The case provides an opportunity to analyze sourcing decisions in a firm. Specifically, the case illustrates the development of a supplier scorecard system in an organization involved in new product development, where the technology of component design may change over time. The case also attempts to link the design of the scorecard mechanism to that of the incentives (or reward mechanisms) for various players.
This case describes the sourcing contract selection challenge faced by an electronics manufacturing company. The company must decide whether to continue the existing wholesale price contract, or should they switch to the quantity flexibility contract suggested by the supplier.
The case describes the contract selection issue by an embedded product manufacturing company towards the procurement of a component. The manufacturing manager is evaluating various procurement contracts. Currently, the company sources the component through a long-term wholesale contract combined with sourcing it from an alternate online platform. The supplier firm has suggested an options-based contract. The manufacturing manager is also planning to discuss buyback-based sourcing contract with the supplier.
This case study illustrates various incentives in the healthcare system using recent research in economics. Healthcare is important but it is difficult to objectively measure it from the perspective of providers, patients and third parties. Hence, incentives are used to motivate behavior in both providers and patients. The design of incentives is an enduring challenge and the case study tries to motivate managers to think through this problem in more detail.
This case describes the sourcing challenge faced by a firm which is involved in contract manufacturing of a device. The company must decide whether to continue as a contract manufacturer where they are engaged in a wholesale price contract, or they should get into the development of their channel by engaging with the design firm through a revenue sharing contract.
Every manager faces the problem of motivating employees to show up to work, focus on the assigned task, and work hard. In the absence of strong motivations to work or close monitoring by managers, employees tend to shirk, a phenomenon that economists call 'moral hazard'. In view of this problem, the worker's employment contract should be designed so that a part of the payoff (both monetary and non-monetary) is conditional on performance. In tasks where the manager can directly observe and monitor the worker's effort, designing such a conditional contract is easy. For example, a salesperson is offered a bonus directly depending upon the number of items he sells. However, when the effort is not so easily observable, overcoming potential moral hazard becomes harder. Using different policy experiments conducted with teachers in India, Kenya and United States, this case study explores how to motivate school teachers to turn up for class, teach well and put in maximum effort towards educating their students.
SATTVA eTECH is an electronics company involved in design and development of embedded new products. The senior manager of the company is working on the planning and execution of a defense project. Further, the manager is also evaluating the various alternative strategies to tackle uncertainties in the project network.
SATTVA eTECH is an electronics company involved in design and development of embedded new products. The company designs and manufactures client's requirements ranging from nuclear control systems to industrial automation systems. The company is analyzing the three potential design orders received from clients of different industry segments. One of the managers (Samidth in the case) has been assigned the responsibility to present his independent assessment of this order selection dilemma and present the entire detailed analysis to the company's top management.
Ferrero Group is a confectionery manufacturing company which produces a line of chocolates and chocolate spreads with hazelnut as the main ingredient. The company is the largest buyer of world hazelnuts (25%). The company procures hazelnuts from Oltan, the world's largest producer of processed hazelnuts with a market share of 25% to 30%. Ferrero purchases almost 70% of Oltan's hazelnut production. Recently, there was crop damage owing to which the harvest of hazelnut crop is low. This has increased the prices of hazelnut. One of the customers (Esha in the case) is concerned about the price increase of Nutella owing to such hazelnut supply issues. Hazelnut is a major ingredient of this chocolate spread. Esha is considering Ferrero's vertical integration, in which it may decide to purchase large producers such as Oltan. Further, she is also evaluating the implication of such a strategy for the final market prices of Nutella.
This note summarizes recent research on how information technology (such as mobile phones or internet) can be used to reduce costs associated with searching for prices, as well as the associated increases in social welfare.
Does discrimination on the basis of gender, religion or ethnic origin exist in the job market? Why do employers use these factors in hiring decisions? Is discrimination equally prevalent in different sectors and in the presence of countervailing information? Are reasons for job market discrimination justified? What are possible strategies for combating job market discrimination? This case examines these questions in the context of hiring in the entry level white collar job market in an emerging economy.
Why is allocating courses to students in universities a challenging task? How difficult is it for institutions to strike a balance between the students' preferences over courses and what they can make available given the feasibility and other constraints? What are the plausible short-term and long-term effects of this demand-supply mismatch on students' university experiences and career aspirations? What are the relative pros and cons of allocation mechanisms such as course auctions, rank-order lists and random serial dictatorship used by academic administrators? Can universities design better systems that are simpler, fairer and cannot be gamed yet put students in courses they want? This case attempts to answer these questions by primarily examining the course allocation problem as a two-sided matching issue.