In March 2019, Molson Coors CEO Mark Hunter considered a request to pull forward $65 million CAD in anticipated future funding for Truss Beverages, a Toronto-based cannabis beverage company that Molson Coors created in a joint venture with a Canadian cannabis production company. The request was for the construction of a new production facility for cannabis beverages, a new product in an as-yet-nascent market.
Having already made 10 acquisitions of competitors in the last decade, the CEO and Senior Vice President of Arrow are evaluating the acquisition of another small competitor to boost sales, become #1 in a niche market segment, and achieve economies of scale. They are struggling with whether the deal makes strategic sense given forecasts that this niche segment is declining, whether the price is too high given the competitor's lack of profitability, and how to integrate the company into Arrow to maximize its value if he does the deal. Provides information to permit valuing the acquisition and developing a post-merger integration strategy and plan.
Reed Hastings founded Netflix to provide a home movie service that would do a better job satisfying customers than the traditional retail rental model. But as it encountered challenges it underwent several major strategy shifts, ultimately developing a business model and an operational strategy that were highly disruptive to retail video rental chains. The combination of a large national inventory, a recommendation system that drove viewership across a broad catalog, and a large customer base made Netflix a force to be reckoned with, especially as a distribution channel for lower-profile and independent films. Blockbuster, the nation's largest retail video rental firm, was initially slow to respond, but ultimately rolled out a hybrid retail/online response in the form of Blockbuster Online. Aggressive pricing pulled in subscribers, but at a price to both it and Netflix. But a new challenge was on the horizon - the rapid growth of the company's online streaming service, which had a very different business model. Hastings' efforts to separate the activity into two separate companies met with strong pushback from consumers and the press. What was the best path forward?
How do you reduce headcount when almost everyone gets the same scores on performance reviews? HR vice president Nils Ekdahl confronts that question at Circale Corporation, a fictional electronic-components distributor that has just completed a series of acquisitions. Ekdahl wants to make the personnel cuts objectively, but the company's new performance-review system yields disappointing results: On a five-point scale, virtually every employee gets a 4 or 5 on each dimension. So Ekdahl instructs managers to redo the evaluations, tells them they're not allowed to give just 4s and 5s, and requires an average score of 3 across each manager's direct reports. This time the scores indeed average 3, but they are nearly all 3s. Grade compression at the top of the scale has merely shifted to the middle. Should Ekdahl initiate yet another round of performance reviews or make do with the data he has? The authors of this fictionalized case are Brian J. Hall and Andrew Wasynczuk, both of Harvard Business School. Expert commentary comes from John Berisford, currently of The McGraw-Hill Companies and formerly of Pepsi Beverages, and from Stephen P. Kaufman, currently of Harvard Business School and formerly of Arrow Electronics (the company whose performance-review system was the seed for this case). HBR's readers also weigh in.
How do you reduce headcount when almost everyone gets the same scores on performance reviews? HR vice president Nils Ekdahl confronts that question at Circale Corporation, a fictional electronic-components distributor that has just completed a series of acquisitions. Ekdahl wants to make the personnel cuts objectively, but the company's new performance-review system yields disappointing results: On a five-point scale, virtually every employee gets a 4 or 5 on each dimension. So Ekdahl instructs managers to redo the evaluations, tells them they're not allowed to give just 4s and 5s, and requires an average score of 3 across each manager's direct reports. This time the scores indeed average 3, but they are nearly all 3s. Grade compression at the top of the scale has merely shifted to the middle. Should Ekdahl initiate yet another round of performance reviews or make do with the data he has? The authors of this fictionalized case are Brian J. Hall and Andrew Wasynczuk, both of Harvard Business School. Expert commentary comes from John Berisford, currently of The McGraw-Hill Companies and formerly of Pepsi Beverages, and from Stephen P. Kaufman, currently of Harvard Business School and formerly of Arrow Electronics (the company whose performance-review system was the seed for this case). HBR's readers also weigh in.
