The release of ChatGPT and other generative AI models marked the beginning of a revolution in various industries by automating work processes. These AI technologies, accessible through chatbot interfaces, could generate text, audio, code, images, and videos, saving time and resources. In 2023, generative AI was starting to transform the way professionals worked in the accounting industry, enabling them to streamline auditing and accounting processes, utilizing natural language processing (NLP), and improving information search. The big-four accounting firms invested heavily in developing their own AI solutions to enhance efficiency and offer innovative client solutions. However, in early 2023, some big-four offices restricted the use of generative AI models, while other firms embraced the technology, providing guidance and training to their staff. The rapid growth of generative AI posed challenges for businesses unprepared for automation, leading them to assess the risks and benefits before adopting AI. Joesy Loh, an audit partner at a Singaporean CPA firm serving SMEs, recognized the potential of generative AI to improve audit efficiency and financial statement preparation. How can Joesy persuade her partners to embrace generative AI technology, considering their concerns about the accuracy of the generated output and data security for their firm and clients?

The Silicon Valley Bank of SVB Financial Group (NASDAQ: SIVB) supported tech startups and venture capital funds primarily in Silicon Valley. On 8 March 2023, the bank attempted to raise equity and sell debt securities to improve liquidity, but was unsuccessful. Doubts about the bank's solvency led its depositors to withdraw cash, totaling around USD42bn. On 10 March 2023, the US regulators shut down the bank and halted its shares from trading on NASDAQ. In 2021, SVB invested heavily in long-dated securities, such as mortgage bonds securities, and US treasury 10-year bonds to be held until maturity, thus classifying the majority of them as HTM. HTM securities were recorded at amortized cost, and changes in fair market value were only disclosed. After interest rate hikes starting at the end of March 2022, SVB disclosed unrealized loss on HTM securities, and on 31 December 2022, it was USD15.1bn, and total equity was USD16.3bn. Recording unrealized losses would force many US banks to incur significant losses, requiring replenishment of capital reserves. What approach should the board of the Financial Accounting Standards Board take to provide useful information to users of financial reports, and also balance the interests of the banking industry?

This case is set in the last quarter of 2022. Tesla Inc. (NASDAQ: TSLA), the renowned global supplier of electric vehicles (EV), was one of the most talked about companies in the media, partly because the company's cofounder, director, and CEO, Elon Musk, took over Twitter for USD44bn in October 2022. Aiming to turn around Twitter's profitability, Musk carried a bathroom sink to Twitter's headquarters and let the management and staff members "sink in" the idea of massive layoffs. However, his reform plans and public vote result of Twitter's users resulted in a backlash. On 20 December 2022, Musk tweeted he would resign as CEO of Twitter once a replacement was found. On 24 December 2022, Tesla suspended its EV production in its Gigafactory Shanghai, its second largest plant, without providing an explanation to the public. It was believed the suspension was due to the surge in COVID-19 cases, and the slower demand for Tesla vehicles in the Chinese market. Musk and his companies had a few turbulent years, dramatic success and painful failures, as well as inspiring vision and self-inflicted wounds. Now, even some of his most enthusiastic supporters were beginning to question his leadership. For the 12 months of 2022, the NASDAQ Composite Index experienced a 33.89% drop, and Tesla's share price fell by 69.2% after closing at USD123.18 on 30 December 2022. Whether Musk's leadership performance was related to his recently revealed diagnosis of Asperger syndrome was being questioned. Could his Asperger's partly explain both his visionary genius and his irrational behavior? Did Musk's Asperger personality features contribute to his interest in Twitter, thus distracting him from Tesla? Did his unique personality profile affect his questionable management decisions? Musk's lack of focus on Tesla was blamed for a dramatic stock value downturn, and questions about his future fit as the primary steward of Tesla was becoming an issue for the Tesla board and Tesla's

Rollins Inc., a listed pest control company on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE: ROL), and former CFO, Paul Edward Northen, were charged by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) with improper earnings management. The charges were based on the company's financial reporting between 2016 and 2018. The SEC alleged that Northen waited the preliminary earnings results were ready, and adjusted the company's accounting reserve accounts to align with the research analysts' consensus EPS estimates, without following U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US GAAP), and failed to properly document the basis for his adjustments. Rollins was known for boasting about its EPS record. In late 2020, the SEC's Enforcement Division detected irregularities in the company's EPS results through data analytics. On 18 April 2022, the SEC found Rollins to have violated the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Despite not admitting or denying the SEC's findings, Rollins and Northen agreed to pay civil penalties of USD8mn and USD100,000, and to stop any future violations of their previous misconduct. The SEC investigators, Carolyn Winters and Tonya Tullis, uncovered the series of Rollins' misconduct. What steps could they take to avoid similar situation for at Rollins and other U.S.- listed enterprises going forward?

