Hefu Catering Management Co. Ltd. (Hefu) was founded in 2012 as a high-end Chinese noodle chain brand. Its mission was to promote Chinese culture through Chinese fast food on a global scale. In 2018, Hefu experienced significant demand growth. To ensure a steady supply of safe, fresh, and organic foods, Hefu established a centralized kitchen in Nantong, Jiangsu Province, serving 300 restaurants in nearby cities. As Hefu expanded into North and Central China, it faced challenges in delivering fresh food from the centralized kitchen to meet the demands of all its restaurants.
This case study focuses on the digital transformation strategy of Tsingtao Brewery in the Chinese beer market. Tsingtao Brewery is one of the oldest and most famous beer brands in China. However, this legacy brewery company also faces challenges, such as fierce competition, slow market growth, and consumption upgrading. To respond to the changes of consumer demand and industry competition, Tsingtao Brewery accelerates its digital end-to-end supply chain in various aspects, such as procurement, production, logistics, and marketing. During its digital transformation, did Tsingtao Brewery choose outsourcing digital technologies, applying the Blue Ocean Strategy, or centralizing its organization? These dilemmas were awaiting answers.
Shen Peng founded Beijing Zongqing Forward Technology Co (Waterdrop) in Beijing, China, in 2016. After more than three years of development, Waterdrop began to provide health-care funding solutions and insurance services to the public through three business subsidiaries: Waterdrop Mutual Aid, Waterdrop Medical Crowdfunding, and Waterdrop Insurance. Waterdrop had become a leading domestic insurance and health-care service platform in China. However, a potential business risk emerged for Waterdrop Mutual Aid. The increasingly stringent regulatory policies of the mutual aid sector in China could impact profits. At the same time, Waterdrop Medical Crowdfunding was unable to generate revenue, and profits from Waterdrop Insurance were struggling to support the Waterdrop parent company. The profitability of Waterdrop’s three subsidiaries was weak and the company found itself in a challenging financial position on December 31, 2020. The company reported a net loss of US$90 million for the year, reflecting its ongoing financial difficulties. In the face of this combined crisis, Shen considered closing Waterdrop Mutual Aid and expanding into the clinical trial patient recruitment industry. The idea had received mixed reactions from the company’s executives. Given Waterdrop’s financial difficulties, should Shen proceed with closing Waterdrop Mutual Aid and venture into clinical trial patient recruitment?
Despite Tims China already operating more than 800 stores, the coffee company was still at a disadvantage in terms of store numbers. An urgent issue that the chief executive officer and his management team needed to resolve was how to rapidly expand to achieve economies of scale: Should they stick to company-owned stores to maintain absolute control over quality, or open up to franchising to rapidly expand their footprint?
Most CEOs take a narrow, tactical view of pricing and delegate pricing to lower levels of the organization. This myopic approach is costly, as it prevents companies from realizing their potential. In the hands of the best-run companies, pricing is not a battlefield tactic to win a particular competitive skirmish but a transformative long-term strategy for sustained competitive advantage. We present an agenda of six specific action items that defines how to unlock the power of pricing. CEOs and senior executives, our research suggests, should not set prices, but instead, they should create the context, the capabilities, the behaviors, the infrastructure, and the aspirations that enable their organization to excel in pricing.
Ucommune was the first co-working space operator in China to submit a prospectus to the US Securities and Exchange Commission. As its basic business, Ucommune provided co-working spaces for members and customers, and gradually formed two specific space operation models: the self-operated model and the asset-light model. Ucommune also offered members comprehensive value-added services and promoted the development of a service business by establishing a service ecosystem. Constant exploration of the co-working space industry had enabled Ucommune to create a unique business model and, through its creation, positively change the industry's old model. Although it had reached certain goals, Ucommune still faced challenges, including problems with achieving profitability, fierce competition, and dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic. To transcend the current obstacles, In early 2020, Ucommune had to consider how to further adjust and optimize the business model.
Ucommune was the first co-working space operator in China to submit a prospectus to the US Securities and Exchange Commission. As its basic business, Ucommune provided co-working spaces for members and customers, and gradually formed two specific space operation models: the self-operated model and the asset-light model. Ucommune also offered members comprehensive value-added services and promoted the development of a service business by establishing a service ecosystem. Constant exploration of the co-working space industry had enabled Ucommune to create a unique business model and, through its creation, positively change the industry's old model. Although it had reached certain goals, Ucommune still faced challenges, including problems with achieving profitability, fierce competition, and dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic. To transcend the current obstacles, In early 2020, Ucommune had to consider how to further adjust and optimize the business model.
