In December 2003, Paolo Rocca, chairman and CEO of Tenaris S.A., could look back on a momentous first year for the company. Much had been accomplished since the formation of this leading global supplier of seamless steel pipe and related services in December 2002 via an exchange of the shares and American Depository Receipts of three separately listed pipe companies--Siderca in Argentina, Tamsa in Mexico, and Dalmine in Italy--for shares in the new company. The new company had eight manufacturing facilities variously located in South and North America, Europe, and Asia and distribution and sales centers present in over 20 countries. It enjoyed annual sales of $3.1 billion to the oil and gas, energy, and mechanical industries, a market-leading 19% share globally in seamless OCTG pipes (sold to the oil and gas industry), with particularly strong market shares in a number of national OCTG markets where it had local manufacturing. Despite these accomplishments, Tenaris faced challenges ahead as it sought to transform itself strategically and organizationally. Faced with a mature seamless steel pipe market, Rocca looked to further geographic expansion and a move into service provision to maintain growth and consolidate its market position. Both of these would require new skills and new ways of managing, especially on the human resources side. Building on the legal unification to transform Tenaris' 14,500 employees from eight heritage companies into one centrally aligned, unified operation was also proving to be a major managerial challenge as the company sought to realize the potential advantages of a sophisticated new organizational design. Further, the new organization needed to generate significant cost savings from the consolidation. What should Rocca expect from himself and his managers in the face of these changes? How would they need to manage differently in a unified global organization?

Nokia Corp. is a global telecommunications company that, in eight years, went from a near-bankrupt conglomerate to a global leader in mobile telephony, delivering almost 30% annual compound growth in revenues during 1992-2000, while shedding businesses that had accounted for almost 90% of its 1998 shares. By spring 2000, Nokia had the highest margins in the mobile phone industry, a negative debt-equity ratio, the most valuable non-U.S. brand in the world, Europe's highest market capitalization, a presence in 140 countries, and unique corporate structures, processes, and culture that gave it the feel of "a small company soul in a big corporate body." Along with growth in size and diversity, however, came growth in complexity. Nokia had to develop multiple businesses and technologies (while dealing with the great technological uncertainties that were inherent in the convergence of mobile telephony and the Internet). It also had to manage a growing network of alliances and a number of acquisitions, mostly in the United States. This case provides the background to the issues Nokia faces as it considers how to meet these challenges while maintaining its unique company values and way of working that made it possible to execute efficiently while continuing to innovate.

In 1997, Novo Nordisk was one of two leading firms globally in the diabetes-care industry, dominating the business outside the United States but struggling to win market share there. It was formed in 1989 from a merger of two Danish firms that had previously competed fiercely. In the early 1990s, communications difficulties between its American operations and headquarters in Denmark led to its failing to adapt to changing U.S. Food and Drug Administration regulations. It was forced to withdraw the product it had made for the U.S. market and to inform its customers there that they would have to obtain their needed medicine from its main competitor. This case describes the company's organizational responses to this crisis. These centered on a reaffirmation of values; a definition of a new "Novo Nordisk Way of Management (NNWoM)," embodying a list of "Fundamentals"; and the creation of a group of facilitators whose role was to ensure that units adhered to the NNWoM.

On Monday, November 16, 1998, the day before Daimler-Benz would officially merge with Chrysler, Dr. Kurt Lauk, head of Daimler-Benz' commercial vehicles division (CVD) reflected on the organizational changes he had directed over the course of the previous two years to make CVD more competitive in an era of industry-wide globalization. To unite an extremely decentralized organizational structure at Daimler, Lauk initiated a worldwide reorganization and the integration of the company's manufacturing operations. He encouraged individual units within CVD to look for collaborative opportunities that would enable the division to realize global scale economies. Although Lauk promoted a global perspective within CVD, he believed that the business units could compete effectively only if they were allowed considerable autonomy to respond to their own unique market conditions. Lauk was proud of the achievements resulting from these directives. However, pressing concerns overshadowed his satisfaction. Although the CVD was profitable overall, its Power Train Unit continued to lose money. In addition, Lauk was concerned about Daimler's progress in building adequate distribution channels in the Asian region. Finally, Lauk considered the impact of the merger with Chrysler on CVD and the general uncertainty concerning how a more centralized organization would affect the CVD.

During the 1990s, CEMEX went from being a purely domestic producer of cement and ready mix in Mexico to the third largest firm in the rapidly globalizing cement industry, with operations in North and South America, Western Europe, and Southeast Asia, as well as a large trading operation. CEMEX's first moves to internationalize itself, by exporting to the United States, fell afoul of an antidumping ruling. It then began a series of acquisitions, first in Spain and then in Central and South America. This case describes the acquisitions and the process of post-merger acquisition. It raises the issue of whether the economic crisis in Southeast Asia presents opportunities for further expansion. Can be used to examine the logic and process of internationalization in a commodity business and the selection of markets to enter. Can also be used to examine the basis for globalization of what many would think of as a very local business. Finally, it presents an opportunity to examine the logic of global competitive moves, as CEMEX's entry into Spain, which was intended explicitly to counter a European rival's aggressive expansion in Mexico.

In 1992-93, British Petroleum plc, Britain's fourth-largest of the great international integrated oil companies, faced a major crisis. The company was experiencing its first losses in its eighty-year history, while morale was battered by downsizing and organizational upheaval.

In the 1990s, many international brewers sought to enter the Chinese beer market, using a variety of strategies that differed in geographic and market segment choices, the use of alliances, importing versus local production, acquisitions versus greenfield site development, marketing mix, and more. This case describes the Chinese beer market and industry and the strategies adopted by several leading participants. Can be used to examine alternative strategies for entering emerging country, consumer goods markets. Can also be used to examine how standard "five-forces" industry and competitor analysis must be adapted to deal with emerging economies with ill-functioning markets, poor infrastructure, highly changeable government policies, and weak legal systems.

British Petroleum (BP) had very profitable years in 1996 and l997. However, CEO John Browne knew that BP could not rest on its laurels. In Browne's view, the company's ability to compete was based on the extent to which it could foster learning across units.

An agreement signed in 1993 allowed AT&T to re-enter the Chinese telecommunications equipment market. Bill Warwick, the CEO of AT&T China, faces three interrelated challenges in building a business there. The first is how to compete with established, lower-cost rivals in a market with fierce price competition. Second is how to achieve coordination among AT&T's very independent business units to serve the Chinese market. Third is what role to take in the debate about linking renewal of China's most-favored-nation status to its human rights record. In the background is the issue of whether AT&T ought to be in China.

Focuses on the auto supply industry and especially the relations between Johnson Controls (JCI) Automotive Systems Group's Georgetown plant and its main customer, Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Toyota's U.S. assembly plant, for which JCI supplies seats on a just-in-time basis. Can be used to investigate the differing patterns of supplier relations that were traditional in the U.S. and Japanese auto industries, to examine the adaptations that Toyota made to its traditional methods to deal with a U.S. supplier, and to study the very high degree of coordination and cooperation that is achieved between the two companies. JCI's adoption of a version of the Toyota Production System is also discussed.