Lea Block has tried to initiate digital transformation at Seuzach AG, a large global provider of medical devices for the health care industry. As marketing director, she has identified major shifts in German health care that demand that Seuzach changes its ways of approaching customers. Instead of targeting the specific needs of doctors in hospitals, Seuzach should rather address the new decision makers: the CEOs, CFOs, or CIOs of hospitals, who have a different buying logic. Seuzach should also leap into the future players in the industry through the application of digital innovations which allow for data driven, cloud-based digital services and business models that integrate data across the whole product range. In Seuzach's matrix organization (global product responsibility, supported by regional sales) Lea wants to convince the heads of marketing for the different product businesses to change. She seems to be able to quickly convince her colleagues of what she calls 'digital C-level marketing.' However, as soon as work is supposed to start, she realizes that commitments were less strong than she assumed. A few weeks later, Lea is clearly told that there will be no support for her. The short case study is set when Lea realizes the failure of her digital transformation initiative. This case is an update of the case Anna Frisch at Aesch AG: Initiating lateral change, a sanitized case that was set in 2007, in response to demands from students to have more up-to-date case as a basis for classroom discussions. As compared to the original case, this case provides an update of the developments in the German healthcare sector and puts stronger emphasis on the technology-related aspects of the proposed changes.
Supplement to case ES1691. This four-part case series can be used to discuss business ethics, compliance/governance, integrity management, reacting to and preparing against corruption in the context of internationalization and allows to also briefly touching upon the issue of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Case (A) describes a challenge IKEA was facing, while trying to enter Russia in 2000. The company was preparing to open its first flagship store on the outskirts of Moscow, only the first of several planned projects. After substantial investments in infrastructure and logistics, IKEA focused on marketing, but quickly faced a sudden complication. Its major ad campaign in the Moscow Metro with the slogan "[e]very 10th European was made in one of our beds" was labeled "tasteless". IKEA had to stop the campaign because it "couldn't prove" the claim. Soon Lennart Dahlgren, the first general manager of IKEA in Russia must have realized that the unsuccessful ad campaign was going to be the least of his problems: A few weeks before the planned opening, the local utility company decided not to provide their services for the store if IKEA did not pay a bribe. What should IKEA and Lennart Dahlgren do? Was there any alternative to playing the game the Russian way, and paying? The subsequent cases (B), (C), and (D) describe IKEA's creative response to the challenges described in case (A), and then report about new challenges with alleged corruption within IKEA and in the legal environment, and finally raise the question whether IKEA can be considered to have a social responsibility to fight corruption on a societal level in order to build the platform for its own operation in Russia.
Supplement to case ES1691. This four-part case series can be used to discuss business ethics, compliance/governance, integrity management, reacting to and preparing against corruption in the context of internationalization and allows to also briefly touching upon the issue of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Case (A) describes a challenge IKEA was facing, while trying to enter Russia in 2000. The company was preparing to open its first flagship store on the outskirts of Moscow, only the first of several planned projects. After substantial investments in infrastructure and logistics, IKEA focused on marketing, but quickly faced a sudden complication. Its major ad campaign in the Moscow Metro with the slogan "[e]very 10th European was made in one of our beds" was labeled "tasteless". IKEA had to stop the campaign because it "couldn't prove" the claim. Soon Lennart Dahlgren, the first general manager of IKEA in Russia must have realized that the unsuccessful ad campaign was going to be the least of his problems: A few weeks before the planned opening, the local utility company decided not to provide their services for the store if IKEA did not pay a bribe. What should IKEA and Lennart Dahlgren do? Was there any alternative to playing the game the Russian way, and paying? The subsequent cases (B), (C), and (D) describe IKEA's creative response to the challenges described in case (A), and then report about new challenges with alleged corruption within IKEA and in the legal environment, and finally raise the question whether IKEA can be considered to have a social responsibility to fight corruption on a societal level in order to build the platform for its own operation in Russia.
