This case describes the origins, design, and operations of a social enterprise that was working on the challenge of making high-skill employment opportunities available to non-speaking people with autism. Key to the organization’s efforts was a unique community model that provided the supports needed to activate the talents of a group of people who had historically been excluded from the labour market. These activities were an important part of the overall evolution of work that was happening in the early twenty-first century due to shifting social, technological, and competitive factors.
This case focuses on the efforts of Bavarian Nordic A/S, a Danish pharmaceutical company, to create a new COVID-19 vaccine. Their vaccine is based on a newer technology and has the potential to provide longer-lasting protection than the currently dominant BioNTech/Pfizer and Moderna vaccines. However, the project also faces obstacles related to uncertainty of vaccine efficacy, financing, product positioning, distribution, and access to production infrastructure. Indeed, given the head start of the incumbents’ vaccines, the dominance in this business of large pharmaceutical companies, and the multitude of other COVID-19 vaccines, some wonder whether the company should be going down this path at all.
A.P. Moller-Maersk (MAERSK), an integrated container logistics company based in Copenhagen, Denmark, has been on a decade long strategic transformation journey that was accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic. MAERSK’s ambitious strategic business transformation converted the organization from an unwieldy family-owned conglomerate to an integrated container and logistics company. This massive shift required new organizational capabilities, new leadership, and most importantly, a significant change in company culture. The transformation helped make MAERSK successful both from a business perspective (e.g., digital transformation, mergers, acquisitions) and from a culture transformation perspective. The company took appropriate steps to break away from a traditional culture without jeopardizing its core values. From a change management perspective, MAERSK’s 9,000 people managers evolved from “a victim mindset” within “a cycle of despair” to a “growth mindset” within “a cycle of hope.” However, the company faced several key questions about its future: “Why did it implement strategic change in the first place? What are the benefits of strategic transformation? Was the company’s transformation successful? What comes next? What challenges will it face in its consistent drive to be better?
This case deals with the challenges and learnings associated with the implementation of flexible work practices at TDC Group, Denmark’s largest provider of digital infrastructure and entertainment. The company has decided that most of its workforce should not return to the office as per normal before the COVID-19 pandemic lockdowns. The case examines TDC Group's vision of a new way of working and how it went about implementing the new program.
In September 2019, Mircom Technologies Limited faced a serious crisis after sustaining a ransomware attack. The medium-sized manufacturer based in Toronto, Canada had been offering smart building solutions for almost two decades. The attackers encrypted all of the company’s data, halting all business systems and processes that relied on information technology, including email, voice-over-Internet phones, manufacturing, billing, shipping, and receiving. The company was suddenly unable to conduct basic business operations. The attackers demanded a large payment in bitcoin in exchange for a decryption key that would allow the company to access its data. Over the next several weeks, Mircom Technologies Limited faced unforeseen challenges in its attempt to recover its data, negotiate with the attackers, and eventually find a way to successfully restore normal operations.
JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPMC), one of the world’s largest banks, was confronting the advent of open banking in its retail banking business. In late 2020, policy makers and regulators were advocating movement toward open banking with growing enthusiasm as a way to stimulate competition in the financial services sector and thus, encourage greater value creation for consumers. JPMC, however, seemed to embrace open banking while also resisting it, aggressively building out the technical infrastructure required for open banking while also blocking some third-party financial services companies from accessing customers’ Chase bank accounts, citing data security and privacy concerns. Open banking seemed fraught with risk, but might it represent new and significant opportunities for banks? In either case, what should the approach to open banking be for an established bank like JPMC?
This article explores how companies can make themselves more competitive by understanding how crises open the door to innovation, then offers advice on how to foster innovation in good times and bad. Thanks to the coronavirus outbreak, organizations around the world are experimenting like never before, and this forced increase in experimentation represents a unique opportunity to take innovation to a higher level because it is taking place while everyone’s standard operating environment has been disrupted. One lesson for organizations experimenting during the pandemic is that there can be value in mistakes. Making sure that you don’t miss the serendipitous opportunity of a lifetime requires the willingness to venture down a rabbit hole without being held back by your original objective. Working without a clear objective can be wasteful, but it also opens the door to finding something unique and valuable. At the same time, the tension that typically exists between an organization’s fiscal stewards and its creative folks exists for a reason—failure is costly. As a result, building an innovative culture that is also a sustainable and profitable culture is a balancing act.
As recently as 2017, General Electric (GE) had been touted as an example of how established companies could pre-emptively transform their businesses digitally, without waiting to be forced to do so by their competition. But in 2018, the wheels appeared to fall off GE's transformation, amid a crisis that included leadership changes, dividend cuts, credit downgrades, and a stock price crash. The company announced that it would sell GE Digital, the newly built-up organization at the heart of its celebrated transformation. This case examines the digital transformation that GE had been attempting and the challenges it encountered. Students will develop ideas about what happened and what GE’s experience means for digital transformation initiatives within other established firms.
