By 2017, pervasive mobile connectivity and the rise of the on-demand economy resulted in an explosion of businesses attempting to fulfill immediate consumer demand in the food delivery market. A broad, secular shift was occurring: Online or mobile orders were rapidly replacing the traditional method of picking up the phone to call in takeout and delivery orders. Still, concerns began to arise as market participants struggled to raise funding amid an uncertain investing climate in 2016. Meanwhile, despite rapid consolidation amongst industry players, the market remained highly competitive with up to a half-dozen players vying for customer attention in some locations. In addition, the arrival of logistics platforms, Uber and Amazon, into the food delivery space posed a serious competitive threat, while companies in segments not in direct competition, such as local delivery platform Postmates, continued to chip away at market share. As a result, questions arose regarding the long-term profitability of food delivery businesses. Specifically, observers wondered whether the businesses could make money, who was best positioned in the marketplace, and what aspects of each business model would prove to be an essential competitive edge. This case examines the challenges facing the on-demand food delivery market. It provides a brief history of food delivery, an industry overview, a summary of predominant food delivery models and predominant U.S. food delivery companies, an in-depth look at industry trends, and a brief view toward the future of online food delivery.

In early 2017, camera manufacturer GoPro stunned investors by reporting its first recorded annual profit loss and a revenue forecast that sharply missed analyst estimates. What had once been widely heralded as one of the biggest initial public offerings of 2014, tripling in price in just over three months following the June IPO, the stock had tumbled 90.7 percent by the end of 2016. A series of camera pricing mistakes, altered product release schedules, and lower marketing spend, set against a backdrop of relative market saturation, negatively impacted demand for GoPro cameras. In fiscal year 2016 alone, units shipped and revenues both declined by nearly 30 percent, a remarkable reversal from the early days, when revenues more than doubled each year following the company's 2004 launch. While sales of GoPro cameras declined, its brand remained one of the most revered in the world. As a result, Tony Bates, director and former president of GoPro, mulled over ideas for leveraging the brand beyond the camera. For Bates, this meant potentially launching a new product using the existing GoPro brand in a different category. While it seemed easy enough, GoPro had to consider where to extend the business in a way that made sense for the company's core demographic. GoPro also had to determine whether to license the brand to others or partner with another company. Given the consumer-centric roots of the company and the evolution of the brand, there was a lot to consider. This case examines the challenges facing GoPro in the face of falling sales, and how best to leverage its increasingly popular brand. It provides a brief background of the company, the evolution of the brand, a description of early attempts to grow the brand, models for licensing the brand, how best to implement a licensing model, the need to protect the brand, as well as two case studies using Red Bull and Virgin Group as examples of successful brand extensions.

On November 25, 2008, the high-end department store Saks slashed its prices by 70 percent, creating a tsunami in the fashion industry. Years later, the ripples of this action still lingered. This action and its effects provide an opportunity to analyze downstream supply chain management, the impacts of Saks' price-cutting throughout the supply chain, and the options available to various stakeholders to mitigate the damage.

Ben Kaufman founded Quirky in 2009 to enable anyone with a product idea to access an online network of people to help evaluate and improve the idea, and potentially bring it to market. By the end of 2012, Quirky was shipping 74 products, and had many more in development. Its products were sold in 35,000 stores worldwide. Each week, the company took three products into the research and development process, out of more than 1,000 submitted online. It paid 10 percent of third party sales, and 30 percent of direct sales, to its community members based on their participation in developing products-more than $2 million in 2012. Despite these signs of success, the company faced substantial challenges. Margins were low, and had to be dramatically improved before the company would become profitable. The product development model, using both online participants and internal staff, was stressed by the ever-increasing number of products being developed. The supply chain, relying on external manufacturing, had to adapt to a continual stream of new products. And retail partners were not well suited to the Quirky model-retailers focused on a few high-selling products. This case describes the business model used by Quirky, and challenges students to address the unique challenges facing the company.

This is an update to GS-61, describing developments at the company through 2011, including a major acquisition, distribution in China, and an initiative to cultivate start-ups that might grow into future clients.

In 2009, many thought Crocs was "dead." The C case presents exhibits that illustrate the company's recovery.

Through 2007, Crocs grew rapidly, and its stock soared. In early 2008, the stock plunged, as analysts cited excess inventory. During 2008, revenues decreased, and the company restructured. The B case summarizes these developments, and asks what the company should do now.