Kingold Jewelry, Inc. (NASDAQ: KGJI), was one of mainland China's largest gold processors and gold jewelry manufacturers. In 2002, Jia Zhihong, chairman and CEO, founded the company, which was based in Wuhan, Hubei Province. In August 2010, it was listed on NASDAQ using "backdoor listing." It sold gold jewelry, ornaments, and investment-oriented products. Between 2015 and 2020 Jia decided to increase Kingold's reliance on gold as collateral to obtain loans at around CNY20.6bn (USD3.2bn) from 14 Chinese commercial banks and trusts across different provinces, including China Minsheng Trust Co. Ltd., Hengfeng Bank, and Dongguan Trust Co. Ltd. The 83 tonnes gold bars were largely secured physically in bank vaults after independent testing institutions certified them and insurance companies examined them; other financial institutions did not have access to the gold bars. In late 2019, Kingold defaulted on a loan repayment to Dongguan Trust and in February 2020, the bank demanded to liquidate the collateral and discovered the fraud. In June 2020 a Beijing-based financial news outlet, Caixin, published a story about Kingold's counterfeit gold scandal that was initiated by Dongguan Trust and other defaulted loan cases. On 11 August 2020, Kingold filed for voluntary delisting from NASDAQ without filing its overdue financial reports. On 26 August 2021, the Wuhan court began to press charges against Jia and Kingold and detained Jia and other personnel. How could Kingold's corporate governance be improved to disallow such a situation and protect lenders and investors? How could lenders reduce their credit risk in accepting gold bars as collateral when they could not fully rely on their clients, independent testing companies, and insurance companies? Do you consider US regulators' listing and other regulations were adequate for foreign companies? Did Friedman LLP as auditors make a best effort to examine Kingold's assets and present its client's financial information fairly.

In 2021, when GCL-Poly Energy Holdings Limited was the second largest global polysilicon manufacturer. It made and sold polysilicon in mainland China used in the production of solar energy equipment. In September 2019, GCL-Poly's wholly-owned and major subsidiary, Jiangsu Zhongneng Polysilicon was engaged in an engineering, procurement and construction contract (EPC Contract) valued at CNY1.9bn (USD0.3bn). The EPC Contract involved a granular silicon project and engaged a state-owned enterprise (SOE) lead contractor and a subcontractor. But the majority of the holding company's directors claimed they were unaware of this EPC Contract and the contract sum, and they did not announce it to the public and the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong (SEHK). The company's former auditors, Deloitte, raised concerns on the commercial rationale of the EPC Contract, including the validity of the prepayment of CNY510m (USD79.8m) made to the lead contractor. Due to outstanding audit issues and resignation of Deloitte, the company did not release its annual results for year-end 31 December 2020 by the 31 March 2021 deadline. On 1 April 2021, the company's shares were suspended from trading. After the company terminated the EPC contract, on 26 April 2021, the company received a refund from the lead contractor at CNY495.28m (USD77.5m) for the prepayment. The EPC Contract and the prepayment were approved by Jiang Wenwu, the former ED of GCL-Poly's holding company and GM of Jiangsu Zhongneng. According to Jiangsu Zhongneng's relevant internal policy, Jiang also breached the company's internal policy. At the end of October 2021, the SEHK accepted GCL-Poly forensic accountant's report, internal control recommendation, and the new auditor's financial results. The company's shares resumed trading and SEHK and other regulatory bodies did not take disciplinary action towards the company.

