In 2017, a woman with no background in business management or entrepreneurship, started a new venture called MITTI Social Initiatives Foundation in Bengaluru (also known as Bangalore), India. The nonprofit organization was driven by the passion for diversity, equity, and inclusion of its founder, who had a determination to overcome challenges and a drive to learn. The organization was run by a team of mainly women from diverse backgrounds and was managed by employees who were largely from lower socio-economic strata and had physical disabilities, intellectual disabilities, or mental health conditions. Despite its young age, the organization was able to reorient its strategy during the COVID-19 pandemic to launch several new business verticals. In fact, after the pandemic, the company accelerated its organizational momentum and opened eight new cafes in 2022 and 12 more in 2023. The founder, however, had to think and act strategically to increase the venture’s impact on livelihood and inclusion by achieving growth, without diluting the organization’s informal and caring culture.
In June 2023, Zerodha, a leading player in India’s discount brokerage industry, was at a crossroads. Founded in 2010 by Nikhil and Nithin Kamath, who were avid stock traders from a young age, the company had grown significantly by putting customers first. The pandemic and low-interest environment had provided a strong tailwind to the sector as well as the company, especially in terms of the number of customers and revenues. However, the competition was nipping at Zerodha’s heels. Many start-ups offered similar technology interfaces, and some were funded by venture capital. A few were spending aggressively to court customers as well as tech employees. With a debt-free balance sheet built through several years of profitable operations, Zerodha could pursue strategies that required large spending, but the key question was: should Zerodha deviate from its time-tested strategy of being a cost leader and not following the herd in the new post-pandemic environment?
In December 2023, Avenue Supermarts Limited, operating as DMart, celebrated its robust performance in the offline retail sector in India. Since its establishment in 2002, DMart had built a sizable network of profitable offline stores, showcasing industry-leading metrics. However, its online subsidiary faced losses, prompting the management to confront pivotal decisions for future expansion. The management grappled with the choice of expanding its physical stores and deliberated on the strategic approach: Should it broaden geographically or deepen existing clusters? Simultaneously, they confronted the challenge of resource allocation for the online business amid intense competition and recent financial setbacks. DMart’s leadership stood at a crossroads, weighing options to sustain offline success while addressing the complexities of online market dynamics and profitability.
In January 2024, Ben & Jerry’s Homemade Holdings Inc. (Ben & Jerry’s), a subsidiary of Unilever, was facing several critical decisions. It had been over a year since the company had been sued by its independent board about the company’s decision to sell its Israeli business to a long-time licensee in that country. That situation was resolved with the court ruling against the independent board. However, guiding principles had to be developed to prepare for similar situations in the future. Specifically, the Ben & Jerry’s management team had to work with its independent board to help avoid such incidents from reoccurring. Ben & Jerry’s also had to achieve a balance among the perspectives and demands from various stakeholders, which were sometimes in conflict with each other.
In July 2023, Tesla, Inc. (Tesla), a global leader in the manufacture and sales of electric vehicles, needed to formulate its entry strategy in India. Tesla’s chief executive officer, Elon Musk, had met Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on his visit to the United States in June 2023 and expressed optimism about India as a market for Tesla. This development was in sharp contrast to the events of just over a year earlier, when Musk and Tesla had expressed disappointment with the Indian government’s policy of heavily taxing imports of fully assembled Tesla cars and had seemingly abandoned their plans to enter India, at least in the short term. Despite the thaw in the relationship with the Indian government, Tesla’s top management needed to get a number of critical decisions right if the company’s entry into the Indian market was to be successful.
