This case discusses how BOCHK utilizes and apply sustainable finance concepts to develop a new service - green mortgage which is the first ever green mortgage scheme offered in local market. The introduction of the scheme was considered as a substantial leap forward in the development of green finance in Hong Kong. The concepts was relatively new in Hong Kong in 2021. Being the first to navigate the uncharted water was not always an easy task, especially in a highly regulated industry and in a highly competitive market. Despite great deal of uncertainty involved in new product development, BOCHK did not diverge from its mission to promote ESG in Hong Kong. To transform a relatively fresh but abstract concept into a feasible product offer, BOCKH conducted extensive research on similar products across different countries, and held thorough communications with partnering property developers and relevant councils. The scheme was finally launched in Hong Kong in phases in September 2021 and received positive feedbacks from various stakeholders. Through the case, students will grapple with the following practical questions: 1) how should BOCHK roll out its green mortgage scheme and extend the scheme coverage? 2) How could management keep promoting this initiative? 3) Could this idea be expanded to other regions, Southeast Asia?
This case explores the reasons why Wirecard AG (Wirecard, FRA: WDI) could have concealed its fraudulent accounting practices for more than a decade. As a German payment processor and financial services provider founded in 1999, Wirecard became listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange in 2017 and one year after that, became a constituent stock of the DAX index. From 2017 when Wirecard was listed, the stock price rose from around EUR50 to almost EUR200 during its peak in 2018 with a market capitalization of more than EUR24bn. Despite its size and reputation, Wirecard was first alleged by whistleblowers about its fraudulent practices in early 2018. In-house legal team and news media started to uncover more and more truths later on. It was revealed that Wirecard had not properly obtained licenses for most of its overseas operations. For instance, the business addresses were faked, so as the cash at banks, revenues as well as profits. Not until KPMG issued a special audit report in April 2020 did the regulatory authorities take investigative actions. During June 2020, Wirecard's stock price fell to below EUR2, and below EUR1 two months later. The case seeks to highlight the accountability of different parties to the corporate governance failure, namely the management, board of directors/supervisors and audit committee, external auditors, and regulators. Through the case, students will grapple with the practical questions of how to understand and evaluate the effectiveness of corporate governance of a large-scale organization in multi-national setting.
This case revolves around a private hospital in Hong Kong. The hospital suffered a huge net loss during the preceding fiscal year, and the board of directors would like to improve cost management. Dr. Harris Pang, a prominent endocrinologist in the hospital, was appointed to review the existing costing model and to pinpoint opportunities for cost reduction. The case commences with an introduction of the "dual-track" system of the Hong Kong healthcare financial model. It then provides a brief background explanation of the hospital through four lenses: positioning strategy, organizational culture, financial structure and management, and the existing costing. The background information is intended to instill a key message: While the hospital focused on the value of operational excellence and patient-centered care, it failed to capture such value from patients due to inaccurate cost information. While considering the aforementioned case background, Dr. Pang began to design an alternative costing model that would improve the accuracy of cost information. He proposed adopting activity-based costing (ABC). Various costing systems have different results in terms of accuracy and administrative efficiencies. Based on the explanation of the costing methodologies, students are required to (1) compare the individual patient costs of different clinical considerations through the original and proposed costing models, (2) propose potential areas of application, and (3) acknowledge the embedded limitations.
Social impact assessment has become increasingly valued by social investors or funders to capture the value their investments can generate. As such, traditional nonprofit organizations ("NPO"), social enterprises and even corporate social responsibilities ("CSR") initiatives have to be accountable for the funds they receive. This case puts forward a novel discussion on how the performance and social impacts of social sector organizations are assessed in Hong Kong.
This case explores the audit considerations in relation to revenue arising from the operations of a cryptocurrency trading platform. The protagonist is Global Token Limited (Global Token or the Group, stock code: 8192.HK), which commenced its "blockchain technology-related business" segment in FY2018. In the year of commencement, the independent auditors issued a "qualified opinion" on the "commission and service income" recognized from the cryptocurrency trading platform (crypto exchange or cryptocurrency exchanges). In the following year, the auditors issued the same opinion on the same subject matter for the same reasons. Eventually, Global Token resolved to cease all blockchain-related operations during FY2020 owing to the alleged cost pressure. The case seeks to highlight the audit considerations at the stage of client acceptance and continuance. Through the case, students will grapple with the practical questions of how to identify the "assertions" in question, suggest the possible "what can go wrong(s)" (WCGWs) within Global Token's operating procedures, as well as what substantive procedures auditors could perform to obtain assurance in light of the assertions.
