In May 2024, the National Company Law Tribunal of India approved the merger of Star India Private Limited (Star India) and Viacom18 Media Private Limited (Viacom18). Star India was a broadcasting service owned by The Walt Disney Company and Viacom18 was a media company owned by Reliance Industries Limited. The two companies had been working on an agreement to merge the two media and entertainment businesses since December 2023. A new subsidiary of Viacom18 was planned to integrate Star India with an immediate capital investment of US$1–1.5 billion. Facing financial challenges, Viacom18 and Star India saw this merger as a strategic solution to enhance competitiveness and address profit declines. However, questions about regulatory challenges and potential changes in content and service offerings had to be addressed before the deal to be finalized.
In March 2020, the chief innovation and strategy officer (CISO) of Amsterdam-based Koninklijke Philips NV (Philips), a global leader in health technology, was surveying the distance that Philips had traversed in its transition from products to platforms. The CISO faced three managerial dilemmas: How could he transform the long-standing functional orientation at Philips into a multidisciplinary alignment? How could he ensure that Philips’s customer-facing teams moved from a transactional mode to a relational mode? And how could he motivate employees to deal with a burning platform when they did not see one?
In February 2019, the associate product owner of the Branch Rapid Labs at the Bank of Nova Scotia (Scotiabank) was asked to provide his knowledge and expertise to develop the final iteration of a new customer onboarding process. The new model developed for Scotiabank, one of Canada’s Big Six banks, was named Project Fusion. Working closely with cross-functional teams, the associate product manager was advising his product team on how to best proceed after the completion of the final round of user testing trials. With all user trials on the latest prototype completed, he had a significant amount of feedback to analyze and results to implement in the project.
In February 2020, the director of Global Creative Intelligence at McCormick & Company, Inc. (McCormick), was grappling with some challenges at his desk at the company’s headquarters in the United States. Having been mandated to deploy Artificial Intelligence (AI) in developing new products—in partnership with IBM—he had been interfacing with over 500 product developers at the company’s various locations worldwide. The director faced three managerial dilemmas: How should he get the company’s product developers to trust the findings of AI? How could he teach and train AI to become smarter? And how should he deal with the global-local dynamics at McCormick in launching AI-engineered products?
Amazon.com, Inc. (Amazon) India expanded Amazon Food into the food delivery market in March 2021 amid a pandemic and the ensuing lockdown. The move surprised the industry, especially considering that Swiggy and Zomato Ltd. (Zomato), the two key players in the food delivery business, were facing an all-time slump and that restaurants were seeking to move away from aggregators to create their own ordering platform. Zomato and Swiggy, a duopoly in the food service aggregator (FSA) space in the country, had been struggling to keep cash burn low, squeezing delivery-executive commissions, executing mass layoffs, and scaling down profit-draining cloud kitchens. Although the timing of the launch appeared risky, Amazon India’s confidence to take on the established players and challenge the status quo stemmed from its size, reach, resources, technological prowess, reliability, trust, and goodwill. In a market scenario where safety and hygiene standards were set to change forever and the odds were stacked against FSAs, the industry and consumers were expecting a tough battle. Amazon had to reassess whether its strengths would be adequate to help it make satisfactory inroads into the industry, confront the obstacles, and overcome the ongoing slump and make good on its decision to be the new entrant when the established players were bearing the brunt of not only the pandemic but also a deeply divided restaurant industry.
In April 2018, the two co-founders of SafeMotos, a motorcycle taxi service in Rwanda, in Central Africa, were examining their expansion plan. Their start-up had not yet become profitable, but they were already making plans to expand into the neighbouring Democratic Republic of the Congo. They were also driven by the larger goals of replicating their tried and tested growth model in other cities on the African continent and moving quickly into the underserved city transportation markets of Asia and the Far East. As they reviewed their four-year experience of working in Africa, they were facing a singular question: What should be the roadmap for scaling up their ride hailing service?
In March 2018, the managing director of Maha Research Labs Private Limited, a pharmaceutical company in India, was charting his 2020 vision for the company. His ambitious plan was to achieve net revenue of ₹1 billion in 2018 and to have a pan-Indian presence and sales revenue of ₹2 billion in 2020. The managing director knew that the company would need to expand rapidly over the next year to meet these goals. First, however, he needed to assess several factors that would be key to deciding the sales targets. He also needed answers to some serious questions: How should the sales organization be designed? What sales force structure would be appropriate? Should the company opt for a generalist sales force structure or a specialist sales force structure? What was the optimal size for the sales force? What processes should the company follow to design the sales territories?
In early 2017, the vice-president, Enterprise Innovation, at Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC), one of Canada’s leading banks, encountered roadblocks in partnering with a fintech firm as part of the bank’s open innovation strategy. The vice-president wondered how she could leverage the learnings from her experience with onboarding the fintech firm to better manage future open innovation projects at the bank. Streamlining the onboarding process was a priority, as was dealing with internal pushback. The vice-president thought about the role of the facilitator in this process, and whether she should pursue an enterprise innovation lab within the bank.
In 2012, a pilot study undertaken by the data services team of the Dow Chemical Company in the polymer division of the multinational company’s Midland, Michigan, plant had revealed an uncanny trend on the company’s shop floor. Plant engineers were working for the data; the data was not working for them. The data services director saw an opportunity to reverse the trend through the deployment of big data capabilities and, more specifically, enterprise manufacturing intelligence (EMI), a subset of big data. How should he gain user acceptance of the proposed EMI?
