In 2021, Hitachi Limited was reconsidering its ownership of Hitachi Construction Machinery (HCM). The decision about HCM’s future was one of the last steps in a more than decade-long effort to reorient Hitachi from a manufacturing conglomerate to a service-oriented company. HCM was a global player in the construction and mining equipment business, and although it no longer relied on Hitachi for product technology, Hitachi’s technological capabilities might once again become more valuable to HCM as automation and electrification of construction and mining equipment gained importance. Would there be greater synergies from more closely integrating HCM with Hitachi’s other businesses, or would both sides be better off if HCM was completely independent?
In September of 2020, an international business executive at the North Dakota Trade Office was asked by a client company, Dakota Growers Pasta Company Inc., to advise it on how to increase pasta exports to South Korea. Like many other firms in North Dakota, the client faced a number of hurdles to building successful export businesses. These included limited exposure to foreign markets and limited expertise in trade-related regulations and processes, as well as logistical issues. In his role, the business executive aided local companies’ efforts to develop and sustain export businesses. The client company now needed to find a new distributor to grow sales in the South Korean market, but selecting the right one required deciding which market segment to focus on first. The business executive had to determine what advice he should he give to his client company about expanding in South Korea.
Japan's number-one apparel brand and retailer, Uniqlo Co. Ltd. (Uniqlo), built its business by delivering high-quality basic casual clothing at low prices. Uniqlo's founder and chief executive officer of Uniqlo's parent company, Fast Retailing, stated that his goal was to become the world's number-one apparel retailer. He argued that success in the U.S. market was crucial to meeting this goal; yet, Uniqlo USA was not doing well. In mid-2017, after more than a decade of efforts, Uniqlo USA had relatively few stores and continued to lose money. As the gap between its goals and performance continued to diverge, the company needed to re-examine its U.S.-based business and potentially its globalization strategy altogether.
In July 2014, the expatriate CEO of McDonald’s Japan (MDJ) faced a crisis after a video was broadcast accusing one of the company’s China-based food suppliers of serious health and sanitation violations. Although MDJ was the biggest brand in Japan’s fast food industry, the company’s sales had been falling since 2008, and its profitability had deteriorated dramatically since 2012. The CEO, who had recently taken over at MDJ, urgently needed to turn around the company’s situation and deal with the crisis at hand. How could she reassure Japanese consumers and put the company back on the road to growth?<br><br>See supplement 9B15M084.
This case is a supplement to 9B15M083. In February 2015, the sales of McDonald’s Japan had continued to slide, despite the implementation of new pricing and the introduction of new food items. The company posted a loss for 2014, citing costs in dealing with the Shanghai Husi debacle and the impact it had on sales. However, numerous reports of foreign objects in McDonald’s food items had resulted in the loss of consumers’ trust. How should the expatriate CEO rebuild the company’s position in the Japanese market?
Human resource (HR) management practices in Japan are significantly different from those in Europe and North America. A knowledge of the traditional Japanese HR system, including practices relating to recruiting and compensation, unions and the labour market, is crucial for foreign companies operating in Japan as well as those seeking to do business with Japanese firms. While Japan’s distinct HR system was once considered a source of competitive advantage, changing economies and labour markets have called its current effectiveness into question. The traditional system primarily provided stable long-term employment for full-time employees; however, for a variety of reasons, non-regular forms of employment, including part-time and short-term positions, are on the rise. HR managers in Japan must consider relevant societal and economic changes and develop more effective HR systems in response.
In 1998, Boots PLC was in the midst of planning to enter the Japanese retail drugstore market. Boots, a household name in the United Kingdom and a fixture in traditional English shopping areas known as High Street, had an impressive lineup of Boots-branded health and beauty products. Boots developed, manufactured, marketed, and sold these products through its chain of Boots The Chemists stores. Management was convinced that the markets for health and beauty products were becoming increasingly global. Although Boots made few international sales at this time, it was in the midst of expanding overseas and had identified Japan as a particularly attractive market to enter.<br><br><br><br>International retailing efforts can prove difficult, as many failed international ventures show. Japan presented a number of unique challenges and required careful planning and attention. Boots had dispatched a manager to Japan to work on market entry and had been discussing a joint venture to develop several pilot stores together with Mitsubishi Corporation, one of Japan’s large trading companies. Mitsubishi had a great deal of clout in Japan, something Boots lacked, and was interested in the retailing venture. The case centres around the question of whether Boots should go ahead with the joint venture with Mitsubishi, and also facilitates a broader consideration of the market attractiveness and market entry in general.
In 2006, the Japanese subsidiary of Tommasi Motorcycles, an Italian manufacturer of high-end motorcycles, was implementing a new customer data application to help its motorcycle dealerships increase the effectiveness of their sales and marketing activities. Horizon LLP, a consulting firm, was Tommasi’s global implementation partner for the application. To identify any dealer concerns regarding the new system, Tommasi Japan had brought in additional consultants from Horizon to conduct interviews with the dealers. As the consultants soon discovered, the dealers’ concerns with Tomassi went far beyond the new application. An unannounced visit by an influential dealer set all the players on a collision course, and soon exposed their widely differing views and a number of fundamental problems in the relationship between Tommasi Motorcycles Japan and its dealer network.<br><br><br><br>The case begins with a series of separate dialogues involving the director of sales and marketing; the expatriate president of Tommasi Motorcycles Japan; an influential owner of multiple dealerships; and two non-Japanese consultants from Horizon. When they meet in the board room of Tommasi Motorcycles Japan, the ensuing conversation reveals a number of issues: opportunistic behaviour by the bilingual director of sales and marketing, who limits and shapes communications between the dealers and Tommasi’s Japanese National Office; a limited understanding of local market conditions by expatriate Tommasi management; frustration on the part of business-savvy dealers; and naiveté on the part of the consultants, who do not see the social hierarchies at work, nor realize that their cultural and language fluency, which has in past projects always been an asset, could also be a threat.
