The case follows the design and creation of a software innovation lab at Volkswagen. Particular issues explored include the role and structure of internal innovation groups, establishing culture and defining business models for innovation, and developing strategy for innovation in an established enterprise environment.

This case describes the transformation of the UK's oldest financial services franchise from a product-aligned and brick-and-mortar traditional banking institution to a customer-aligned and digital-first technology organization. The case parallels Lloyds' business transformation with the growth of its digital-focused Transformation division - which commenced as a small hundred-person task force and ultimately grew to comprise one third of the bank's 70,000 employees.

This case details how semiconductor company PMC-Sierra implemented different corporate entrepreneurship strategies to take advantage of two major industry disruptions: 1) the transition from hard disk drives to solid state drives; and 2) the rise of cloud computing. The core business of PMC-Sierra's enterprise storage business was developing products called controllers that interfaced directly with hard disk drives. The company sold these controllers to the world's largest storage equipment manufacturers, including HP, Dell, and IBM. The case focuses on the years 2010-2012, during which the company strove to develop a new type of controller optimized for solid state drives-while maintaining the strength of its existing core hard disk drive business. With the rise of cloud computing, PMC-Sierra added a major new customer base: giant cloud service providers like Amazon, Google, and Facebook. As these cloud service providers grew in strength, they upended the industry supply chain, negatively impacting PMC-Sierra's traditional core customers such as Dell and HP. The big challenge, and opportunity, for PMC-Sierra was to retain its current large customers while capturing new growth opportunities. The case ends in 2012 at a decision point for PMC-Sierra. Should the company continue building solid state drive products internally, given that it was emerging from two major setbacks-or look for an acquisition possibility, which would be very expensive? Either way, the company had to decide how to organize its next development effort, drawing from corporate entrepreneurship lessons it had learned in the previous few years. Additionally, the company had to decide whether to develop a newer, but riskier, technology on the horizon. Could PMC-Sierra launch and maintain development of two new technologies, or would it have to choose one or the other?

The (B) case starts with PMC-Sierra's decision to acquire for $100 million a solid state drive controller business, which included a prototype and a team of 50 people. The company also acquired intellectual property required to build PCIe switches-a related product family that was newer and cutting edge, but riskier to develop. After the acquisition, PMC-Sierra created a new, isolated business, the Non-Volatile Memory Solutions Group (NSG), and protected NSG's resources. To encourage rapid decision making, PMC-Sierra rolled marketing, R&D, and technical support under NSG's leader. NSG was indeed able to move quickly to produce a new product. At the same time, carving out this dedicated business meant that PMC-Sierra lost some efficiencies in the company as a whole. The acquisition and formation of NSG also put some burden on other parts of PMC-Sierra, as NSG required dedicated attention and resources during its start-up phase. A few months after the acquisition, PMC-Sierra leadership shut down the existing internal group working on the solid state drive controller, because the company had two teams and two sets of products. This proved to be one of the company's biggest tradeoffs-and an unpopular decision. Along with that decision, the company opted to develop the newer, riskier product that it had acquired the intellectual property for, PCIe switches.

I@NS was intended to mimic the experience of founding a start-up, getting it funded, building a product, and taking it to market, with all the potential risk and reward this entailed. Except, of course, this particular start-up experience would occur within Nokia Corporation, a 150-year-old global company with 103,000 employees working in more than 100 countries-a company that described its mission as "creat[ing] the technology to connect the world." Given this rather unusual "start-up" environment, the creators of the program had no idea how it would all unfold. But, they went ahead and established it, evangelized it to Nokia Software employees around the world, judged the first round, and then launched a second round, which was still underway at the time this case was written. In the process of creating I@NS, its founders learned many important lessons about encouraging and supporting innovation and a start-up mentality within an established corporation. The case covers many elements of the design and implementation of an innovation program including: Strategic objectives of innovation processes; Defining success; Determining the scale and scope of new ventures; The staging of the innovation process; The gating and funding decision making process; The definition of the strategic objectives behind the innovation process; Communicating the process to the wide organization; Communicating (the go/no go) gating decisions; Identifying and allocation resources; Recruiting evangelists and mentors; Team formation and composition; How the process interacts with and impacts the culture in the organization; Incentives for innovation; Career development paths for innovators; Attitudes to risk.

I@NS was intended to mimic the experience of founding a start-up, getting it funded, building a product, and taking it to market, with all the potential risk and reward this entailed. Except, of course, this particular start-up experience would occur within Nokia Corporation, a 150-year-old global company with 103,000 employees working in more than 100 countries-a company that described its mission as "creat[ing] the technology to connect the world." Given this rather unusual "start-up" environment, the creators of the program had no idea how it would all unfold. But, they went ahead and established it, evangelized it to Nokia Software employees around the world, judged the first round, and then launched a second round, which was still underway at the time this case was written. In the process of creating I@NS, its founders learned many important lessons about encouraging and supporting innovation and a start-up mentality within an established corporation. The case covers many elements of the design and implementation of an innovation program including: Strategic objectives of innovation processes; Defining success; Determining the scale and scope of new ventures; The staging of the innovation process; The gating and funding decision making process; The definition of the strategic objectives behind the innovation process; Communicating the process to the wide organization; Communicating (the go/no go) gating decisions; Identifying and allocation resources; Recruiting evangelists and mentors; Team formation and composition; How the process interacts with and impacts the culture in the organization; Incentives for innovation; Career development paths for innovators; Attitudes to risk.

In 2010, only 16 percent of Americans were streaming movies and television shows online. By the end of 2011 that number would almost double, and the entertainment industry began barreling towards a digital future. This case follows Netflix, Hulu, Amazon, and HBO through the year 2011 as they launched and improved their streaming video capabilities. Though Netflix had historically been the most popular player in the streaming video market, Hulu, Amazon, and HBO had deep pockets and various incentives for entering this market and by the end of the year the competitive advantages of each player had begun to emerge.

In 1997 Reed Hastings founded Netflix on the heels of a $750 million exit of his first venture-a software company. The premise was simple: Hastings believed that he could leverage the high-performance culture and data-drivenness embodied by tech companies to succeed in the DVD-rental-by mail business. Within a decade Netflix was bringing in more than a $1 billion in revenue a year and revered as one of the most innovative companies in Silicon Valley. This case covers four distinct eras of Netflix, spanning from 1997 to 2015: A.) the Pre-IPO Era, within which Netflix withstood the dot com bubble and settled on a successful DVD-rental-by-mail business model; B.) The DVD Growth era, within which they held an initial public offering and scaled their business to more than 850,000 subscribers; C.) The Introduction of Streaming era, where Netflix introduced their online video-on-demand service and eventually pivoted to offering streaming only subscriptions; and D.) the Content era, within which Netflix began producing their own exclusive television shows and movies to in response to the ever rising costs of content licensing.