This article analyzes online technology strategically from the perspective of traditional (face-to-face) providers of higher education. Analysis of current and projected relative positions explains why face-to-face providers need to take online technology seriously. But both pure strategies entirely face-to-face and entirely online have significant limitations from their perspective, directing attention toward mixed or blended strategies, for which a strategic typology, illustrated with a broad range of examples, is provided. Moving from an entirely face-to-face approach to a blended one is likely to generate some implementation challenges, which are also addressed.
Business leaders are scrambling to adjust to a world few imagined possible just a year ago. The myth of a borderless world has come crashing down. Traditional pillars of open markets--the United States and the UK--are wobbling, and China is positioning itself as globalization's staunchest defender. Countries throughout North America and Europe have experienced waves of anti-globalization sentiment. In the face of such uncertainty, leaders of multinationals wonder whether they should retreat, change strategy, or stay the course. In making that decision, they need to understand two things. First, the world is less globalized than even experienced executives realize. Second, history tells us that even in the face of a trade war, international trade and investment would still be too large for strategists to ignore. Today's turmoil calls not for a mass retreat from globalization but for a more subtle reworking of multinationals' strategies. This article examines common misperceptions about what is--and isn't--changing about globalization and offers guidelines to help leaders decide where and how to compete in a complex world.
This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. The globalization of companies can be -and frequently has been -looked at in different ways: in terms of the internationalization of sales or assets, cross-border supply chains or shared services, organizational structures, functional policies (marketing standardization versus customization) and so on. In this article, the authors look at much less-studied individual measures of globalization: the extent to which the executives who head the world's largest corporations -at the CEO level and at the level of the managers listed as reporting directly to the CEO -are native or not to the country where the corporation is headquartered. Some studies indicate that national diversity in the top management team can be associated with better performance. What's more, the presence -or absence -of nonnative executives in a company's top management team can send a signal to employees outside the home country about the long-term career prospects for foreign middle managers already in the company as well as for potential hires. The basic pattern emerging from the authors'research, both at the CEO and the top management team level, is unmistakable: Even at the world's largest companies, natives generally rule the roost. In 2013, 67 of the Fortune Global 500 companies (13%, or about one in eight) had a foreign-born CEO. The share has barely budged since 2008. Looking at the full top management teams, the authors found that on average 15% of the top management team members, excluding the CEO, are nonnatives. The authors examine some of the possible reasons for this and look for correlations that may explain why certain countries have higher rates of nonnative CEOs. They then examine several levers for enhancing a company's ability to deal with international differences and distances.
"Competitive Advantage" introduces core concepts in competitive advantage including value creation and distribution, added value, and willingness to pay and supplier opportunity cost. The Reading explores how a firm's unique activities directly relate to establishing competitive advantage. Readers also learn how to analyze a firm's value proposition. The latest revision (June 2022) features updated examples and figures throughout the reading. The overall framework is unchanged. The example that opens the reading has been updated significantly, with newly acquired data (2005-2021), and now focuses on Lilly and Air Canada, replacing the original analysis of Merck and US Steel. Learn more: https://bit.ly/strategycc-guide
Grolsch reassesses its international strategy in light of the company's recent acquisition by SABMiller, the world's second-largest brewer. Grolsch was the 21st-largest global beer brand, sold 51.5 percent of its volume in international markets, and exported to 70 countries. However, its poor profitability in international markets--four countries alone accounting for two-thirds of foreign sales--and churn of markets and distribution partners raised concerns about the company's international strategy and execution. Grolsch's 60 years of history in foreign markets provide a rich backdrop to introduce a range of international strategy topics, including performance assessment, rationale for expansion, market selection, and choice of entry mode.
Mittal Steel's remarkable rise to the top of the steel industry spearheaded a wave of cross-border consolidation that aimed to fundamentally change the industry's competitive and geographic structure. This case provides the opportunity to examine how Lakshmi Mittal built his company's position via international acquisitions, to assess the logic of global integration in the steel industry, and to think through how Mittal can continue adding value to its acquired operations on an ongoing basis (i.e., post-turnaround) as a global steel company.
The Indian IT Services sector's rapid, profitable growth has transformed the geography and economics of IT while simultaneously spearheading India's broader economic resurgence. Discussion focuses on what many regard as the iconic Indian sector and illustrates the globalization that is under way in parts of the service sector. The case offers students the opportunity to analyze this industry's rise and prospects at a period when many observers were questioning whether its growth could be sustained.
This case provides an opportunity to examine the growth of offshore services from the perspective of India's oldest and largest IT services firm. Focusing on Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) at this stage of its development offers a window into the process of upgrading within a sector that historically competed based on low prices, as TCS aspires to compete also on a promise of superior quality. The case also provides an opportunity to discuss the international expansion of emerging market-based companies and the shifting geography of the IT services industry in the context of TCS's expansion in Latin America and Western IT services firms' expansion in India.