Following the 2010 Gulf of Mexico explosion and oil spill caused by the Deepwater Horizon, public attention focused on BP's safety record, practices, and management culture as the primary causes of the disaster. Drawing on public sources, this case traces the circumstances surrounding the accident, including not only the role of BP but also those of the two principal subcontractors hired to actually do the drilling and capping of the oil well (Transocean Ltd. and Halliburton Energy Services). The case examines BP's safety record and prior accidents at a refinery in Houston in 2005 and along a pipeline in Alaska in 2006 and describes managerial changes imposed by the Board of Directors and safety programs instituted by Tony Hayward, the new CEO installed in 2007.
After Kaufman became a CEO, he was struck by how perfunctory the board was in its feedback on his performance. The chair of the compensation committee would pop by his office following the year-end board meeting, congratulate him on the company's making its numbers, and then hand him an envelope containing the details of his comp package before walking out the door. The entire exchange would last no more than 10 minutes. That sort of review was a big contrast from the intense evaluations Kaufman received as a senior executive--assessments based on input from many sources and on multiple dimensions of his performance. As chief executive, all of sudden his total worth was summed up in just three or four financial measures. Although CEOs should have autonomy, reducing performance management to only financial measures makes little sense. All the financial incentives in the world won't transform CEOs into better decision makers. And bad decisions can bring companies down. Boards have an obligation to shareholders to ensure that companies are led well, and the sooner they can spot problems with leaders' performance, the better. With that in mind, Kaufman encouraged Arrow Electronics, where he was CEO for 14 years, to adopt a formal process that obliged independent directors to talk to executives and observe operations firsthand. Directors considered CEO performance in five key areas: leadership, strategy, people management, operating metrics, and relationships with external constituencies. As a result, they picked up on problems Kaufman might not have noticed, provided counsel that made him a stronger leader--and avoided disasters along the way.
Most companies aren't half as innovative as their senior executives want them to be (or as their marketing claims suggest they are). What's stifling innovation? There are plenty of usual suspects, but the authors finger three financial tools as key accomplices. Discounted cash flow and net present value, as commonly used, underestimate the real returns and benefits of proceeding with an investment. Most executives compare the cash flows from innovation against the default scenario of doing nothing, assuming - incorrectly - that the present health of the company will persist indefinitely if the investment is not made. In most situations, however, competitors' sustaining and disruptive investments over time result in deterioration of financial performance. Fixed- and sunk-cost conventional wisdom confers an unfair advantage on challengers and shackles incumbent firms that attempt to respond to an attack. Executives in established companies, bemoaning the expense of building new brands and developing new sales and distribution channels, seek instead to leverage their existing brands and structures. Entrants, in contrast, simply create new ones. The problem for the incumbent isn't that the challenger can spend more; it's that the challenger is spared the dilemma of having to choose between full-cost and marginal-cost options. The emphasis on short-term earnings per share as the primary driver of share price, and hence shareholder value creation, acts to restrict investments in innovative long-term growth opportunities. These are not bad tools and concepts in and of themselves, but the way they are used to evaluate investments creates a systematic bias against successful innovation. The authors recommend alternative methods that can help managers innovate with a much more astute eye for future value.
Pandora.com provided a highly customizable online radio service tailored to listeners' musical preferences, and had registered explosive growth since its September, 2005 launch. But proposed changes in royalty rates threatened to kill off many Internet radio sites, including Pandora. Explores Pandora's business model, and whether it can evolve to remain viable.
Reed Hastings founded Netflix with a vision to provide a home movie service that would do a better job satisfying customers than the traditional retail rental model. But as it encouraged challenges it underwent several major strategy shifts, ultimately developing a business model and an operational strategy that were highly disruptive to retail video rental chains. The combination of a large national inventory, a recommendation system that drove viewership across the broad catalog, and a large customer base made Netflix a force to be reckoned with, especially as a distribution channel for lower-profile and independent films. Blockbuster, the nation's largest retail video rental firm, was initially slow to respond, but ultimately rolled out a hybrid retail/online response in the form of Blockbuster Online. Aggressive pricing pulled in subscribers, but at a price to both it and Netflix. But a new challenge was on the horizon: video-on-demand. How should Netflix respond?
