Digital technologies are pushing decision-making ability to the edges of the organization, allowing businesses to adopt structures that are flatter and more reconfigurable than those they have traditionally used. When AI and other software make information transparent to all authorized decision-makers on the front lines, directly and without managerial filters, it unleashes their creative and collaborative potential instead of trapping them in endless reporting and coordination loops. It can help to create, in other words, a "permissionless corporation." The authors contend that companies with three or four layers, faster problem-solving, and a permissionless mindset will outcompete traditional players. But making the transformation to such a structure will require companies to completely rethink how people work; it's not enough to streamline a process here or there or take out one layer of traditional structure. Using real-world examples, the authors detail how companies need to pay painstaking attention to performance metrics, ensure that information gets to the front line, communicate the context in which decisions are made, and leverage multifunctional teams.

To create long-term value, corporate boards must focus on managing talent, strategy, and risk. But they also have to satisfy their shareholders, who often have competing demands. Activists, for example, might press for short-term profits, while index funds and other long-term shareholders are more concerned with the company's longevity. Drawing on years of work with boards, top executives, and the investment community and on interviews with the heads of public and private companies and investment firms, the authors offer a playbook for managing stakeholder relationships productively. They argue that regular, open communication is key; whether aligned with or hostile to the board's long-term objectives, investors often have valuable information about a company and its competitors and can be a source of fresh ideas. The authors provide guidance on how and when to meet with investors, how to get useful feedback, how to understand what each type of investor is looking for, and how to anticipate and ward off activist attacks. Although the advice is directed at board members, the insights will be valuable to CEOs, other members of the senior management team, and large shareholders as well.

When it comes to selecting a new CEO, judgment really matters. The choice may devastate a company or create enormous value. In his work advising companies, Charan has observed that some board members are especially great at succession decisions. In this article he describes how they go about picking the right candidate. Directors who excel at selection zero in on the two or three distinct capabilities that a CEO will need to thrive at the firm in question. (Charan calls this the "pivot" because the succession decision turns on it.) For example, when IBM was conducting a CEO search in 1993, many thought it should hire a technologist, but two directors saw that what the company really needed was an executive with business acumen, a customer orientation, and execution skills. At their urging, the board brought in Lou Gerstner, who quickly turned IBM's $8 billion loss into a $3 billion profit. Astute directors also keep an open mind about where the best candidate will come from; they shed assumptions about insiders and outsiders and may even consider a leader a few levels below the CEO. They go deep to understand which person is the best fit with the pivot, doing their own due diligence. Finally, they allow for the imperfections in the chosen candidate, figuring out which gaps can be filled by other executives or corrected with coaching.

Although people drive every organization's success, research shows that most CEOs undervalue their HR function and their chief human resources officer (CHRO). No wonder, then, that managing human capital is a top challenge for companies. To address it, say the authors, CEOs must redefine and elevate the CHRO role. They should spell out their expectations in a new written contract, focusing on three contributions that the CHRO, as an expert on talent (both in-house and at the competition), should be making: predicting the outcomes of strategically deploying human resources, diagnosing people-related problems that are hurting the company's performance, and prescribing actions on the people side that will create value. Administrative tasks, such as managing benefits, might be delegated to others. And the CHRO should be assessed by actions that deliver revenue, margin, brand recognition, or market share. With a new mandate from the CEO, and with appropriate business training, the CHRO can contribute to the organization just as powerfully as the CFO can. Indeed, the CEO should partner with the CHRO and the CFO in what the authors call a G3--a triumvirate to steer the company. Although reshaping the HR function could take three years or more, the authors' experience with companies such as GE and BlackRock suggests that it's well worth the effort.

The author, a globally known business adviser and speaker, proposes that traditional HR departments divide into two strands: One would primarily manage compensation and benefits and would report to the CFO. The other would focus on improving the people capabilities of the business and would report to the CEO.