On May 2, 2019, So-Young International Inc. (So-Young) became the first Chinese Internet-based company in the cosmetic surgery sector to be listed on the Nasdaq Stock Market. With effective use of the Internet and mobile devices, So-Young provided a one-stop resource that allowed consumers to access information about cosmetic treatments, search for and purchase cosmetic surgery services, and benefit from peer and professional support during recovery. With its service, So-Young had positively transformed a fast-growing Chinese cosmetic surgery market that was lacking transparency and trustworthy information.<br><br>The company had used a process of enterprise business model innovation to build its brand image, expand its audience, and engage the cosmetic surgery industry value chain. While the process had been successful, So-Young faced competitive and internal challenges that it needed to overcome to maintain its leadership position and grow future prospects.
On May 2, 2019, So-Young International Inc. (So-Young) became the first Chinese Internet-based company in the cosmetic surgery sector to be listed on the Nasdaq Stock Market. With effective use of the Internet and mobile devices, So-Young provided a one-stop resource that allowed consumers to access information about cosmetic treatments, search for and purchase cosmetic surgery services, and benefit from peer and professional support during recovery. With its service, So-Young had positively transformed a fast-growing Chinese cosmetic surgery market that was lacking transparency and trustworthy information. The company had used a process of enterprise business model innovation to build its brand image, expand its audience, and engage the cosmetic surgery industry value chain. While the process had been successful, So-Young faced competitive and internal challenges that it needed to overcome to maintain its leadership position and grow future prospects.
By 2018, NIO Inc. was more than just a car company. By providing high-performance smart electric vehicles and the ultimate user experience, NIO had shown its commitment to creating a pleasant lifestyle for its users and creating a worldwide “user brand.” Based on mobile Internet thinking, NIO created its own unique business model with the user experience at its core.<br><br>Unlike Tesla Inc., NIO took only four years from its inception to its launch, while Tesla spent about seven years to achieve this. While NIO and Tesla were often equated, NIO’s founder, Ben Li, specifically differentiated NIO from Tesla with his powerful statement that “becoming the world’s most user-satisfied company is more important than revenue.” To achieve this great value proposal, NIO had to develop its own business model.
By 2018, NIO Inc. was more than just a car company. By providing high-performance smart electric vehicles and the ultimate user experience, NIO had shown its commitment to creating a pleasant lifestyle for its users and creating a worldwide "user brand." Based on mobile Internet thinking, NIO created its own unique business model with the user experience at its core. Unlike Tesla Inc., NIO took only four years from its inception to its launch, while Tesla spent about seven years to achieve this. While NIO and Tesla were often equated, NIO's founder, Ben Li, specifically differentiated NIO from Tesla with his powerful statement that "becoming the world's most user-satisfied company is more important than revenue." To achieve this great value proposal, NIO had to develop its own business model.
In the face of rising business complexity and competitive pressure, many firms succumb to price pressures and enter pricing wars. Others focus on creating, quantifying, and capturing pricing power from their market. Since 2011, with help from Warren Buffet and Jim Cramer, Wall Street financial analysts have begun paying close attention to firms with great pricing power. But what is pricing power? How do firms know whether they have it? And how does it affect profit? This research, based on a survey of 128 organizations, identifies and validates the drivers of pricing power and its impact on firm performance. In this article, I create and validate a pricing power assessment instrument that firms can use to get started. This article offers practical recommendations for go-to-market functions on how to start the pricing power discussion, how to measure it, and how to operationalize it.
On April 20, 2016, printer and ink maker Lexmark International, Inc. (Lexmark) announced that it was being acquired and taken private by a consortium comprising China-based computer hardware company Apex Technology Co., Ltd. (Apex), as well as private equity firms PAG Asia Capital (PAG) and Legend Capital (Legend). On the same day, Apex formally announced its acquisition of Lexmark for the Chinese capital market. The announcement caused a huge sensation because Apex was a small company compared to Lexmark; Lexmark completed 2015 with US$3.6 billion in revenue—approximately 10 times the revenue of Apex. To raise enough money to pay for the acquisition, Apex had established the consortium with PAG and Legend, and borrowed a large sum of money from its controlling shareholder and banks. Although Apex had ultimately raised enough money to complete the acquisition, its satisfaction over this success soon gave way to pressing questions about financing. In order to dispel the doubts of regulators and the market, Apex needed to decide whether it should adjust its financing plan for the acquisition, and if so, how.