Supplement to case ES1691. This four-part case series can be used to discuss business ethics, compliance/governance, integrity management, reacting to and preparing against corruption in the context of internationalization and allows to also briefly touching upon the issue of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Case (A) describes a challenge IKEA was facing, while trying to enter Russia in 2000. The company was preparing to open its first flagship store on the outskirts of Moscow, only the first of several planned projects. After substantial investments in infrastructure and logistics, IKEA focused on marketing, but quickly faced a sudden complication. Its major ad campaign in the Moscow Metro with the slogan "[e]very 10th European was made in one of our beds" was labeled "tasteless". IKEA had to stop the campaign because it "couldn't prove" the claim. Soon Lennart Dahlgren, the first general manager of IKEA in Russia must have realized that the unsuccessful ad campaign was going to be the least of his problems: A few weeks before the planned opening, the local utility company decided not to provide their services for the store if IKEA did not pay a bribe. What should IKEA and Lennart Dahlgren do? Was there any alternative to playing the game the Russian way, and paying? The subsequent cases (B), (C), and (D) describe IKEA's creative response to the challenges described in case (A), and then report about new challenges with alleged corruption within IKEA and in the legal environment, and finally raise the question whether IKEA can be considered to have a social responsibility to fight corruption on a societal level in order to build the platform for its own operation in Russia.
This four-part case series can be used to discuss business ethics, compliance/governance, integrity management, reacting to and preparing against corruption in the context of internationalization and allows to also briefly touch upon the issue of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Case (A) describes a challenge IKEA was facing, while trying to enter Russia in 2000. The company was preparing to open its first flagship store on the outskirts of Moscow, only the first of several planned projects. After substantial investments in infrastructure and logistics, IKEA focused on marketing, but quickly faced a sudden complication. Its major ad campaign in the Moscow Metro with the slogan "[e]very 10th European was made in one of our beds" was labeled "tasteless". IKEA had to stop the campaign because it "couldn't prove" the claim. Soon Lennart Dahlgren, the first general manager of IKEA in Russia must have realized that the unsuccessful ad campaign was going to be the least of his problems: A few weeks before the planned opening, the local utility company decided not to provide their services for the store if IKEA did not pay a bribe. What should IKEA and Lennart Dahlgren do? Was there any alternative to playing the game the Russian way and paying? The subsequent cases (B), (C), and (D) describe IKEA's creative response to the challenges described in case (A), and then report about new challenges with alleged corruption within IKEA and in the legal environment, and finally raise the question whether IKEA can be considered to have a social responsibility to fight corruption on a societal level in order to build the platform for its own operation in Russia.
In 2002 the management team of Deutsche Lufthansa AG was considering the upcoming threat from low-cost airlines in the context of an increasingly complex and competitive strategic environment. Finally the decision was taken to respond to the innovation by opening an own low-cost carrier, Germanwings in late 2002. But over time the business model of Germanwings was modified repeatedly. The case series covers * Lufthansa's considerations regarding various options to respond to the competitive challenges brought up by the emerging low-cost airlines such as easyJet or Ryanair in 2002 (Case A), * the foundation of Germanwings in late 2002 and some early successes until 2005 (Case B), and * some more recent changes in the Germanwings business model in the following five years until end of 2010 (Case C).
In 2002 the management team of Deutsche Lufthansa AG was considering the upcoming threat from low-cost airlines in the context of an increasingly complex and competitive strategic environment. Finally the decision was taken to respond to the innovation by opening an own low-cost carrier, Germanwings in late 2002. But over time the business model of Germanwings was modified repeatedly. The case series covers * Lufthansa's considerations regarding various options to respond to the competitive challenges brought up by the emerging low-cost airlines such as easyJet or Ryanair in 2002 (Case A), * the foundation of Germanwings in late 2002 and some early successes until 2005 (Case B), and * some more recent changes in the Germanwings business model in the following five years until end of 2010 (Case C).
In 2002 the management team of Deutsche Lufthansa AG was considering the upcoming threat from low-cost airlines in the context of an increasingly complex and competitive strategic environment. Finally the decision was taken to respond to the innovation by opening an own low-cost carrier, Germanwings in late 2002. But over time the business model of Germanwings was modified repeatedly. The case series covers * Lufthansa's considerations regarding various options to respond to the competitive challenges brought up by the emerging low-cost airlines such as easyJet or Ryanair in 2002 (Case A), * the foundation of Germanwings in late 2002 and some early successes until 2005 (Case B), and * some more recent changes in the Germanwings business model in the following five years until end of 2010 (Case C).