Dollar General Corporation (DG) operates one of the leading chains of extreme value retailers in the United States. 2006 revenues reached $9.2 billion, making DG the 6th largest mass retailer in the country. With revenues growing at 9% annually over the five-year period up to 2005, DG had the distinction of being only one of three retailers to outperform Wal-Mart in both revenue and profit growth in that time. Life in a Dollar General store paints a vivid picture of the roots and historical focus of the company. Opportunistic buying has given the stores an eclectic merchandise mix. Analysts often referred to this category as "treasure hunt" SKUs. Offers an opportunity to examine a company's business model, particularly since DG has been so successful competing with Wal-Mart where so many other retailers have not. While it started out as a family business in the five-and-dime tradition, it evolved to a close-out retail model where its unique low-overhead operations were advantageous. As it added highly consumable categories its mix shifted, but it managed to retain its low-overhead model. Interestingly, the mix shift was likely more an emergency strategy driven by store level operations than by top-down driven strategy. Frames the growth options available to DG's CEO as he grapples with how to maintain growth.
Summarizes a model that helps managers determine what sorts of initiatives an organization is capable and incapable of managing successfully. The factors that affect what an organizational unit can and cannot accomplish can be grouped as resources, processes, and the priorities embedded in the business model. Demonstrates what kinds of changes are required in an organization and team structure for each different type of innovation.
Having already made 10 acquisitions of competitors in the last decade, the CEO of Arrow is evaluating the acquisition of another small competitor to boost sales, become #1 in a niche market segment, and achieve economies of scale. He is struggling with whether the deal makes strategic sense given forecasts that this niche segment is declining, whether the price is too high given the competitor's lack of profitability, and how to integrate the company into Arrow to maximize its value if he does the deal. Provides information to permit valuing the acquisition and developing a post-merger integration strategy and plan.
Hiram Phillips couldn't have been in better spirits. The CFO and chief administrative officer of Rainbarrel Products, a diversified consumer-durables manufacturer, Phillips felt he'd single-handedly turned the company's performance around. He'd been at Rainbarrel only a year, but the company's numbers had, according to his measures, already improved by leaps and bounds. Now the day had come for Hiram to share the positive results of his new performance management system with his colleagues. The corporate executive council was meeting, and even CEO Keith Randall was applauding the CFO's work. Everything looked positively rosy--until some questionable information began to trickle in from other meeting participants. It came to light, for instance, that R&D had developed a breakthrough product that was not being brought to market as quickly as it should have been--thanks to Hiram's inflexible budgeting process. An employee survey showed that workers were demoralized. And customers were complaining about Rainbarrel's service. The general message? The new performance metrics and incentives had indeed been affecting overall performance--but not for the better. Should Rainbarrel revisit its approach to performance management? In R0301A and R0301Z, commentators Stephen Kaufman, a senior lecturer at Harvard Business School; compensation consultant Steven Gross; retired U.S. Navy vice admiral and management consultant Diego Hernandez; and Barry Leskin, a consultant and former chief learning officer for ChevronTexaco, offer their advice on this fictional case study.
Hiram Phillips couldn't have been in better spirits. The CFO and chief administrative officer of Rainbarrel Products, a diversified consumer-durables manufacturer, Phillips felt he'd single-handedly turned the company's performance around. He'd been at Rainbarrel only a year, but the company's numbers had, according to his measures, already improved by leaps and bounds. Now the day had come for Hiram to share the positive results of his new performance management system with his colleagues. The corporate executive council was meeting, and even CEO Keith Randall was applauding the CFO's work. Everything looked positively rosy--until some questionable information began to trickle in from other meeting participants. It came to light, for instance, that R&D had developed a breakthrough product that was not being brought to market as quickly as it should have been--thanks to Hiram's inflexible budgeting process. An employee survey showed that workers were demoralized. And customers were complaining about Rainbarrel's service. The general message? The new performance metrics and incentives had indeed been affecting overall performance--but not for the better. Should Rainbarrel revisit its approach to performance management? In R0301A and R0301Z commentators Stephen Kaufman, a senior lecturer at Harvard Business School; compensation consultant Steven Gross; retired U.S. Navy vice admiral and management consultant Diego Hernandez; and Barry Leskin, a consultant and former chief learning officer for ChevronTexaco, offer their advice in this fictional case study.
A four-phase model of multinational corporate planning proves useful for evaluating and improving corporate planning systems. Advances in explicit formulation of issues and alternatives, quality of preparatory staffwork, participation and guidance by top management, and effectiveness of implementation mark each phase.