Lenovo Group Limited had its origins at Legend in mainland China, starting as a personal computer (PC) importer in 1984. After becoming China's largest PC manufacturer, it purchased IBM's PC business in 2005. It successfully evolved into a multinational corporation and a global leader in the PC market. In 2021, it held about 24% of the global PC market share. Despite its success in the PC market, in late 2019, Lenovo prepared for a reshape of its digital and IT service-led transformation. The company began prioritizing growth in IT solutions and services for their higher profit margins, and thus began the move forward into a global digital transformation. In April 2021, a new business segment, Solutions and Services Group (SSG) was strategically formed after a series of reorganization to include all of Lenovo's businesses that were not directly related to selling hardware directly to customers, and its data center services. One of SSG's services called Managed Services aimed at combining Lenovo's hardware, with software and IT services for clients, generating revenue from clients on a subscription basis. Ken Wong was appointed as President of Lenovo SSG to spearhead this transformation and oversee large growth targets. In mid-2021, Lenovo Chairman and CEO, Yang Yuanqing (YY), set a target for Ken to lead SSG to spearhead the company's growth and double the company's net profit margin in three years' time. In 2021, approximately 90% of Lenovo's revenue was generated from smart devices and hardware. The competition among IT solutions and services providers was intense with incumbents such as Microsoft, IBM Cloud solutions and Accenture dominating the market. How could Ken and his team transform the largest PC and laptop maker in the world to the next generation of IT solutions provider, and maintain a strong profit growth for the company at the same time as meeting the targets set for him by YY, his direct boss?

China Huarong Asset Management Co., Ltd. was a majority state-owned financial asset management company in China, with a focus on distressed asset management. On 30 June 2020, Huarong had around CNY1.7tn in total assets. It missed the deadline for its 2020 annual report filing to the SEHK at the end of March 2021, and its shares were suspended from trading after 1 April 2021. A major concern the investors had about the company was a direct result of the execution of its former chair, Lai Xiaomin, in January 2021 for financial crimes involving the abuse of power to allocate credit through Huarong. In April 2021, offshore US dollar bonds issued by Huarong plunged in value, and credit agencies downgraded the company's ratings as an issuer and as a company. There was also pressure on Huarong for the repayment of around CNY143bn in Chinese corporate debt due at the end of 2021. In order to reduce the risk of the market tumbling and to assist Huarong's cash flow, Chinese regulators asked Chinese banks to provide loans to the company, in order to stabilize the banking industry. In addition, the regulators suggested Huarong had the option of restructuring.

Victory City International Holdings Ltd. was principally engaged in the textile businesses and had subsidiaries in mainland China that manufactured and sold its own products. The company was founded in 1983 in Hong Kong, and it was listed on the main board of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (SEHK: 539) in 1996. On 22 February 2021, Victory City announced that, on 22 January 2021, Deloitte had obtained two credit reports as evidence that two of its main subsidiaries in mainland China had outstanding bank loans in the aggregate amount of CNY946m (USD148m). According to the credit reports, Victory City's mainland subsidiary signed bank facilities of CNY994m (USD156m) on 11 December 2020 with mainland banks, and a substantial portion of these loan amounts was not recorded in the consolidated financial statements of the company. If Deloitte's findings were valid, the company's management had possibly committed accounting fraud and embezzled funds by transferring a substantial portion of the unrecorded loan of CNY946m (USD148m) to their own pockets. After 22 January 2021, Deloitte, as the whistleblower, suggested remedial actions that the company should take, but no significant governance response was received and the management in Hong Kong denied any knowledge of the bank loans or the location of the funds. On 11 February 2021, Victory City filed a winding-up petition; it stated as one of the reasons that it had defaulted on a scheduled bank loan repayment of approximately HKD290m (USD37m) to a syndicate of banks in Hong Kong. On 19 March 2021, the Hong Kong government's Financial Reporting Council (FRC) initiated an investigation into Victory City's financial statements to determine the extent of the unrecorded loans. In addition, FRC was investigating whether Deloitte had conducted its work in accordance with the relevant auditing standards. Victory City requested that the trading of its shares be suspended at SEHK, effective 22 March 2021. On 27 April 2021, the