In early 2018, Modena, Italy’s Pagani Automobili S.p.A (Pagani Automobili), a boutique designer and manufacturer of high-performance internal combustion engine powered supercars, was struggling to develop a response to the emergence of electric vehicle technology. This technology appeared to be interesting and potentially useful. It outperformed internal combustion technology in terms of speed and power. In 2018, relatively inexpensive electric cars could already accelerate faster than most supercars over a quarter-mile distance. However, the electric car driving experience seemed very different from the experience of driving a supercar powered by an internal combustion engine, due largely to fundamental differences between the technologies. Could Pagani Automobili build an electric vehicle that its customers would perceive as a true Pagani Automobili creation?
Big Hit Entertainment, a Korean-based producer of popular music content, was promoting its hit "idol group," BTS, as a serious entry in the world’s mainstream musical entertainment business, alongside global performers such as Justin Bieber. The "K-pop machine" represented a complex set of practices for producing performances, many of which were unique to Korea and criticized as being "overly manufactured." The case raises questions about the extent to which processes and institutions designed to generate commercially valuable creative outcomes could be developed into a reliable, repeatable, or standardized form. Could a formula be used to generate successful and creative products?
In 2015, the chief executive officer (CEO) of Hart Schaffner Marx, a 130-year-old U.S. maker of men’s suits and sport coats in Des Plaines, Illinois, set out to create an employment program for people with autism with the help of the company's partner, Autism Workforce. Unlike other similar employment programs, this program aspired to employ people who were seriously affected by autism challenges. The two partnering organizations had worked diligently to activate work skills in people with developmental disorders, and now sought to extend and leverage their initial successes. In 2017, the company’s CEO and owner was now facing decisions about how to extend and leverage the employment program’s initial success.
In 2015, the Copenhagen School of Entrepreneurship (CSE), the largest business incubator in Denmark, was admitting 100–125 new start-ups each year and attracting external funding of US$33 million from both public and private sources—all with an annual budget of US$435,000, funded exclusively by the Copenhagen Business School. Like most business incubators, CSE worked to provide entrepreneurs with training, mentorship, and investors, and to enhance their visibility in the market. It required all admitted start-ups to participate in a screening/selection tool and a set of incubation activities over three specific stages. The school measured success in terms of the number of incubator participants who had both a business customer and a sustainable business model at the end of a nine-month incubation period. In 2015, CSE's success rate was 53 per cent. At this point, CSE's leaders recognized a need to question how they measured the benefits of the program. How should the 53 per cent success rate be compared to the Copenhagen Business School's investment? What changes could the CSE leadership make to create more value for Danish society?
Vietnam has made impressive economic gains over a period of three decades, following the Doi Moi reforms of 1986. Before reform, the country’s socialist economy had been unable to displace the poverty that had plagued the country in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. After reform, Vietnam has experienced many years of sustained growth, as evidenced by its advances on several economic performance rankings. By 2014, Vietnam's rankings compared favourably with those of many of its Asian neighbours. A major feature of the country’s strategy for economic development was its emphasis on information and computing technologies. Students will analyze Vietnam's past successes to extract lessons that can lead to additional future success.
It took 19 years to build Knight Capital Americas LLC into the largest market maker on the New York Stock Exchange, but on August 1, 2012, it took only 45 minutes for the firm to be wiped out by an information technology (IT) problem: a change in the company's software caused it to lose more than $450 million dollars in less than an hour. Although it was ultimately saved from bankruptcy when it was acquired two days later, the terms of acquisition were very unfavourable to the company’s shareholders. How did this happen? Could it have been prevented? What should the staff, the chief executive officer, other managers and the board of directors have done differently? What lessons does this story hold for how firms should be managed and governed? And what does it say about our ability to manage risk in large modern corporations operating in increasingly fast-moving and complex global markets?
Tokyo Jane is an accessible fashion jewelry company that makes and markets its products as “luxury for less” by designing, importing and selling fashion jewelry pieces that look luxurious but cost only a fraction of the high-priced items that inspired them. Finished products are air-shipped to company headquarters in Copenhagen, Denmark from factories in China, stocked in the head office and delivered to 400 retail partners —small fashion boutiques, big department stores and online shops — who then sell to consumers in Europe, Scandinavia, the United Kingdom and Canada. The two partners who founded the firm in 2005 are facing several problems: the brand definition is not well enough developed to support the next stage in the firm’s growth, certain challenges have outstripped available human resources — they have only three permanent employees and a revolving number of interns — and distribution operations and management need to be rethought as the firm rapidly increases the scale of its operations. Things come to a head in April 2013, when they are confronted by an important customer about quality issues with their products. How can they not only save their company but continue to grow?