Vertu Corporation Limited (Vertu), a manufacturer and retailer of luxury mobile phones, was founded as a subsidiary of Nokia in 2000. It was later acquired by a Swedish private equity firm in 2012, and then sold to Godin Holdings in 2015. Despite these multiple corporate ownership transitions, Vertu had remained uniquely positioned, differentiated by its phones’ bejewelled embellishments and a worldwide concierge service available at the touch of a button. The luxury phones were sought after by ultra-high net worth individuals as instantly recognizable status symbols akin to luxury watches. However, in the early 2000s, the introduction of luxury-priced, full-featured iPhones; the decline of conspicuous consumption among ultra-high net worth individuals after the financial crisis; and the anticorruption movement in Asia rendered Vertu’s business model unsustainable. Or was it? In July 2017, Vertu’s new owner faced a critical decision upon the liquidation of Vertu. Should he sell or license the remaining brand assets to a luxury brand owner or retrench in China to focus on existing customers without taking into consideration the ethical and reputational implications to the brand in the rest of the world?

Vertu Corporation Limited (Vertu), a manufacturer and retailer of luxury mobile phones, was founded as a subsidiary of Nokia in 2000. It was later acquired by a Swedish private equity firm in 2012, and then sold to Godin Holdings in 2015. Despite these multiple corporate ownership transitions, Vertu had remained uniquely positioned, differentiated by its phones' bejewelled embellishments and a worldwide concierge service available at the touch of a button. The luxury phones were sought after by ultra-high net worth individuals as instantly recognizable status symbols akin to luxury watches. However, in the early 2000s, the introduction of luxury-priced, full-featured iPhones; the decline of conspicuous consumption among ultra-high net worth individuals after the financial crisis; and the anticorruption movement in Asia rendered Vertu's business model unsustainable. Or was it? In July 2017, Vertu's new owner faced a critical decision upon the liquidation of Vertu. Should he sell or license the remaining brand assets to a luxury brand owner or retrench in China to focus on existing customers without taking into consideration the ethical and reputational implications to the brand in the rest of the world?

In 2016, the founder and sole owner of Mobiado, a Canadian line of luxury mobile phones, was evaluating his company’s marketing strategy. Proud of what he had achieved and passionate about his role as designer of one of the most unique and distinctive product lines in the category, he reflected on how he might need to adjust his company’s strategies to fit current trends and to remain competitive. Could the Mobiado product line continue to succeed by offering exclusive precision-engineered mobile instruments without the latest smartphone features? Would the new breed of luxury consumers continue to value form over function?

In 2016, the founder and sole owner of Mobiado, a Canadian line of luxury mobile phones, was evaluating his company's marketing strategy. Proud of what he had achieved and passionate about his role as designer of one of the most unique and distinctive product lines in the category, he reflected on how he might need to adjust his company's strategies to fit current trends and to remain competitive. Could the Mobiado product line continue to succeed by offering exclusive precision-engineered mobile instruments without the latest smartphone features? Would the new breed of luxury consumers continue to value form over function?

Swedish camera manufacturer Hasselblad was founded in 1841. The brand reached new heights in 1969, when astronaut Neil Armstrong used a Hasselblad camera to take the first photos on the moon. For decades, Hasselblad was renowned for making the world’s best high-end, medium format cameras for professional photographers. Faced with the paradigm shift from film-based to digital imaging, the company launched digital cameras and also diversified into the luxury digital camera market through a strategic partnership with Sony. On November 5, 2015, Hasselblad announced a minority stake investment by Shenzhen-based DJI, a global market-leader in aerial camera photography. Changes to Hasselblad were inevitable. Was Hasselblad poised to take its core competency in medium format photography to the next level?

Swedish camera manufacturer Hasselblad was founded in 1841. The brand reached new heights in 1969, when astronaut Neil Armstrong used a Hasselblad camera to take the first photos on the moon. For decades, Hasselblad was renowned for making the world's best high-end, medium format cameras for professional photographers. Faced with the paradigm shift from film-based to digital imaging, the company launched digital cameras and also diversified into the luxury digital camera market through a strategic partnership with Sony. On November 5, 2015, Hasselblad announced a minority stake investment by Shenzhen-based DJI, a global market-leader in aerial camera photography. Changes to Hasselblad were inevitable. Was Hasselblad poised to take its core competency in medium format photography to the next level?

