustrates these with comparative studies of computer and pharmaceutical industries. Probes effects of labor, capital, and customer market institutions on these sectors in the United States and Japan.
Ethan Berman, CEO of J.P. Morgan's risk management spinoff, has grown RiskMetrics Group (RMG) from a small team of 30 to a 70-person firm contemplating an IPO. Along the way, the consensus-based decision-making process that he espoused started to prove unwieldy; his personal and informal managerial style also could not meet the growing demands on his time. More senior managers were needed--but who? Could the unique, informal culture of the group be maintained as it grew into a mid-sized firm? How should Berman go about making these decisions?
Staples.com, the online unit of the U.S. office supplies retailing chain Staples, faces a range of strategic and organizational issues as it accelerates its growth. Should it pursue only existing Staples customers or consumers who do not shop in Staples stores? How quickly should it add services (e.g. legal, payroll, accounting) to its product offering? Which operating functions should be shared between the online units and the core business? Should Staples.com be spun off as a tracking stock?
Online broker DLJdirect faced two decisions during the fall of 1999: what customer segments should it target and how much should it spend on marketing? Unlike its competitors, who focused either on day traders or more mainstream investors, DLJdirect differentiated its service to meet the needs of self-directed, sophisticated, high net worth investors. But was DLJdirect forfeiting profits by not pursuing day traders? In the coming year, the ten largest online brokers were projected to spend $1.5 billion on marketing; E*Trade would lead the pack with a $300 million budget. DLJdirect was planning to spend $65 million on marketing in 1999, a 250% increase over the prior year. But would increased ad spending yield a positive long-term return as the marketing costs per new account doubled? And as advertising battles intensified, was a $65 million marketing budget big enough to allow DLJdirect to sustain its competitive position?