Around 6:00 p.m. on May 31, 2007, Urs Müller and Christoph Burger from ESMT European School of Management and Technology were getting prepared for the presentation. In about an hour they would present their proposal for an executive education program to the CEO of Energie aus Deutschland Systems (EAD Systems) and two of his senior HR managers. Sitting in the lobby of a hotel in western Germany next to the main entrance of the EAD Systems headquarters, Urs recalled the pitching process by scrolling through his notes. ESMT's pitch to EAD Systems" describes the efforts of ESMT European School of Management and Technology to acquire EAD Systems as a client for an executive education program. The case study comprises two parts, A and B, which allow comprehensively reviewing sales management in a professional services firm.
Around 6:00 p.m. on May 31, 2007, Urs Müller and Christoph Burger from ESMT European School of Management and Technology were getting prepared for the presentation. In about an hour they would present their proposal for an executive education program to the CEO of Energie aus Deutschland Systems (EAD Systems) and two of his senior HR managers. Sitting in the lobby of a hotel in western Germany next to the main entrance of the EAD Systems headquarters, Urs recalled the pitching process by scrolling through his notes. ESMT's pitch to EAD Systems" describes the efforts of ESMT European School of Management and Technology to acquire EAD Systems as a client for an executive education program. The case study comprises two parts, A and B, which allow comprehensively reviewing sales management in a professional services firm.
This abridged case deals with the quest for boundaries of corporates' social and environmental responsibility. It poses the question where the responsibility of a company might start or end in a given context and once the company has been able to assess the extent to which it holds itself responsible, what action it ought to take in this regard. In the case of Axel Springer the question is focused on the aspect how much responsibility the company might have for its supply chain: how far and how deep down the supply chain does or should responsibility of a corporation reach? On what facts does this responsibility depend? The publishing house Axel Springer AG serves as good example as it wonders about the scope of their responsibility: After making the strategic decision to move aggressively into the field of digital news and media, the company wonders about their responsibility for digital devices, in particular with respect to conflict minerals that are extracted for the production and use of such electronic devices under highly problematic conditions.
On Thursday January 27, 2011, hundreds of thousands of protesters in Egypt were vociferously demanding an end to the 30-year rule of President Hosni Mubarak, and to the state of emergency he had let prevail, and nurtured during that tenure. The protest movement was expected to gather even greater momentum following the afternoon prayers the next day, a Friday. The communication and connectivity through social media had acted as a key catalyst in enabling the protesters to coordinate their actions. President Mubarak's government decided to strike hard at the lifeline of this virtual medium, by exploiting some of the rights that the state of emergency had accorded them. That afternoon, the government ordered the three main voice and data communications providers in Egypt - Vodafone, Mobinil, and Etisalat - to suspend services in selected areas. Among these areas was Tahrir Square ("Freedom/Martyrs' Square") in Cairo, the biggest nucleus where protesters had assembled. Later, the government would also instruct these communications providers to broadcast propaganda text messages to all their subscribers, imploring them to be on the side of the Egyptian Army, which the government said was the true protector of Egypt. When Hatem Dowidar, CEO of Vodafone Egypt, heard about the government's order, he was about to take a crucial decision. He knew that the situation in Egypt was being observed closely from all over the world. Dowidar also realized that the course of action he opted for would have consequences not just for Vodafone Egypt, but also for the parent Vodafone Group. He contemplated the possible consequences, well aware that any decision he took would invariably evoke strong reactions.