For French watchmaker Pequignet, its return to the annual luxury watch and jewelry show, Baselworld, signaled a new page in the company’s 40-year history. As the only “haute horlogerie” manufacturer in France since the quartz crisis in the 1970s, Pequignet had caught the attention of both the media and the watch collector community, despite going through receivership and a change of ownership. In addition to showcasing its Calibre Royal collection, Pequignet presented a new line of entry-level watches. Should the company invest further in its manufacturing processes to make high-end mechanical watches, as it had in the past? Or should it focus on producing more affordable, accessible products, as with its most recent collection? As an independent atelier, Pequignet had to address these questions in order to succeed in the highly competitive global watch market.

For French watchmaker Pequignet, its return to the annual luxury watch and jewelry show, Baselworld, signaled a new page in the company's 40-year history. As the only "haute horlogerie" manufacturer in France since the quartz crisis in the 1970s, Pequignet had caught the attention of both the media and the watch collector community, despite going through receivership and a change of ownership. In addition to showcasing its Calibre Royal collection, Pequignet presented a new line of entry-level watches. Should the company invest further in its manufacturing processes to make high-end mechanical watches, as it had in the past? Or should it focus on producing more affordable, accessible products, as with its most recent collection? As an independent atelier, Pequignet had to address these questions in order to succeed in the highly competitive global watch market.

In the summer of 2014, the founder and sole owner of F.P. Journe, a maker of luxury watches, sat in his Geneva headquarters and wondered about the future. Founded in 1999, the private company had 125 employees and a strictly limited production of 850 to 900 watches per year. It was a well-respected brand that was distributed globally through a network of company-owned boutiques and third-party jewellery stores. Its exclusively designed and individually manufactured products were prized by collectors and had won many awards and distinctions. However, the “haute horology” market had become increasingly competitive. Was producing 95 per cent of all watch components in-house a good idea? Should he scale up his business through mergers and acquisitions or by increasing the company’s online presence? Or should he rest on his laurels and preserve the status quo?

In the summer of 2014, the founder and sole owner of F.P. Journe, a maker of luxury watches, sat in his Geneva headquarters and wondered about the future. Founded in 1999, the private company had 125 employees and a strictly limited production of 850 to 900 watches per year. It was a well-respected brand that was distributed globally through a network of company-owned boutiques and third-party jewellery stores. Its exclusively designed and individually manufactured products were prized by collectors and had won many awards and distinctions. However, the "haute horology" market had become increasingly competitive. Was producing 95 per cent of all watch components in-house a good idea? Should he scale up his business through mergers and acquisitions or by increasing the company's online presence? Or should he rest on his laurels and preserve the status quo?

Nokia, headquartered in Finland, was a global telecommunications equipment manufacturer. It operated Vertu, a luxury mobile phone brand that had pioneered the luxury mobile phone market in the late 1990s by using precious materials such as diamonds, sapphires, titanium, and exotic leather for phone production. The company had enjoyed impressive growth in almost 70 countries and had sold hundreds of thousands of phones in the eight years since its launch. On February 11, 2011, Stephen Elop, the new CEO of Nokia, announced a new mobile strategy to adopt Microsoft’s new but unproven Windows Phone as its primary smartphone operating system. The market reacted poorly, and the company’s share price took a 14 per cent dive on the day of announcement. How should Vertu respond to this new Nokia mobile strategy? Was Vertu well positioned to take the brand forward under the new Nokia? Should this U.K.-based wholly owned subsidiary be left alone and continue to be managed at arm’s length from Nokia? Changes to Vertu were inevitable — it was not a matter of if, but when.

Finland-headquartered Nokia was a global telecommunications equipment manufacturer. It operated a luxury mobile phone brand called Vertu, founded by Frank Nuovo in the late 1990s, which pioneered the luxury mobile phone market by using precious materials such as diamonds, sapphires, titanium and exotic leather for phone production. The company enjoyed impressive growth in almost 70 countries, and sold hundreds of thousands of phones in the eight years following its launch. On February 11, 2011, Stephen Elop, the new CEO who had been at the helm at Nokia for only five months, announced a new mobile strategy to adopt Microsoft's new but unproven Windows Phone as its primary smartphone operating system. The market reacted poorly, and the company's share price took a 14 per cent dive on the day of announcement. How should Vertu respond to this new Nokia mobile strategy? Was Vertu well positioned to take the brand forward under the new Nokia? Should this UK-based wholly owned subsidiary be left alone and continue to be managed at arm's length from Nokia? Changes to Vertu were inevitable-it was not a matter of if, but of when.