Samson Paper's 森信紙業 (SEHK: 731) main business was the manufacturing, trading, and marketing of paper products in China. After the company failed to file its year-end 31 March 2020 annual report before the deadline, the stock was suspended. Following the suspension, a board meeting was held on 11 July 2020, after which the board received resignation letters from one non-executive director (NED) and three independent non-executive directors (INEDs). In a public announcement on 14 July 2020, Samson declared that at the board meeting, Samson's auditors had advised: "There were substantial payments made to the company's connected party's suppliers. Such payments were booked to inter-company accounts rather than amounts due to the connected party." According to Samson's announcement, the NED, INEDs, and the auditor did not receive satisfactory replies from management on the commercial substance and intentions of these transactions during the meeting. The management denied any wrongdoing in relation to these transactions. On 18 July 2020, after the company had defaulted on a HKD780mn loan, it filed for voluntary liquidation.

The key objective of this case is to review an innovative product's supply chain, so as to identify its supply risks and to improve its supply chain resilience. When COVID-19 caught the world off guard in early 2020, Germagic Biochemical Technology (HK) Ltd. (GBT) was ready to introduce its disinfectant products that demonstrated long-lasting properties to eliminate more than 99% of infectious viruses and bacteria. Through testing and certification from different government authorities and health bureaus, the protagonist of this case, Hamilton Hung, co-founder of GBT has been working with partnering firms to build international recognition while exploring the export market. As a family run industrial business, Chiaphua Industries Ltd. faces many challenges in promoting Germagic products. Without global uniform standards and protocols in long-lasting disinfectant products, some customers are skeptical about their effectiveness. Exploiting the market need, different suppliers have flooded the market with certain products that are less effective than what they claim, while COVID-19 continues its devastation for the foreseeable future. On the flip side, it is also possible that COVID-19 may just disappear like many previous pandemics in human history, and that will cause a big drop in demand of such products. Facing all these challenges and market uncertainties, how could GBT expand into the local and regional markets by creating a more forward-looking, resilient supply chain that allows the company to stay ahead of its competitors? And how can it improve the distribution channels to promote customer products?

iQIYI Inc. (爱奇艺), which promoted itself as the "Netflix of China," was one of the three largest entertainment streaming platforms in mainland China. It was listed on the Nasdaq (NASDAQ: IQ) after being spun-off from Baidu Inc. (百度) (NASDAQ: BIDU). In April 2020, Wolfpack published a research report on iQIYI, accusing it of inflating revenue numbers, among other things. The report claimed iQIYI's revenue in FY2019 was overstated by 27% to 44%, equivalent to CNY8bn to 13bn. One of the accusations was that iQIYI recorded more than its own share in revenue, and included a large portion of its membership subscriptions bundled with services offered by its business partners.

Ant Group (螞蟻集團) was on course to raise HKD273bn in a dual offering on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (SEHK) and the Shanghai Stock Exchange's (SSE) STAR Market. Pre-IPO, Ant's value as a fintech was estimated at HKD2.43tn. As investors were subscribing en masse, China's central bank and finance regulators published a new draft legislation to regulate "micro-lending business operated by internet." What would have been the largest IPO in history was cancelled just two days before its scheduled listing on 5 November 2020. Ant spun off from its parent, Alibaba. It owns Alipay, one of the two largest digital payment systems in China. Ant diversified into a fintech business that included lending, wealth management, and insurance business lines among others. Ant's lucrative lending business, explosive growth, and business model disrupted the Chinese traditional finance industry. After the new legislation came into effect, Ant's capital reserve ratio for its CreditTech business would have to increase from the current 2% to 30%. This was expected to impact the size and growth of its lending business and therefore its value.