In 2004, Kaneo Itoh, president of the consumer electronics firm Pioneer Corporation, was considering acquiring the plasma display operations of another Japanese firm, NEC. Pioneer had decided some years ago that plasma display panel (PDP) technology was a good strategic area in which to invest. Recently, Pioneer had been selling increasing numbers of plasma television sets using PDPs. While the company was building a new PDP production facility that would soon become operational if demand continued to increase, additional capacity would become necessary. Buying NEC’s plasma operations would give Pioneer this capacity, the potential for realizing scale economies, and some valuable intellectual property NEC had developed. Itoh had to make a decision: Should Pioneer buy NEC’s plasma business?
Faced with major losses from operations, Sharp Corporation’s young and unconventional president questioned the company’s long-standing operating model. Sharp was a leader in the area of liquid crystal display (LCD) technology and manufacturing. It also held strong positions in several categories of consumer electronics in the Japanese market. Although Sharp had been increasing its involvement in overseas markets, it had yet to replicate its successes overseas. Sharp’s operating model placed sensitive, high-value-added operations such as research, development, and component manufacturing near its headquarters in Japan. The company jealously guarded its LCD knowhow and had implemented strict security measures at its LCD panel plants. As Sharp’s international sales grew, limitations with its business model became more apparent. Operating primarily in Japan had drawbacks, such as exposure to currency risk, high infrastructure cost, and high taxes. Additionally, the logistics of shipping large items overseas, such as LCDs and solar panels, presented other dilemmas. Sharp needed to reconsider this model and develop an approach that was more suitable to the environment in which it now competed.
A recent Ivey study confirms the commonly held view that General Electric is an excellent breeding ground for future business leaders. This article summarizes the study and its three conclusions: Firms led by CEOs who were trained at GE will outperform firms led by CEOs who were not; GE's reputation for developing CEO talent is, in fact, well deserved and not mere hype; and GE appears to develop more CEO talent than other noted CEO talent-generating firms.
In January 1997, Sir John Craven, a highly respected investment banker and chairman of the investment bank Deutsche Morgan Grenfell, was offered the chairmanship of Lonrho, a conglomerate with headquarters in London, England, and operations primarily in Africa. Lonrho's more significant interests were in hotels, mining, agribusiness and trading. The company was experiencing financial trouble, and was no longer respected by the financial community in London. Tiny Rowland, the tycoon entrepreneur who built the firm, had recently been fired. The firm lacked the leadership and direction it needed to remove itself from its current financial troubles and prosper in the future. Sir John needed to decide whether he should accept the offer of the chairman position, and if he did, what direction Lonrho should take. Supplements From Lonrho to Lonmin (B): Restructuring a Conglomerate, product 9B05M068 and Lonrho (C): Lonmin, product 9B05M069 look at the Sir John's decision and the company's focus.
In this supplement to Lonrho PLC (A): An African Conglomerate, product 9B05M067, Sir John Craven discusses his decision to accept the chairman position. It also looks at the general direction taken by Sir John, and how Lonrho had faired as it took this new direction. Lonrho has decided to focus on mining in Africa and dispose of non-mining related assets.
A highly respected investment banker was offered the chairmanship of Lonrho, a conglomerate headquartered in London, England with operations primarily in Africa as outlined in Lonrho (A): An African Conglomerate, product 9B05M067. The investment banker's decision is discussed in From Lonrho to Lonmin (B): Restructuring a Conglomerate, product 9B05M068. This supplement looks at the next step in the firm's strategy development, to consider whether the company should focus on a particular type of mineral extraction, and if so, what kind.
In early 2003, WestJet's management was reviewing its plans for growth, and specifically considering whether WestJet should move its eastern Canada base of operations from Hamilton's Munro airport to Toronto Pearson airport. WestJet had grown rapidly since its launch in 1996, and was now the second largest airline in Canada. WestJet had originally focused on Western Canada, but had entered eastern Canada in March of 2000, with an eastern base of operations in Hamilton, a secondary airport in the greater Toronto area. Pearson was Canada's largest domestic and international airport, the primary commercial airport for the greater Toronto area, and a hub of WestJet's largest competitor, Air Canada. Compared with Pearson, Hamilton was less congested and charged much lower fees. WestJet's operations had been closely modeled upon Southwest Airlines. The use of a secondary airport such as Hamilton as a base of operations was consistent with Southwest's low cost, high utilization features. With higher costs and longer turnaround times due to congestion, a base at Pearson was arguably not consistent with the Southwest business model, however, it was hard for WestJet to ignore the growth potential.