This Note introduces a module of cases used at Harvard Business School to teach fundamental concepts about navigating nascent industries and product categories. It elaborates a set of 'innovation tensions' that managers must address in these domains. In connecting the cases to scholarly research on nascent industries (including research by the author), the module builds out a structured process for identifying the tensions and proposes product-strategy sequences and operational processes for resolving them effectively. It concludes by describing core ideas an instructor can teach via the module's six case studies.
Category creation is the holy grail in business, but more often than not, the very companies that establish lucrative new markets don't end up being the category kings. Why? Many executives undermine their own ventures standing by misinterpreting and misfiring on strategies considered fundamental to creating new categories. Here, the authors spell out three common mistakes that turn would-be kings into commoners in the categories they create.
To succeed, a new company must rally investors, staff, customers, and the media around a good story. But often that narrative turns out to be wrong, and entrepreneurs realize they need to change direction. How that shift is communicated can have a huge impact on a venture's future. Through extensive research with founders, innovation chiefs, analysts, and journalists, the authors have identified stratagems for maintaining stakeholder support during pivots. Early on, entrepreneurs should avoid a focus on overly specific solutions and instead present the big picture. When changing course, they can then signal continuity by explaining how the new plan fits with the original vision. Once the reboot has happened, it's critical to be conciliatory and empathetic to stakeholders who may feel abandoned. Employees and customers are far more willing to remain loyal if given guidance about how they'll be affected and if leaders seem to genuinely care about their situation.
Brand-new markets are like the wormholes of science fiction, where the usual rules of time and space do not apply. When a market has just been born, the forces of competition there are constantly in flux, it's unclear who your customers really are, and conventional strategies just don't make sense. How then can you navigate this constantly shifting terrain? Over the past few years, two business school professors have interviewed entrepreneurs and corporate innovators in new fields such as genomics, augmented reality, and fintech. They discovered that the most successful ones practice something called "parallel play," exploring and testing the world the way preschoolers do. Instead of trying to differentiate their businesses, they observe what others in the market are doing and borrow ideas. After relentless experimentation, they commit to a single template for creating value. But rather than quickly optimizing that template, they leave it partially undetermined and pause, watch, and wait. As they gather serendipitous insights and the market begins to settle, they refine their models bit by bit.
Five years on from the 2008 financial crisis, Goldman Sachs remained wounded. Revenues at the global investment bank had stagnated below pre-crisis levels, and the firm had yet to rebound from a substantial decline in securities-trading revenues. Marcus by Goldman Sachs was one response-an effort that operated as a start-up but was sponsored by senior Goldman executives-to grow the firm's revenues by entering consumer banking with digital-only offerings. The move marked a dramatic cultural as well as product shift: the 150-year-old institution historically served only businesses and the wealthiest of individuals. In 2016, Marcus launched unsecured personal loans for the mass market; it rolled out high-yield deposits in 2017 and a credit card in partnership with Apple in 2019. By autumn of that year, Marcus had $5 billion in loans outstanding and $55 billion in deposits. It also faced a dilemma-ceaseless and rapid expansion had strained its people and infrastructure, yet Goldman expected Marcus to generate $1 billion in revenues in 2020. What now was the better bet, to pause to allow performance to catch up with growth or to seize the additional opportunities that beckoned for Marcus to diversify into consumer finance products?
This note focuses on the development of the drone industry in recent years and provides insights on the drone technology, regulations, applications, market size, top players, and ecosystem. This note was written in conjunction with the case study "Parrot: Navigating the Nascent Drone Industry" (HBS No. 619-085).
As he seeks to place the division he leads on a firm footing for the future, Tom Staggs, chairman of Walt Disney Parks and Resorts, is considering a range of investments designed to either upgrade the guest experience in the company's existing parks or to expand access to "the Disney magic" beyond the company's current efforts. The case invites students to reflect on the "job to be done" that the parks perform for their guests, as well as on how far Disney can go to accommodate those for whom the parks are out of reach while still maintaining a premium experience.
In 2018, Henri Seydoux, CEO and Founder of Parrot, believed that his company was at an inflection point in its history. Parrot had been a European leader in consumer electronics since the 1990s, first developing Bluetooth kits for cars before moving on to electronic toys and, significantly, the AR Drone in 2010 - a remote-controlled quadcopter that was way ahead of its time. In the years that followed, Parrot's sales volumes and popularity quickly increased. But new players were entering the market. Giant Chinese rival DJI, in particular, aggressively lowered its prices, forcing weaker companies out of the market. If Parrot was to survive the shakeout, Seydoux would have to figure out how to compete in an industry where even well-capitalized companies were collapsing. The questions that he faced were both strategic and urgent. Where to compete and how to win?
This short case, meant for pairing with HBS case 615-013 "AmazonFresh: Rekindling the Online Grocery Market," explores Amazon's rationale for acquiring Whole Foods.
After twenty years of growth unprecedented in the sports apparel industry, Under Armour finds itself with a new record to beat: making the leap from $5 to $10 billion in sales - a feat only accomplished to date by competitors Nike and Adidas. At the heart of this challenge is how Under Armour can maintain its brand's authenticity while adding new products that fuel future growth. The case traces the evolution of Under Armour's brand and describes how the company chose to extend or not extend its brand into adjacent categories and markets in the past. Now Under Armour needs to decide on their next steps. Should the company focus on its core markets? Should it stretch the brand into more adjacencies? Or should it consider something more radical, like app-related sales through subscriptions and wearable technologies?
Founded in 2008, Floodgate pioneered the "micro-VC" category, a new type of investment firm that raised smaller funds and made earlier, smaller investments in technology startups than traditional venture-capital firms. By 2015, Floodgate had raised three funds totaling $225 million and achieved outsize success with investments in high profile startups like Twitter, Twitch, Cruise Automation, and Lyft. Floodgate measured success in terms of its coverage of the top 10-15 exits in any given year. These "Thunder Lizards," which had the potential to change the business landscape and grow to Godzilla-like scale, accounted for 97% of returns. With increasing competition from micro-VCs and alternatives like crowdfunding, opportunity funds, and incubators, partners Ann Miura-Ko and Mike Maples wondered how Floodgate could continue to compete successfully in a rapidly changing venture-capital landscape. Should Floodgate stay with the micro-VC model it helped invent, or raise more capital, leveraging its successful track record to make investments at the scale of more traditional VC firms? In selecting a path, they needed to consider Floodgate's dual responsibility to entrepreneurs and LPs.
In 2013, a team led by Gopalan Sunderraman, vice president of corporate development at Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd.-one of the companies owned by Godrej Group, a large Indian conglomerate-was preparing to launch an innovative low-cost refrigerator. Developed expressly for the approximately 80% of Indians who lacked access to refrigeration (a market Godrej had never before targeted), the chotuKool represented a technological marvel-a small, inexpensive thermoelectric appliance powered by a rechargeable battery. The case traces chotuKool's development and evolution from an initial product concept inspired by theories of innovation and the strategic vision of Jamshyd Godrej (managing director and chairman at Godrej & Boyce Mfg.) to a promising new line of business that emerged from a process of learning and discovery through market feedback. As the company geared up for the broader rollout of chotuKool, Sunderraman and his team faced some tough questions. What was the proper target and scope for the launch? Which strategy gave them the best chance of success? Could chotuKool really redefine the company and bring refrigeration to hundreds of millions of Indians?