As artificial intelligence (AI) evolved, it started to be applied in a wide range of industries and functions. Its use allowed for the automation of data processing and handling. Many AI functions involved the use of robotic process automation (RPA) as a tool and machine learning skills to imitate human thinking. It could lead to increased productivity, improved accuracy in data input and processing, optimized revenue, and reduced cost. When AI was used in the accounting function, it could be applied in the areas of accounts payable, accounts receivable, procurement, expense management, consolidation, and trading management, among others. The results also assisted with internal control, compliance, and auditing as well as in making more informed management decisions. Radial Tires Company (RTC) manufactured radial tires in mainland China. The company was headquartered in Hong Kong, with five manufacturing plants in Shangdong and Jiansu. In a recent meeting with the holding company, David Lee, RTC's CFO, was told that from the next financial quarter on, the holding company required that RTC provide more extensive reporting and shorten reporting time. Lee was considering the use of AI technology to achieve this. But he had no experience with using AI for accounting and neither did his contacts at other manufacturing enterprises. Lee contacted FlexSystem, RTC's existing accounting and enterprise resource planning (ERP) software provider. FlexSystem would advise on the use of RPA, other AI tools, and automation processes to work with RTC's ERP and accounting software. It would also develop a proposal for RTC in which it would present a workflow using various IT solutions and describe how they could improve speed and efficiency in accounting processes, the estimated project time required and recommend key performance indicators to measure results and return on investment (ROI). Once FlexSystem completed the proposal, Lee, other department heads, and his CEO had to

The We Company (WeWork) rented office spaces for long-term leases, turned them into hip offices, and then offered them for short-term leases. Its charismatic cofounder and CEO Adam Neumann, explosive growth funded by significant cash injections from SoftBank and its USD100bn Vision Fund, and a pre-IPO valuation of USD47bn ensured the company was one of the most talked-about unicorns in August 2019. WeWork's valuation was similar to that of a high-tech stock with high price multiples. From FY 2016 to FY2018, its losses totalled USD3.3bn, outstripping revenue at USD3.1bn. After release of Form S-1 pre-IPO filing documents, numerous financial analysts and the press scrutinized WeWork. In addition to its lower than expected financial performance, some questioned WeWork's business model, its governance model, and its valuation. In the weeks that followed, the IPO was withdrawn, WeWork announced plans to lay off 2,000 staff, Neuman was removed as CEO, and Softbank doubled down on its bet in order to keep the company going. This latest share purchase by Softbank valued the company at USD8bn, compared to USD49bn two months earlier.

ArtGo Holdings Limited (HKSE:03313) was listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange's main board. The company mined marble in mainland China. In July, after MSCI, the index company, announced it would include the stock in the MSCI China All Shares Index, the share price shot up from around HKD2.0 to a high of HKD14.96 in November. Inclusion was expected to result in significant demand for this stock by passive investors. When MSCI announced it would not include ArtGo in its index after all, the share price dropped to HKD0.305 before share trading was halted on the morning of 21 November. Almost HKD46bn, equivalent to 98% of the shareholders' wealth, had been wiped out Stocks listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, one of the world's largest, are famous for their volatility. Without substantial changes in its business or economic outlook, stock prices have been known to go up multiple times. At the same time, it is not unheard of for a stock to lose most of its value within a single day. This case addresses a few interesting and important questions about stock valuation on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. Stock financing agreements between substantial shareholders and lenders can have a significant effect on the value of listed companies in Hong Kong. The same goes for market news and rumours. How can (minority) shareholders can avoid this kind of tail risk, and what are the problematic risk indicators in such cases? Does the regulator do enough to protect the interest of minority shareholders?

Hunan TV & Broadcast Intermediary Co. Ltd. ("TIK"), was listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (stock code 917), and it was recognized as one of the leaders in the TV industry in mainland China. Its major lines of business included TV broadcasting, TV and movie production, TV and movie distribution, and an advertising agency. A major client of TIK was Hunan Satellite TV, a related company of TIK. Hunan Satellite TV was the second most popular TV broadcasting station in mainland China. The chairman of TIK, 龙秋云[Long Quiyun], was replaced by 陈刚[Chen Gang] on 30 October 2017. Long was arrested later, on 11 January 2018, on charges for illegally accepting bribes. TIK also appointed three new executive directors in January and February 2018 out of a total of four. The shake-up was followed by a surprise financial result announcement. From FY2010 to FY2016, the company had reported profits ranging from CNY387m to CNY649m. When the company forecasted profits of CNY26m to CNY39m for FY2017 in a mandated forecast on 31 January 2018, investors knew profits for the year would be significantly lower as than the years before. On 26 April 2018, when the company announced a net loss for FY2017 of CNY464m on 26 April 2018, this came as an unwelcome surprise. Both FY2017 and FY2018 were subject to major write-downs in the value of several assets. The write-down provision in FY2017 was CNY411.1m, while for FY2018, it was CNY552.6m.