An initial public offering (IPO) is the first sale of stock or shares by a company to the public. IPOs are often issued by smaller, younger companies seeking capital to expand, although they can also be done by large privately owned companies looking to become publicly traded. When a company lists its shares on a public exchange it will almost always issue additional new shares at the same time. The money paid by investors for the newly issued shares goes directly to the company (versus later trades of shares on the exchange, in which money passes between investors). Therefore, the IPO provides the company with access to a wide pool of stock market investors who can provide significant capital for future growth. Instead of the company repaying this capital, the new shareholders will have a right to future profits distributed by the company and the right to a capital distribution in the case of dissolution. Once the company is listed, it can continue to issue shares, which again provide it with capital for expansion without incurring debt. This ability to regularly raise large amounts of capital from the general market is a key incentive for many companies seeking to list. Additional reasons for going public include providing liquidity for venture investors, management, and employees, who are typically holders of stock options. In addition, through an IPO, the company gains worldwide prestige with customers, suppliers, and within its local and business communities.

Zappos was founded in 1999, during the Internet boom, to sell shoes online. The company's founding premise was to provide the ultimate in selection to its customers-all brands, styles, sizes, and colors. Zappos organized all aspects of its business (including recruiting, culture, call center, inventory, website, and supply chain) to provide the best possible service-it wanted to "wow" everyone who interacted with the company, from customers to employees to corporate partners. Zappos grew rapidly, and by 2008 was profitable with net sales (after returns) of about $650 million. The company faced a number of issues as it looked forward. While it had penetrated only about 3 percent of the U.S. market for shoes, Zappos had expanded its product lines to items such as camping gear and video games. It needed to determine those elements of its strategy had contributed to its success in shoes, and whether it would be able to duplicate that success in other product lines. It also needed to determine how it could scale its business-much of the effort it had made to "wow" its customers was labor intensive and expensive-could this be scaled to a company with revenues of tens of billions? Finally, the economic landscape changed dramatically in late 2008, with the financial market collapse and recession. The service-intensive Zappos.com business was based on sales at little to no discount, unlike many websites that relied on selling at the lowest possible price. Would the company need to make changes to respond to the changed economic environment, and if so, what were those changes? The case provides an opportunity to evaluate the core competences of an Internet retailer that has experienced rapid, initial success. The case enables students to consider supply chain issues, which are critical to the company's success, in the broader context of the business: the bases of Zappos' success, its core competencies, culture, and competitive environment.

This case describes a number of situations in which important customers of a major electronics manufacturing firm (contract manufacturer) behaved in a manner that could be considered "ethically challenged." The case is told from the perspective of the EMS firm's ECO, who was personally involved in addressing these issues. Issues with three customers are described. All were a significant portion of the EMS firm's overall business. In one, a customer misled the EMS firm about its order receipts, leading to the EMS firm acquiring a substantial excess inventory that the customer was contractually required to pay for. The customer threatened to withdraw its future business if forced to make the payment. A second customer, facing a profit shortfall, demanded a payment for a "warranty problem." The EMS firm faced difficulties with a third customer related to a small R&D firm that it purchased at the customer's request, in order to serve the customer's engineering needs.

This case discusses the astounding growth of Crocs, Inc., a manufacturer of plastic shoes, from 2003 through early 2007. Much of the company's growth was made possible by a highly flexible supply chain that enabled Crocs to build additional product within the selling season. The normal model used within the fashion industry was to take orders well in advance of each selling season, and produce to those orders, with relatively little additional production. If demand was far in excess of this production, there would be stockouts and the company would lose the ability to capture revenue for that season. The product might or might not be in fashion the following year, when production would again be based on preseason orders. Crocs' ability to build additional shoes within the season enabled it to take advantage of strong customer demand, resulting in the company filling in-season orders totaling many times that of the initial prebooked orders. The case describes the Crocs supply chain. It asks students to assess the company's core competencies and how those can be exploited in the future. The case was revised in March 2011 to present information on the company's results in 2007 and prepare students for discussions of problems that would be faced in 2008 (covered in the B and C cases).

For all the talk about global organizations and executives, there's no definitive answer to the question of what we really mean by "global." A presence in multiple countries? Cultural adaptability? A multilingual top team? We asked four CEOs and the head of an international recruiting agency--HSBC's Stephen Green, Schering-Plough's Fred Hassan, GE's Jeffrey Immelt, Flextronics' Michael Marks, and Egon Zehnder's Daniel Meiland--to tell us what they think. They share some common ground. They all agree, for example, that the shift from a local to a global marketplace is irreversible and gaining momentum. "We're losing sight of the reality of globalization. But we should pay attention, because national barriers are quickly coming down," Daniel Meiland says. "If you look ahead five or 10 years, the people with the top jobs in large corporations...will be those who have lived in several cultures and who can converse in at least two languages." But the CEOs also disagree on many issues--on the importance of overseas assignments, for instance, and on the degree to which you need to adhere to local cultural norms. Some believe strongly that the global leader should, as a prerequisite to the job, live and work in other countries. The executives' essays capture views that are as diverse and multidimensional as the companies they lead.