As one of the world's preeminent advisers to CEOs, Ram Charan has spent the past 35 years on the road, helping hundreds of executives deal with their toughest challenges. In this edited interview, he shares what he's learned about decision making over the decades. Getting to the right answer is a lot harder today than it was 10 years ago, Charan points out. Leaders have to contend with more variables and constituencies than ever before. They must be able to cut through all that complexity and to make subjective judgments about highly ambiguous, and constantly changing, factors. The best executives know which decisions to focus on (and which to delegate), when to make a decision, and what the risk of not making a decision is. When opportunities arise and vanish quickly, timing is critical. In this environment, good decisions involve a lot more than analytics. They demand perceptual acuity, or the ability to see change coming; qualitative judgment, which allows leaders to formulate and select the right options; and credibility, which helps them gain acceptance for decisions. All three traits can be developed over time by practicing the right habits, such as listening to diverse and contradictory views, thinking through second- and third-order consequences, and socializing decisions by demonstrating transparency and explaining their performance payoff.

What could be harder than turning around a seemingly wildly successful company by imposing a centralized framework on a heretofore radically decentralized, antiestablishment, free-spirited organization? That was the challenge GE alumnus Robert Nardelli faced when he abruptly succeeded Home Depot's popular founders, Bernie Marcus and Arthur Blank, as the top executive in December 2000. Talk about a shock: No one expected Marcus and Blank, both in their 50s, to leave. And, as Nardelli himself acknowledges, the last thing anyone wanted was an outsider who would "GE-ize their company and culture." But despite its glossy high-growth exterior, Home Depot was standing on shaky financial footings. Rapid expansion had stretched cash flow, inventory turns, profits, and store manager ranks thin. Each store's vaunted independence was making the company as a whole highly inflexible, unable to take advantage of economies of scale. What so effectively got Home Depot from zero to $50 billion in sales wasn't going to get it to the next $50 billion. The story of the vision, strategy, and leadership skills Nardelli used to move Home Depot to the next level has been told. But vision, strategy, and leadership alone--while necessary--are not enough. Typically, culture change is unsystematic and, when it works, is based on the charisma of the person leading the change, Ram Charan says. "But Home Depot shows--in perhaps the best example I have seen in my 30-year career--that a cultural transition can be achieved systematically." In this article, Charan lays out the panoply of tools that, wielded in a coordinated and systematic fashion, enabled Home Depot to get a grip on its freewheeling culture so that the company could reap--and sustain--the advantages inherent in its size. Many an up-and-coming company would do well to look to this model to gain similar advantage when the time comes to exchange the thrill of entrepreneurial spirit for the strength of established power.

The single greatest cause of corporate underperformance is the failure to execute. According to author Ram Charan, such failures usually result from misfires in personal interactions. And these faulty interactions rarely occur in isolation, Charan says in this article originally published in 2001. More often than not, they're typical of the way large and small decisions are made (or not made) throughout an organization. The inability to take decisive action is rooted in a company's culture. Leaders create this culture of indecisiveness, Charan says--and they can break it by doing three things: First, they must engender intellectual honesty in the connections between people. Second, they must see to it that the organization's social operating mechanisms--the meetings, reviews, and other situations through which people in the corporation transact business--have honest dialogue at their cores. And third, leaders must ensure that feedback and follow-through are used to reward high achievers, coach those who are struggling, and discourage those whose behaviors are blocking the organization's progress. By taking these three approaches and using every encounter as an opportunity to model open and honest dialogue, leaders can set the tone for an organization, moving it from paralysis to action.

The CEO succession process is broken. Many companies have no meaningful succession plans, and few of the ones that do are happy with them. CEO tenure is shrinking; in fact, two out of five CEOs fail in their first 18 months. It isn't just that more CEOs are being replaced; it's that they're being replaced badly. The problems extend to every aspect of CEO succession: internal development programs, board supervision, and outside recruitment. While many organizations do a decent job of nurturing middle managers, few have set up the comprehensive programs needed to find the half-dozen true CEO candidates out of the thousands of leaders in their midst. Even more damaging is the failure of boards to devote enough attention to succession. Search committee members often have no experience hiring CEOs; lacking guidance, they supply either the narrowest or the most general of requirements and then fail to vet either the candidates or the recruiters. The result is that too often new CEOs are plucked from the well-worn Rolodexes of a remarkably small number of recruiters. These candidates may be strong in charisma but may lack critical skills or otherwise be a bad fit with the company. The resulting high turnover is particularly damaging, given that outside CEOs often bring in their own teams, can cause the company to lose focus, and are especially costly to be rid of. Drawing on over 35 years of experience with CEO succession, the author explains how companies can create a deep pool of internal candidates, how boards can consistently align strategy and leadership development, and how directors can get their money's worth from recruiters. Choosing a CEO should be not one decision but an amalgam of thousands of decisions made by many people every day over years.

