In the fall of 2013, the people of Ukraine disagreed passionately whether their country should intensify ties with the European Union or Russia. After President Yanukovych rejected the free trade agreement with the EU in November, thousands of Ukrainians peacefully protested. But the protest movement morphed into a violent, deadly confrontation in January, culminating in February in mass slaughter, an overthrow of government, foreign invasion, and international crisis. The four months that shook Ukraine is a case study on the interrelated problems of geopolitical struggle, politics of economic pacts and clash of regional economic blocks, post-imperial disintegration and trade, and identity and interdependence.
The spring 2014 acquisition of U.S. alcoholic spirits maker Beam Inc. by Japan's Suntory Holdings vaulted Suntory from 15th to third-largest international spirits company in the world. Yet Suntory had borrowed nearly the entire $16 billion purchase price, and relied on Beam to fund repayment of that debt. In October 2014, Takeshi Niinami became Suntory's president and CEO, the first outsider to run the family business since its 1899 founding. Niinami immediately faced governance issues-not least relating to his relationship with Beam CEO Matt Shattock-and sought to enhance Beam's production quality and consumer focus without alienating either Beam management and staff or the family that had placed their trust in him to run Suntory.
Supplements (A) case: The spring 2014 acquisition of U.S. alcoholic spirits maker Beam Inc. by Japan's Suntory Holdings vaulted Suntory from 15th to third-largest international spirits company in the world. Yet Suntory had borrowed nearly the entire $16 billion purchase price, and relied on Beam to fund repayment of that debt. In October 2014, Takeshi Niinami became Suntory's president and CEO, the first outsider to run the family business since its 1899 founding. Niinami immediately faced governance issues-not least relating to his relationship with Beam CEO Matt Shattock-and sought to enhance Beam's production quality and consumer focus without alienating either Beam management and staff or the family that had placed their trust in him to run Suntory.
For the first half of 2020, the COVID-19 crisis seemed on the verge of spiraling out of control. The business world struggled to figure out what COVID meant for macroeconomics. Extended restrictions limiting human interaction meant an end to normal economic production, and a resulting global economic crisis. France, Germany and the United States tackled the economic side of the COVID crisis through complex fiscal policy measures, with differing levels of success.
The collapse of central authority in the Soviet Union in 1991 ushered in a period of revolutionary transformations for the states that emerged in its wake. The leaders of Russia, the USSR's successor, struggled to reestablish central authority while also seeking to avoid further disintegration, establish a democratic polity, and institute a market economy across the next several years. Russia would navigate further economic crisis and a swiftly evolving geopolitical order as it returned to the world stage. The case examines the different governance approaches adopted by Presidents Boris Yeltsin, Dmitry Medvedev and Vladimir Putin, and concludes with a discussion of Russia's strategic challenges and opportunities in 2019. The case focuses on problems of state authority; fiscal capacity; institutionalization of political parties; relations between the federal center and provincial governments; relations between the state and big business; economic policy; international relations; and models of economic development.
Though the shale revolution transformed the U.S. into the largest producer of petroleum products, it was unclear how much success American exporters would find selling liquefied natural gas on the European energy market. Gazprom, the state-controlled Russian energy company, provided Europe with the majority of its natural gas. Many voices discussed European energy needs in terms of security or politics, but buyers and sellers of natural gas in the private sector approached the question from a somewhat different angle. This case, built around unique calculations that model the prices different European customers pay for gas, analyzes the strategic considerations and pricing decisions of Russian and American natural gas suppliers, and pushes students to consider the broader political context of energy in Europe.
CareerWise Colorado (CWC) is an organization that equips high school students with the skills to build successful careers through apprenticeships. Founded in 2016, the young organization has attracted interest from different groups and civic leaders from across the U.S., some of whom want to replicate CWC's model, and others who want CWC to bring and then operate its program in their localities. Noel Ginsburg, CWC's founder and CEO, and Ashley Carter, COO, now have to decide how, when, and where to grow CWC. They both believe in CWC's apprenticeship model's widespread applicability, but so far it is still a relatively small-with just over 200 active apprentices spread across two cohorts; all of whom live in Colorado-and unproven entity. As of late 2018, no apprentices had yet completed the three year program. They did not want to scale the program too soon, but Ginsburg and Carter also did not want to miss out on the attractive opportunities being presented to them. How should they scale this organization?
Italy's March 2018 elections led to a populist government which included the right-wing League and the anti-establishment 5 Star Movement. To respect their electoral promises, the two parties came up with a budget plan which provided for a public deficit at 2.4%, a figure higher than what the previous administration had promised the EU Commission. On October 23, 2018, the EU Commission rejected such plan asking Italy to revise downwards the public deficit. The same day, Italian bond yields spoke to 4-year highs, up to 3.7% as investors questioned Italy's capacity to repay its public long-term debt, the second highest in the EU. Would the Italian government be able to implement its plan?