On Thursday January 27, 2011, hundreds of thousands of protesters in Egypt were vociferously demanding an end to the 30-year rule of President Hosni Mubarak, and to the state of emergency he had let prevail, and nurtured during that tenure. The protest movement was expected to gather even greater momentum following the afternoon prayers the next day, a Friday. The communication and connectivity through social media had acted as a key catalyst in enabling the protesters to coordinate their actions. President Mubarak's government decided to strike hard at the lifeline of this virtual medium, by exploiting some of the rights that the state of emergency had accorded them. That afternoon, the government ordered the three main voice and data communications providers in Egypt - Vodafone, Mobinil, and Etisalat - to suspend services in selected areas. Among these areas was Tahrir Square ("Freedom/Martyrs' Square") in Cairo, the biggest nucleus where protesters had assembled. Later, the government would also instruct these communications providers to broadcast propaganda text messages to all their subscribers, imploring them to be on the side of the Egyptian Army, which the government said was the true protector of Egypt. When Hatem Dowidar, CEO of Vodafone Egypt, heard about the government's order, he was about to take a crucial decision. He knew that the situation in Egypt was being observed closely from all over the world. Dowidar also realized that the course of action he opted for would have consequences not just for Vodafone Egypt, but also for the parent Vodafone Group. He contemplated the possible consequences, well aware that any decision he took would invariably evoke strong reactions.
The case deals with the quest for boundaries of corporates' social and environmental responsibility. It poses the question where the responsibility of a company might start or end in a given context and once the company has been able to assess the extent to which it holds itself responsible, what action it ought to take in this regard. In the case of Axel Springer the question is focused on the aspect how much responsibility the company might have for its supply chain: how far and how deep down the supply chain does or should responsibility of a corporation reach? On what facts does this responsibility depend? The publishing house Axel Springer AG serves as good example as it wonders about the scope of their responsibility: After making the strategic decision to move aggressively into the field of digital news and media, the company wonders about their responsibility for digital devices, in particular with respect to conflict minerals that are extracted for the production and use of such electronic devices under highly problematic conditions.
In its 100th year of existence in 2009, Borussia Dortmund (BVB) was the only German soccer club listed on the stock exchange. With three days to go before the annual shareholders' meeting on November 24 of that year, the club's managing directors, Thomas Tress and Hans-Joachim Watzke, went through the year-end figures one more time. Although the situation had improved since 2005, when the club was on the brink of insolvency, the closing accounts once again showed a negative net income. After nine years as a publicly traded company, the BVB had to report its fifth loss, this time for 5.9 million Euro, which added up to a cumulative loss of more than 145 million euros. After the passing of a century, many stakeholders were concerned about the way forward. What was the organization's purpose? What was more important, finally making a profit and meeting shareholders' expectations, or playing for the fans and the club's honor? What could the managing directors offer to their shareholders, who had seen the value of their shares drop from 11 euros at the IPO to less than 1 euros in November 2009?
The case describes a critical external incident which will have fundamental consequences for a small but very successful family business. At the beginning of 2010, Konnopke's Imbiss was considered to be one of the, if not the most famous snack bars in Berlin. This family-owned business was especially famous for the legendary "Currywurst", a Berlin invention that consists of a sausage fried in hot oil and served with ketchup, chili sauce, curry-powder and French fries. The Konnopke Imbiss main branch was located in the Berlin district of Prenzlauer Berg, which was considered to be one of the "coolest" districts of Berlin. Konnopke's had become a Berlin fast food icon, winning critical acclaim in almost all major Berlin travel guides. But at the same time, the snack bar did not any longer seem to fit to its environment which had changed from a working class district, to a posh neighborhood mainly consisting of young freelancers and tourists.
The case describes the joint venture negotiation between Mr. Hartmut Holgebretsen, vice president of sales at Euroland Motors, in the English-speaking country of Norland, and Mr. Wu Chang, deputy president at Munchao Motors Import (MMI) in Munchao. It serves as information for a negotiation exercise. The negotiation takes place after the agreement on an initial letter of intent. However, MMI wanted to reopen a few issues before signing a final contract on the import of gas and diesel engines. The case contains "General information" that is available to both negotiation parties. In separate case supplements, Supplement (A): "Negotiation brief for Euroland Motors" and Supplement (B): "Negotiation brief for MMI," the two parties receive confidential information that is exclusively for them and should not be made available to the other party before the negotiation exercise. The case combines three levels of discussion: a) business issues, b) cross-cultural issues, and c) ethical issues (especially "dirty" negotiation tricks, intellectual property rights, confidential information, and corruption).