This case covers a common issue concerning traditional manufacturers in the digital era. As we know, Chinese manufacturers mainly focus on products and make profits by ramping up capacity and expanding dealer channels. As the Chinese economy shifts to a lower gear, this type of business model leads to overproduction and market saturation while also failing to meet consumer demand for more personalized products. In the digital era, therefore, traditional manufacturers need to change their business model to transform their business structure. While such a goal may be clear, how to reach it is a different matter. Founded in 2011, SAIC Maxus, a Chinese auto manufacturer, began exploring the C2B (Customer to Business) model in 2016, shifting from a product-centric approach to a user-centric one and from standardized mass production to personalization and smart customization. To this end, it had to adopt a new business model and digitize the entire manufacturing process and supply chain. With no precedent in the market to fall back on, how did SAIC Maxus figure out the C2B model from scratch? How did its C2B model help digitize the traditional value chain of the auto industry? What challenges would the C2B model face in the next step? What lessons does SAIC Maxus' exploration of the C2B model hold for other traditional manufacturing companies?

This case examines a universal question: How can a tech startup (such as an AI or big data startup) address the pain points of traditional vertical industries through technological innovation and create value? Some tech startups set ambitious goals, which demand significant and sustained investments in R&D, but fail to plan for commercial development in order to remain viable: when funding runs out, they go bust. Others aim for low-hanging fruit in more easily accessible markets, at the expense of pursuing their original goal; once engaged on this path, it is extremely difficult to change course and build an iconic name. The issue, then, is how tech startups should strike a balance between "aiming too high" and "taking a faster route." The LinkDoc Technology (hereinafter "LinkDoc") case was compiled as one way to find answers to these questions. The case examines how LinkDoc, specializing in big data and serving the vertical healthcare industry, found its own answers to these issues and, more specifically, how it identified and entered its target market segment, and subsequently found a way to commercialize its technology and create a viable business.

Since China's reform and opening up, in merely four decades, the GDP of the city of Shenzhen has grown more than 10,000-fold. The city's development in the past 40 years has been underpinned by industry transformation and innovation, and the Huaqiangbei area in the city epitomizes this development process. Forty years ago, Huaqiangbei was a completely inconspicuous street in Shenzhen, but riding the wave of China's reform and opening up, Huaqiangbei has emerged and gradually grown to be widely known around the world as "China's No. 1 Electronics Street." How should we assess Huaqiangbei's journey of exploration and development? How many rounds of industrial upgrading and market transformation has Huaqiangbei experienced in the course of its development? Also, as the saying goes, nothing lasts forever. After its explosive growth propelled by the knockoff cellphone business, Huaqiangbei soon found itself cornered by the rapid development of e-commerce and mobile Internet technologies. How should it stand up to new challenges and identify new growth opportunities?

This case describes how EVCard, a car-sharing business in China, was created from scratch using a lean startup approach through observing overseas peers, analyzing market opportunities, building a startup team and conducting feasibility studies. The company formed at a time when the commercialization of new energy vehicles (NEVs) in the country was in its infancy, public awareness was low, and viable domestic models did not exist. The case describes how EVCard first developed a minimum viable product and improved on it incrementally through closed testing and a pilot. The firm eventually expanded its Shanghai model to 64 cities across the country, offering more than 42,000 vehicles from more than 13,000 stations to four-million-plus members. They generated nearly 100,000 daily reservations as of November 2018. EVCard's entrepreneurial journey will show students that in a changing market environment, startup companies can develop competitive advantage through rapid learning and product iteration.

Yiliu Tech was established in 2006 to reform road freight in China and address its lack of transparency with information technology. Its philosophy was built on the concept of "logistical transparency", i.e., providing digitalized services to road freight suppliers and customers. These services use real-time positioning and other physical vehicle data collected via various devices and sensors. Of the three stages of logistical transparency, Yiliu Tech has undergone stages 1.0 and 2.0 in the past ten years and is now transitioning from business digitization to data-driven services. How important is logistical transparency, and what do Logistical Transparency 1.0, 2.0, and 3.0 actually mean? How should Yiliu Tech use logistical transparency and logistics big data to optimize logistical decision-making, design more innovative services and make them widely accessible? Against the backdrop of industry-wide transformation and upgrading and the opportunity presented by strategic investment from Cainiao Network Technology (hereinafter "Cainiao"), what path should Yiliu Tech take to pursue its goal of Logistical Transparency 3.0?

This case describes how Opple Lighting, a leading company in China's lighting industry, developed its e-commerce business as online selling brought wholesale changes to the traditional market. Numerous questions emerged as the company embarked on its e-commerce journey. The gulf between online and traditional offline distribution channels in lighting meant that many management figures opposed the move, seeing it as a threat to long-established business lines. Opple's e-commerce team needed to find a way to gain recognition and business support from other departments. While flexible pricing is common in offline stores, price transparency is a defining feature of e-commerce. The next hurdle was ensuring that the e-commerce business avoided direct competition with offline channels. Traditional lighting fixtures are the result of long-term R&D and are subsequently produced in large quantities, whereas e-commerce products undergo rapid iteration and come in small batches. The final challenge for this department was to determine how to iterate new products and which distribution channels to use. The case chronicles the development of Opple's e-commerce business unit between 2012 and 2019. During this period, the team continuously optimized different links, including product development, production, manufacturing, logistics, warehousing, marketing and after-sales service. It also adjusted organizational structure, pursued an innovative talent management approach and improved its performance incentive system. The BU's efforts paid off as online sales rose to make up 30% of total revenue in 2019, up from 6.5% in 2003. E-commerce became a new growth driver for Opple. The BU also spearheaded changes in the company's working culture, structure and incentive system. In 2020, however, Opple witnessed a decline in both online profit and growth rates as competition intensified. What lessons can Opple draw from its journey into e-commerce to be better prepared for the future?