Software maker TopTek has acquired a consulting and systems-integration firm, mainly to profit from the software sales that are a natural by-product of consulting engagements. But in many ways the two companies worked better when they were separate. Before the acquisition, the same people who delivered services to clients made the consulting firm's sales. By contrast, TopTek's professional salespeople, all of them highly skilled at selling product, handled sales. Now the consultants and the salespeople are trying to work together, but they're making a hash of it. For instance, the CIO of a TopTek customer--a retailer--is complaining that consultants from the acquired firm are driving him nuts. They've got his boss's ear, and they're selling additional projects left and right, stimulating demand for a pace of change that the CIO says the retailer can't handle. The consultants in the newly constituted TopTek aren't happy either. They get no commissions on products they sell, because commissions for all sales to an account--forever--go to the salesperson who snagged it in the first place. The sales force has its own gripes. The consultants aren't much help in winning new business, according to Ron Murphy, TopTek's sales VP. What will it take for cross selling to succeed at TopTek? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0407B and R0407Z are Ram Charan, an author and adviser to CEOs; Caroline A. Kovac, the general manager of IBM Healthcare and Life Sciences; Jerome A. Colletti, an author and consultant; and Federico Turegano, the managing director of SG Corporate and Investment Banking, an arm of Societe Generale Group.

Software maker TopTek has acquired a consulting and systems-integration firm, mainly to profit from the software sales that are a natural by-product of consulting engagements. But in many ways the two companies worked better when they were separate. Before the acquisition, the same people who delivered services to clients made the consulting firm's sales. By contrast, TopTek's professional salespeople, all of them highly skilled at selling product, handled sales. Now the consultants and the salespeople are trying to work together, but they're making a hash of it. For instance, the CIO of a TopTek customer--a retailer--is complaining that consultants from the acquired firm are driving him nuts. They've got his boss's ear, and they're selling additional projects left and right, stimulating demand for a pace of change that the CIO says the retailer can't handle. The consultants in the newly constituted TopTek aren't happy either. They get no commissions on products they sell, because commissions for all sales to an account--forever--go to the salesperson who snagged it in the first place. The sales force has its own gripes. The consultants aren't much help in winning new business, according to Ron Murphy, TopTek's sales VP. What will it take for cross selling to succeed at TopTek? Commenting on this fictional case study in R0407B and R0407Z are Ram Charan, an author and adviser to CEOs; Caroline A. Kovac, the general manager of IBM Healthcare and Life Sciences; Jerome A. Colletti, an author and consultant; and Federico Turegano, the managing director of SG Corporate and Investment Banking, an arm of Societe Generale Group.

In July 1991, Lawrence A. Bossidy became chairman and CEO of AlliedSignal, the $13 billion industrial supplier of aerospace systems, automotive parts, and chemical products. The company's story since then appears to be the typical slash-and-burn turnaround, but the view from the inside is far more interesting for anyone grappling with what it takes to lead a competitive organization and sustain its performance over the long term. Bossidy is a straight-shooting, tough-minded, results-oriented business leader. But he is also a charismatic and persistent coach, determined to help people learn and thereby to provide his company with the best-prepared employees. In this interview, Bossidy explains his views on the leader's role in changing a large organization. He discusses how he uses values and goals to "coach people to win." And he explains his efforts to focus AlliedSignal's management on three core processes--strategy, operations, and human resources.

A new term--networks--has entered the vocabulary of corporate renewal. Ten companies (among them, Conrail, Dun & Bradstreet, Du Pont, and Royal Bank of Canada) provide good examples of networks and how they operate. The process of building a network starts at the top, where senior managers work to build a new social architecture. Networks change the frequency, intensity, and honesty of the dialogue among managers on priority tasks.

This is an enhanced edition of HBR article 98301, originally published in May/June 1998. John F. Welch, Jr. believes that GE must operate with the flexibility and agility of a small company. In this interview he explains how he is building a revitalized "human engine" to match GE's "business engine." Welch champions a companywide drive to eliminate unproductive work and energize employees and leads a transformation of attitudes at all levels. The centerpiece of this process is "Work-Out"--an intense multiyear program through which representatives of GE's 14 businesses meet regularly to identify sources of frustration and inefficiency and to overhaul evaluation and reward systems.