Ola Electric Mobility Pvt. Ltd. (Ola Electric) was launched in 2017 by ANI Technologies Pvt. Ltd., better known as Ola Cabs, as a venture for making electric scooters. Bhavish Aggarwal, one of Ola Cabs’ founders, acquired a 92.5 per cent stake in Ola Electric and pursued a path of rapid expansion. By 2022, Ola Electric had successfully raised a large amount of capital from investors, developed several subsystems (especially software) of its products in-house, carried out two product launches and generated tens of thousands of bookings from customers, and was building a state-of-the-art plant for making electric scooters. While Ola Electric’s scooters had received positive reviews from a few expert reviewers and generated customer bookings, the company found it difficult to deliver defect-free scooters in sufficient numbers. The company was also mired in a number of controversies, such as some of its scooters catching fire, alleged safety issues with its products, publicly sharing a customer’s private data, and the departure of several executive from the company. Blunt communication by the founder and majority owner Aggarwal made some of the controversies worse. Aggarwal and his team now had to determine how to address the challenges and decide whether to focus on tackling these or on aggressively pursuing greater volumes. In which direction should they steer the company’s strategy?
In December 2022, Maruti Suzuki India Limited (Maruti Suzuki), the undisputed leader in the Indian car market, was evaluating the various alternatives for its continued growth and sustained performance. In 2015, building on the company's success selling no-frills cars, Maruti Suzuki launched its New Exclusive Automotive Experience (NEXA) line to attract customers who were seeking advanced car models. However, the emergence of electric vehicles posed a key challenge for Maruti Suzuki specifically because it lacked capabilities in this arena. To achieve continued growth and performance, Maruti had to prioritize among three alternatives: building upon its success in selling used cars, further building on the NEXA line, and aggressively trying to launch new electric vehicle models.
In May 2022, Shopee Pte. Ltd. (Shopee), the e-commerce division of Singapore-based Sea Limited (Sea), was at a critical juncture. Over the past several years, fuelled by the growth of its e-commerce business, Shopee had achieved rapid revenue growth. Starting from Singapore and Southeast Asia, the company had expanded its international footprint to countries in Europe, the Indian subcontinent, and Latin America. But early 2022 brought several new challenges for Shopee: Sea’s stock price plummeted as investors sold off high-growth and unprofitable Internet stocks; and Shopee exited France and India rapidly because it was facing pressure from multiple sources, including an industry association in India and the Indian government, which had banned sales of Shopee’s best-selling game in India. Shopee had to carefully choose an appropriate strategy for further international expansion. Should it pause its international expansion and consolidate in the short term or carry on with the rapid pace of expansion?
In August 2021, Singapore Airlines Group (SIA) was at a critical juncture in its history. Since early 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic had forced commercial travel to almost a standstill, requiring SIA to idle most of its fleet. The group’s overall revenues had declined by 76 per cent in the 2020/21 financial year, resulting in a loss of S$4.27 billion. The massive cash bleed forced the group to issue new capital, thus diluting the stake of its existing shareholders. Although SIA’s results had improved for the quarter ended June 30, 2021, the emergence of new virus variants and continued travel restrictions meant that the group needed to make critical decisions that would have implications for both its short-term survival and its long-term performance.
In September 2020, Moovaz, a startup in the tech-enabled relocation space, was at a critical juncture in its evolution. In the three years since its founding, the company had established its business model, shown impressive growth in revenues, raised S$7 million in Series A funding and acquired a portfolio of established magazines in the form of <i>The Finder</i>. Junxian Lee, co-founder and CEO of Moovaz was optimistic about the prospects of the company going forward, despite the COVID-19 pandemic. However, there were a number of caveats to his optimism. Specifically, possible decline in demand if the world economy continues to struggle and challenges in raising the next round of funding in the face of uncertainty.
In May 2020, Usha Martin Limited (Usha Martin), a diversified engineering group based in India, was debating strategies for continued future growth. In April 2019, the company had divested its steelmaking and related operations to reduce its debt load. Though the divestment meant a large decline in the company’s sales for the year ended March 2020, the company managed to reverse the trend of losses incurred in several recent quarters and years to earn positive profits. However, attaining future growth remained a challenge for the smaller, focused company, especially given the economic disruption caused by the COVID-19 crisis. It was critical that Usha Martin’s management made the correct strategic choices so that the company could achieve good, long-term, profitable growth.