Founded in 2008 in Singapore and China, ActSocial was a social marketing company that initially provided brands with word-of-mouth (WOM) marketing services. The firm then adjusted its model to focus on providing online social media and digital content marketing services. After significant success from 2013 to 2015, ActSocial was fully acquired by Linkfluence, a leading global social media monitoring and research company. As part of this larger company, the new leadership team at Linkfluence Asia now needed to decide how to proceed and wondered if they would have influence over the direction of their product, hiring decisions, team-building, and growth plans.
In late 2014, Dropbox, the San Francisco-based pioneering cloud-based file storage service, was at an important stage of its growth. Its user base had expanded into hundreds of millions of users globally, and the company was expanding its service offerings to organizations. At the heart of this expansion was the ever-increasing acquisition of customers in the software-as-a-service (SaaS) model. As Dropbox targeted larger customers, it needed to carefully allocate its limited resources and continually evaluate the appropriate sales approach because of the highly competitive nature of the cloud storage market. The head of the Strategic Finance team needed to recommend how Dropbox could most effectively invest its limited resources. Should it invest in the self-serve, inbound approach, or opt for the more proactive and costlier outbound approach?
On January 18, 2016, the chief executive officer and chief technology officer of Geosoft Inc. (Geosoft) met in Toronto, Canada, with the company’s executive team and regional directors for a critical three-day strategic planning session. Geosoft was a privately held, employee-owned, mid-sized global company that worked to help earth scientists and explorers make discoveries through innovative data solutions and services. The focus of the meeting—a new technology strategy to protect Geosoft from the impact of a global economic downturn affecting its primary markets—was pivotal to Geosoft’s current and future growth. This new strategy, known within Geosoft as the digital intimacy strategy, would radically change the way the company communicated with its customers. Geosoft’s customers were located in five major geographic regions: Latin America, Africa, Australia (including Asia), Europe, and North America. Rolling out the strategy demanded seamless communication of change to multiple stakeholders in vastly differing cultures across five continents. The new digital intimacy strategy was planned for rollout in September 2016 with implementation in 2017. For the new strategy to work, communication was crucial.
In 2015, iQmetrix, a company founded in 1999, developed and sold point-of-sale (POS) software using the software-as-a-service model. Two iQmetrix enterprise account managers were discussing strategies for closing a software subscription deal with a large customer who asked for significant customization to be completed before the deal could be signed. The customization appeared to be critical for the customer, and the account managers thought the added functionality might be valuable for the rest of the company’s customer base. iQmetrix’s product was specialized for use by mobile wireless retailers, and the company was the current market leader with approximately 60 per cent of the POS market in Canada and the United States. The company’s executives now needed to make a decision. Should iQmetrix commit to the customer’s request for significant customization?
Joyus is a growing online video shopping marketplace specializing in women’s health, beauty and fashion products. After three years of operations and having recently secured substantial funding, the company is poised for future growth. The co-founder and chief executive officer faces the difficult challenge of building the right management team and the appropriate organizational structure to support the company’s desired growth. She needs to structure the organization from a human resources perspective, by evaluating the organizational needs and determining the right mix of skills, abilities and personalities required for success.
Joyus is an ambitious and high-potential company just transitioning out of start-up mode. After three years operating in the growing online video shopping marketplace, all the while developing new technology, business partnerships, and fundraising, Joyus is positioning itself for the next level. The company’s goal is to become the dominant player in the rapidly developing video-based ecommerce marketplace. The chief executive officer and her management team need to analyze and evaluate the company’s strengths and weaknesses and decide on the strategic direction of the company.
A burgeoning mobile application entrepreneur has developed an interesting potential product with her friends. However, when she encounters an investment opportunity, she decides to seek legal advice for the first time in her business life. As a result of her initial meeting with a lawyer, she realizes how unprepared she is and some of the tough questions that she will need to answer.
The president of Vic Progressive Diamond Drilling, a Canadian enterprise based in Sussex, New Brunswick that provides products and services to mining companies, is reviewing the progress in the market launch of SkyTrack, a new product designed for use in difficult terrain exploration by large mining corporations. Feedback during field trials has been favourable; the innovation is, in fact, customer-led. There is also evidence that this multipurpose vehicle saves time and money in transporting mining equipment across rough terrain in remote areas. But the company has yet to make its first sale in two years because the user community is experiencing a difficult economic environment and is unwilling to make capital investments. How can product adoption be generated? What customer value proposition can be developed? Can SkyTrack be positioned as a means to improve cash flow for customers during difficult times, or should customers be primed to adopt it when the inevitable uptick in exploration occurs?
It took 19 years to build Knight Capital Americas LLC into the largest market maker on the New York Stock Exchange, but on August 1, 2012, it took only 45 minutes for the firm to be wiped out by an information technology (IT) problem: a change in the company's software caused it to lose more than $450 million dollars in less than an hour. Although it was ultimately saved from bankruptcy when it was acquired two days later, the terms of acquisition were very unfavourable to the company’s shareholders. How did this happen? Could it have been prevented? What should the staff, the chief executive officer, other managers and the board of directors have done differently? What lessons does this story hold for how firms should be managed and governed? And what does it say about our ability to manage risk in large modern corporations operating in increasingly fast-moving and complex global markets?