Never mind what you've heard about the world being flat. Today's global landscape is marked by unbalanced growth, protectionism, and ethnic, religious, and linguistic divides. Differences still do matter. The ideal of a truly global, stateless corporation has become popular, but it simply isn't possible to achieve, says the author. Look at Rupert Murdoch's News Corporation. A major player from Australia to the United Kingdom to the United Sates, the company made huge blunders in its move into TV services in Asia, ignoring English-speaking residents' preference for local-language content and touting satellite TV as a threat to totalitarian regimes everywhere (prompting a ban on satellite dishes by the Chinese government). News Corporation had transcended its Australian origins but not its roots in English-speaking democracies. Crafting a global strategy and organization is possible, but you must focus on understanding the differences among people, cultures, and places-not on eliminating them. One tool that can help you get a handle on the most critical differences is a rooted map, which sizes countries according to measures that reflect a particular nation's perspective, such as the amount of industry services they purchase from domestic companies. A cosmopolitan approach may lead firms, at least in the midterm, to concentrate more on adaptation to local markets than on aggregation or arbitrage. It has various other implications as well. Firms will have to think about how to readjust their organizations to better manage external distances, and they must cultivate leaders who know how to bridge cultural and national differences.
No longer content with being the world's factory for low-value products, China has quietly opened a new front in its campaign to become the globe's most powerful economy: It's on a quest for high-tech dominance. In pursuit of this goal, the Chinese government has ensured that it will be both buyer and seller in certain key industries by retaining ownership of customers and suppliers alike. It has consolidated manufacturers in those industries into a few national champions to generate economies of scale and concentrate learning. And it is co-opting, cajoling, and coercing multi-national corporations to part with their latest technologies, imposing regulations that put those companies in a terrible bind: They can either comply with the rules and share their technologies with would-be Chinese competitors or refuse and miss out on the world's fastest-growing market. Foreign companies doing business in China cannot wait for balancing macroeconomic forces or multilateral solutions; if they wish to survive as global technology leaders, they must bring greater imagination to bear on the problem. Above all, China's maneuvers cast into doubt the optimistic premise that engagement and interdependence with the West would cause capitalism and socialism to converge quickly, reducing international tensions. Storm clouds are gathering over China and the U.S. in particular. Can two economies with such radically different structures and objectives peacefully coexist? Most people expect that the systems will eventually become more similar. However, the authors argue, this will happen only when China becomes as rich-and as technologically advanced-as the U.S.
The 2008 crash hit cross-border business hard. The value of international trade was projected to decline by as much as 9% in 2009. Foreign direct investment has plunged even more: After dropping 15% in 2008, it fell by more than 40% in 2009. Though we may have reached the bottom, the prospects for the medium term don't look promising. For much of the next decade, we can reasonably expect to see weak global growth, pressures from overcapacity, persistently high unemployment, costlier capital, a greatly expanded role for governments, a much larger burden of taxation and regulation for all, and maybe even increased protectionism. It goes without saying that global firms must factor these developments into their strategies for the new decade. To successfully negotiate the rockier path before them, they must rethink their strategic vision and retool their approach to each component of strategy: product and market focus, organizational and supply chain structures, talent management choices, and, of increasing importance, the management of corporate reputation and identity. In particular, firms will need to work harder to adapt to local differences and pay more attention to developing countries-as markets, as launch pads for formidable new competitors, and as sources of process innovation.
Argentine confectionery manufacturer, Arcor Group, seeks to implement an international strategy but in 2003, while recovering from the Argentine financial crisis, globalization plans are thwarted. Already Latin America's leading candy producer and an exporter to over 100 countries, Arcor analyzes how it can become truly global with production facilities and distribution networks in various regions, such as North America, Europe, and Asia. First, however, Arcor must stabilize its operations at home, where a devalued peso, economic uncertainty, and political instability still linger from the devastating financial crisis.
This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Two very different ways of thinking about investment and risk are in competition. One emphasizes the financial risk of investing; the other concerns the competitive risk of not investing. In normal times, the bearishness of the former tends to complement the bullishness of the latter. But during extremes in the business cycle, the author argues, the balance between the two can break down. Specifically, companies seem to overemphasize the financial risk of investing at the bottom of the business cycle, at the expense of the competitive risk of not investing. This is dangerous, in the author's view, because it can create a lasting competitive disadvantage. Using examples from the semiconductor, paper and diamond industries, the author argues that it doesn't make sense to stamp out either financial or competitive risk, even though financial risk could be eliminated by investing not at all and competitive risk could be eliminated by investing indiscriminately. Instead, managers need to strike a balance between the errors implicit in these two types of risk: the error of pursuing too many unprofitable investment opportunities as opposed to the error of passing up too many potentially profitable ones. The original version of this article was published in the Sloan Management Review in Winter 1993. In this updated version, the author expands his views in light of the 2008 economic downturn.