Following a contentious presidential race, Donald Trump's 2016 election destabilized America's status quo. Academics, journalists, politicians and the public at large examined why Trump had won. Many Americans, inside and outside the government, asserted that a state-led Russian disinformation campaign had influenced the election's outcome. The leaders of major social media companies, including Twitter and Facebook, also conceded that state actors had gamed their platforms to influence American politics. Trump himself made conflicting statements, while Russian politicians asserted that American elites had rhetorically weaponized the issue of election interference to justify an unwillingness to work with their country internationally. It was hard to parse where reality ended and political rhetoric began. Post-election, the future of U.S.-Russia relations remained unclear, and the United States grappled with how to regulate cyberspace. Analyzing the 2016 election and its aftershocks helps students confront interrelated questions about business regulation, international relations, cultural identity, strategic communications, political will and the Internet. The case encourages students to consider the boundary between narrative and reality and examine subjectivity, objectivity, and power in the public and private sectors.
The case opens in November 2015, after the Turkish military's shooting down of a Russian military airplane over the Turkish-Syrian border. The incident threatened to undermine the countries' political and economic ties, and starting from late 2015, the dialogue between Ankara and Moscow was suspended for several months. The case explores the initial steps toward rapprochement in June 2016. The central dilemma is this: whether in light of the existing uncertainties companies operating in both countries can resume their investments and commercial activities, or should decisions be put on hold? What is the best strategy during such turbulent times? Can companies bet that a reunion would last?
The United States could enhance or threaten China's energy security but China was unsure of the U.S. intentions. China and the United States were both friends and potential foes. In the meantime, Russia's own ambivalent relationship with the United States and its Western allies worsened. In this context, China and Russia grew closer. Bilateral ties in the energy trade quickly improved: Russian oil exports expanded, while disagreements on the terms of natural gas supplies were resolved. The case describes the impact of the interplay of great power politics, domestic political considerations, and economic factors on the efforts of the Chinese and Russian energy companies to expand business ties.
In December 2014, Russia cancelled the South Stream pipeline that was envisaged to deliver natural gas through the Black Sea basin on to Europe and replaced it with a new pipeline through Turkey. The Turkish Stream was a great opportunity for Turkey to turn itself into an energy hub of its region. It had already secured TANAP, a natural gas pipeline to carry Azerbaijani gas to Europe through Turkey. The country's geographical position was one of its crucial assets: to its east lay 70% of the world's natural gas reserves, including Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Iraq, and the eastern Mediterranean basin. To its west was Europe, one of the biggest energy consumers of the world. If the Turkish Stream and TANAP pipeline projects were to go through and connect to other possible energy reserves within the wider region, would it be likely that Turkey would eventually become one of Europe's main energy corridors-perhaps even a hub? Was it less risky to remain as a transit country and secure its own energy needs at potentially lower prices? What would be the consequences of being even more dependent on Russian gas through the Turkish Stream? Would Turkey be able to prioritize economic gains and take advantage of the available resources in its south?
The 2014 Ukraine crisis once again exposed the mutually limiting knot-a web of commercial relationships and oil and gas pipelines-that historically tied the European Union and Russia closely. In this crisis, a familiar conundrum preoccupied minds in the corridors of power in Western capitals: how to compel Russia to respect the Western geopolitical preferences without harming European allies? The answer, as in the past, pointed to the lack of viable short-term solutions and the longer term need for gaining energy independence without sacrificing energy security in the EU. The case chronicles latest efforts, and its unintended consequences, by all-union authorities in Brussels to untie the Russian knot by implanting American inventions in the European soil: liberalized, transparent natural gas markets and shale gas production. Executives of European and Russian energy companies present their views.
In the fall of 2013, the people of Ukraine disagreed passionately whether their country should intensify ties with the European Union or Russia. After President Yanukovych rejected the free trade agreement with the EU in November, thousands of Ukrainians peacefully protested. But the protest movement morphed into a violent, deadly confrontation in January, culminating in February in mass slaughter, an overthrow of government, foreign invasion, and international crisis. The four months that shook Ukraine is a case study on the interrelated problems of geopolitical struggle, politics of economic pacts and clash of regional economic blocks, post-imperial disintegration and trade, and identity and interdependence.
In 2012, the energy sector in the United States was demanding major reform. Prices of oil and gas had continued to cripple the middle and lower class as the U.S. economy slowly recovered. At the same time, the U.S. lagged behind developed economies in production of renewable energy. The acceptance of climate change remained a partisan issue. The development of hydraulic fracturing (fracking) promised an abundance of accessible, cheap, domestically produced natural gas, but the cost to the environment remained a point of debate. As incumbent Democratic President Barack Obama faced Republican opponent Mitt Romney in the 2012 election, their (and their parties) stances on energy policy and the environment differed in several major areas. The results of the election would shape the country's energy policy for at least the next four years, and potentially create enough momentum to set energy policy of the United States for many years to come.
Russia and China are neighbors with complementary needs: Russia has an abundance of energy resources, which China needs to fuel its industry. The case analyzes the evolution of the China-Russia energy relations in the post-Cold War period, with an emphasis on the political factors, external and domestic, impeding and contributing to the full realization of the potential of energy ties between Russia and China.
In an overview of natural gas as a fossil fuel and traded commodity, the case describes various regional markets of natural gas, highlighting diversity of price formation mechanisms across and within those markets. Recent changes in the economics of unconventional natural gas extraction-"the shale revolution"-could potentially remake those markets, steering the world toward the "golden age" of natural gas.