Green Monday began in 2012 in Hong Kong as a nonprofit organization advocating sustainability and a plant-based diet. After three years of consumer education, in 2015, the group set up a commercial branch, Green Common, as a retailer and wholesaler of plant-based groceries. In 2017, the group further diversified its business to set up an R&D company, which successfully formulated Asia's first plant-based minced meat, OmniPork, in April 2018. Two months later, it opened its first restaurant, Kind Kitchen. In November 2018, Green Monday Group officially launched in Singapore, its first international market, where it partners with a local distributor to sell plant-based products across the country. Currently, the Green Monday nonprofit movement is present in over 30 countries, while the Green Common commercial platform is available in 7 countries, with plans for China and the UK by the end of 2019. This growth was especially impressive in the pessimistic socioeconomic atmosphere in the second half of 2019, when both the local and global economy were doomed by political tensions. Green Monday Group is a "miracle" that performs strongly and surprisingly well in this negative climate. How does Green Monday Group commercialize a philanthropic idea with a sustainable business structure? What are the factors should it consider when it chooses its international market? What business model should it adopt in its overseas operations? How does it manage domestic and international supplier risk?
A sound internal control system does not only help organizations satisfy their legal and compliance obligations. It also provides assurance that an organization can achieve its objectives and reduce financial losses through timely response to internal and external risks, failures and weaknesses. This case walks through the whole process of how consultants review the internal control system of an organization in practice, from understanding client's needs and setting project objectives, defining the scope of the review, evaluating the design and operating effectiveness of the controls, to identifying and remediating control deficiencies.
This practice stands in stark contrast to the kind of NGO corporate governance that is prescribed by the Hong Kong government ("HKG"). Since the HKG launched its subvention approach to NGOs in Hong Kong in 2002, it has attempted to establish a code of practices for corporate governance in NGOs that are under its subvention. The code of practices advocates that NGO boards of directors should focus on areas that would ensure NGOs' legal and regulatory compliance, sound financial management, performance monitoring, and transparency. In addition, the best practice of having a diverse set of independent board members with different backgrounds and professionalism is encouraged. As one of the HKG's subvented NGOs, HKBU received 55% of its expenditure from the HKG subvention and grants in 2011-2012. As an organization that receives government funding and grants, that is, a subvented organization, HKBU is subject to the governance and audit system and framework imposed by the government. To a great extent, this governance and audit approach and framework is derived from the business sector's corporate governance practices. However, as a self-help organization for people with visual impairment, HKBU presents a compelling case for why these control and monitoring roles and practices of NGO boards should not necessarily be universally applicable to all subvented organizations in Hong Kong. Despite the HKG's guidance on the compliance and monitoring function of NGO corporate governance, HKBU sees its board, that is, the executive committee, and the Union's operation staff work closely as a unified team to achieve the NGO's missions and to facilitate fundraising. Against the backdrop of the HKG's governance advocacy, what roles and duties do HKBU's EC and its members fulfill? What are the results? And most importantly, why did HKBU adopt such practices?
Citi Hong Kong ("Citi HK") achieves good results in community engagement with its US$1.5 million annual spending. From a quantitative perspective, its team of less than 5,000 employees performed 23,867 volunteer hours in 2012. During the company's 2012 Global Community Day, 250 of its clients and over 4,000 Citi staff, including their family members and friends participated in volunteer work. In addition, over 36% or over 1,800 of the company's staff chose to participate in the company's Rainbow Day in 2012, through which they donated a lump sum to a charitable organization in exchange for an additional annual leave. From a qualitative perspective, the Hope Development Accounts ("HDA") program, a multi-year program that Citi HK has facilitated and supported since 2007, is among the first few, if not the first, programs that attempt to use asset-building approach for poverty-alleviation in the city. The success of the program hinges on the long-term participation of the volunteers of Citi HK; their contributions mean that Citi HK's support goes beyond monetary terms-the general and financial education offered and the coaching and guidance given are critical in empowering the program participants. How does Citi HK achieve these good results in community engagement with a contained budget? And what roles do its staff play? What does the company do to enable such a high level of staff participation?