Multinational corporations from developed and developing economies alike are aggressively expanding their global presence, particularly in emerging markets. Industry traits largely determine the winners - but that needn't always be the case, say Ghemawat, of IESE Business School, and Hout, of the University of Hong Kong. Companies can break the pattern by anticipating or creating new customer segments, managing cost convergences, or reworking the value chain. Some established MNCs are succeeding in production- and logistics-oriented businesses, where local rivals usually have an advantage. One way is by using technology and capital to accelerate segments' growth. Samsung, Sharp, and others surprised Chinese producers with vicious price competition in flat-screen TVs, which quickly collapsed the demand for conventional TVs, bottoming out Chinese profits. Another way established MNCs are beating emerging players is on costs, as home appliance companies in the United States did when Haier tried to enter the U.S. market for midsize refrigerators. Conversely, some emerging-market challengers are outperforming established MNCs in knowledge- and brand-intensive industries. Bharti Airtel has built the largest mobile-services operation in India by specializing in a limited part of the value chain (customer care and the regulatory interface) and outsourcing the rest, which freed up capital, made Bharti's cost structure more variable, and allowed the company to radically undercut advanced-market prices. Firms such as India's Suzlon Energy are also spotting opportunities to bundle ancillary services and products in which they have an advantage. The authors point to these examples and others to suggest that conditions are right for aggressive global players to move outside their industry comfort zones.
Most managers consider global expansion to be an imperative, and cross-border expansion commands wider support than cross-business expansion. This article not only counteracts such a bias, but provides a framework for valuing cross-border moves, called the ADDING Value Scorecard. There are two broad approaches to evaluating strategies: in terms of principles and in terms of analyzing their implications for value. While principles may help guide routine decisions, they should be seen in the context of important decisions as ways of complementing analysis of value rather than substituting for it. The ADDING Value Scorecard’s first component is Adding volume, and is followed by three levers for improving margins: Decreasing costs, Differentiating, and Improving industry attractiveness. The last two components, Normalizing risks and Generating knowledge (and other resources), are add-ons that reflect large discontinuities that can arise at national borders. As an example, the scorecard is applied to a cross-border move that clearly failed the ADDING Value test — the merger, recently dissolved, of Daimler-Benz and Chrysler.
The main goal of any international strategy should be to manage the large differences that arise at the borders of markets. Yet executives often fail to exploit market and production discrepancies, focusing instead on the tensions between standardization and localization. In this article, Pankaj Ghemawat presents a new framework that encompasses all three effective responses to the challenges of globalization. He calls it the AAA Triangle. The As stand for the three distinct types of international strategy. Through Adaptation, companies seek to boost revenues and market share by maximizing their local relevance. Through Aggregation, they attempt to deliver economies of scale by creating regional, or sometimes global, operations. And through Arbitrage, they exploit disparities between national or regional markets, often by locating different parts of the supply chain in different places--for instance, call centers in India, factories in China, and retail shops in Western Europe. Ghemawat draws on several examples that illustrate how organizations use and balance these strategies and describes the trade-offs they make as they do so. Because most enterprises should draw from all three As to some extent, the framework can be used to develop a summary scorecard indicating how well the company is globalizing. However, given the tensions among the strategies, it's not enough simply to tick off the corresponding boxes. Strategic choice requires some degree of prioritization--and the framework can help with that as well. While it is possible to make progress on all three strategies, companies usually must focus on one or two when trying to build competitive advantage.
Banco Santander, Spain's largest commercial bank, announced in July 2004 the acquisition of Abbey National Bank, the fifth largest U.K. commercial bank. This transaction was the largest ever cross-border acquisition in European banking and would result in the 10th-largest bank in the world. Discusses the main sources of value creation from international expansion and acquisitions in the commercial banking industry. Also, highlights the barriers to integration within the single market of the European Union in a regulated service industry such as commercial banking.
Predictions of global economic integration are at odds with the facts: Most types of economic activity that might cross borders are still largely focused at home.
At the time of the millennium, diamond demand was threatened by an increasing awareness among jewelry customers that diamond production and trading in some countries was being linked to growing inequities and human rights violations. This, in turn, had an impact on De Beers' reputation and consumer confidence in the diamond as a product that represented integrity, love, and commitment. In 2000, De Beers' sustainability depends on the ability of its leaders to shift the paradigm of both the firm and its context and embrace a distinctly different strategy.