In early 2019, Asahi Glass Co., Ltd. (AGC), a diversified Japanese company, was at a critical juncture in its evolution. Three years earlier, AGC had released its Vision 2025, which set a goal for the company to continue as a leading global provider of materials and solutions that improved the daily lives of people around the world. Its financial performance had improved significantly over the previous five years, but profitability remained modest, with operating profit margins slightly above 8 per cent. The modest profitability of the company belied a strong base of technologies in glass, chemicals, electronics, and ceramics. AGC could potentially use these strengths to develop and market high value-added products in varied sectors such as mobility, construction, new energy, and life sciences. To effectively exploit future opportunities, however, the company needed to devise and implement novel strategies, overcome competitive challenges, and align its internal organization. Specifically, it would need to extend or modify its globalization strategy by developing a differentiated strategy for combinations of products and countries, develop new competencies in areas such as biologics, and choose the appropriate entry modes to balance financial and strategic implications. How should AGC proceed toward achieving its Vision 2025 goals?
In March 2017, Airbnb needed to make some important decisions regarding its strategy for the Airbnb Business Travel Vertical (ABTV) in Asia. Despite a short history of less than three years since the formal announcement of its launch, the ABTV had exhibited promising performance. The business travel market offered many attractive characteristics, including its large size. Despite the attractiveness of the business travel segment, two issues related to the choice of countries and the choice of segments were of concern. Another key issue related to identifying the specific corporate clients to approach—whether to leverage existing relationships with multinational customers or to approach Asian corporate clients directly.
In June 2016, Illinois Tool Works (ITW), a Fortune 500 manufacturing company in the United States, was at a critical juncture in its evolution. The company had identified a number of lofty goals in its 2015 annual report to be achieved by the end of 2017. These expectations included reaching over 200 basis points in organic growth above the market, a 23 per cent operating margin, a 20 per cent after-tax return on invested capital, 100 per cent free cash flow as a percentage of net income, and 12 to 14 per cent shareholder returns. Riding on the success of 2015, these targets had seemed achievable based on ITW’s performance and operational excellence. However, the U.S. and world economies faced a variety of challenges related to political uncertainty in the United States due to a presidential election and also in Europe because of the United Kingdom’s recent decision to exit the European Union. Additional challenges such as continued weaknesses in emerging markets and volatile currencies also affected ITW's outlook. ITW’s acquisition strategy had yielded excellent results over the past few years by effectively using diversification and decentralization strategies in its growth, but there was considerable uncertainty about achieving future goals. ITW had to make important choices about resource allocation across product groups based on their past performance and future prospects. The CEO also had to make appropriate decisions for continued superior performance.
Haw Par Corporation’s healthcare division produces Tiger Balm, the external analgesic rub that has gained global popularity. Despite delivering strong results, the division remains dependent on Asian markets, which poses challenges with regard to low affordability, weak protection of intellectual property and aggressive competition. To achieve sustained growth, the company’s executive director is considering several alternatives: geographic expansion, by entering more markets; product expansion, through deeper penetration of existing markets with new products; and extending the brand into the highly competitive wellness space. He also needs to decide whether the division should pursue organic or inorganic growth.
In May 2011, Alan Joyce, chief executive officer of Qantas Group, needed to think about the future strategy of the airline group. Over the past few years, it had launched a number of strategic initiatives to defend its current position and penetrate new markets and segments. Qantas had discontinued its first-class service on many flights, opting to bolster its business-class service instead. Its forays into the budget travel segment through Jetstar proved to be successful and contributed to the overall financial performance of the group. Qantas had also placed a bet on emerging economies such as China, despite experiencing adverse performance in its international routes. However, the financial performance of the company was far from healthy. Qantas was fighting hard to retain its Australian position in the face of attempts by Virgin Blue and Tiger Airways to compete aggressively and gain market share. Analysts wondered whether Qantas was trying to do too much and, in the process, spreading itself too thinly. Would the Qantas Group be better off simply prioritizing across its various alternatives, or did it have sufficient resources (financial as well as managerial) to pursue all the initiatives? And if a narrow focus was better, then which strategic alternatives should Qantas pursue aggressively?