Toyota is one the most successful car companies in the world. The company set the ambitious growth goal of a 15% share of the global markets by 2010 (up from 11% in 2005). For this, the European market is becoming of strategic importance. The case outlines Toyota's global strategy before focusing on the European market in particular. Sales in Europe increased by over 50% between 2000 and 2005. In the process, Toyota's European manufacturing capacities more than tripled to over 600,000 units over the same period. Although Toyota was on the growth path, the launch of the Aygo posed many challenges. The segment was very price-sensitive and production cost had to be tightly controlled. Toyota decided to enter a joint venture with PSA, the maker of Peugeot/ Citroën. The case shows how cost reduction was the overriding principle and explains how both companies worked together. But selling a car with 93% parts commonality also posed many challenges on the marketing side: Toyota wanted to target younger customers in order to lower the average age of customers. Toyota had no experience in this segment and hence had to go new ways. The case takes readers through the various steps Toyota took in order to promote the Aygo. Learning objectives: Toyota is a latecomer to the European minicar segment. The case analyzes how Toyota changed the business system in order to deal with the various intricacies of this segment. On the manufacturing side, Toyota entered a joint venture with Peugeot/Citroën and built a new plant in the Czech Republic. The cars rolling off this assembly line had a parts commonality of 93%. But the innovations did not stop at the factory gate. Toyota invested in a massive Internet presence, meeting potential customers at locations of their preference and sponsorship of concerts etc. The case is a good platform for discussing Toyota's changes to the existing business system, both upstream and downstream.

Skoda Auto is one of the oldest car brands in the world. Prior to its nationalization in 1946, the company was one of the technologically most advanced car companies. For more than four decades, Skoda Auto's potential was severely limited. It was only when Volkswagen bought an equity stake in 1991 for Skoda Auto to regain its lost fame. In fact, the company became the success story from Central and Eastern Europe. Between 1991 and 2002, the company increased its sales from 172,000 units to 445,000 units, of which 84% were exported. The case explains in detail the three-stage transformation of Skoda Auto. By 2002/3, the company was definitely world-class and a key driver of the transformation in the Czech Republic. Nevertheless, some significant decisions had to be made. What was the role of the Skoda going to be within the VW Group? What could be done to overcome the negative perception of the brand? What would change due to the expansion of the EU?

The Beetle made Volkswagen (VW) a household name all over the world for more than 50 years. But in the early 1990s, the VW Group, with its Audi, Seat, and Skoda brands, was in bad shape: a high cost base, costly duplications between the different car brands, and a weak model line-up had led profits to decline by 85% in 1992. At this point, Ferdinand Piech, CEO of Audi, was asked to take over as CEO of the VW group. The company ended 1993 with a loss of almost 1 billion eurodollars. In 2001, the group's net income increased to a record-breaking 2.9 billion eurodollars. Between 1993 and 2001, sales were up from 39.1 billion to 88.5 billion eurodollars, with international sales increasing from 55% to 72%. VW Group's turnaround included making Audi a premium brand, saving Seat from near bankruptcy, and transforming Skoda Auto from a cheap eastern European car maker into a respected player. According to Business Week, VW was "one of the world's best car companies." Describes the transition from 1993 to 2001. Takes readers through VW's successful implementation of a platform manufacturing system, its globalization strategy, the move upmarket, and many innovations along the business system.

Deals with the depletion of fish stocks in the late 1990s. Unilever, one of the biggest fish producers in the world, had a strong interest in finding a solution for this dilemma. Unilever decided to found the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC). This council is run as a joint venture with the World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF). Provides detailed background of both Unilever and the WWF to understand their intentions. Describes the process of setting up the MSC and deals with the issues of stakeholder management. Interestingly, other environmental groups heavily criticized the WWF for joining forces with Unilever.

The year 1998 was an excellent one for Toyota in Europe: The company posted record sales in 10 European countries and had topped Nissan's sales in Europe for the first time ever. However, on a global scale, the European market was still a weak spot for Toyota. The market share in Western Europe stood at only 3%, whereas the company had secured over 10% in other international markets such as the United States. Early 1999 marked a turning point and Toyota publicly announced its goal to raise the European market share to 5% by the year 2005. However, many executives considered the different positioning and perception of the Toyota brand across Europe as a main obstacle to growth. The new president of Toyota Europe had to decide whether there was a need to reposition the brand. If yes, should he recommend a unified brand image within Europe. How could this be achieved? Provides data on the European market for automobiles, customer segments, and positioning of Toyota vs. the competition. Also outlines the intricacies of growing a business by making bold changes to the positioning of products and brands.

Provides an inside view on how the former Daimler-Benz and Chrysler companies organized their integration efforts following their May 1998 merger, the first truly transatlantic merger in history and, at the time, the largest ever. As such, this merger presents an unusually broad array of management issues that were both unprecedented in scope and rather unique, ranging from cross-cultural management and global strategy and implementation to international M&A alliances and change management. Describes a journey that started during the early 1980s, until the events that preceded the Daimler-Chrysler merger, outlining the key strategic, organizational, and execution challenges facing both companies.

Provides an inside view of how the former Daimler-Benz and Chrysler companies organized their integration efforts following their May 1998 merger, the first truly transatlantic merger in history and, at the time, the largest ever. As such, this merger presents an unusually broad array of management issues that were both unprecedented in scope and rather unique, ranging from cross-cultural management and global strategy and implementation to international M&A alliances and change management. Describes how DaimlerChrysler actually organized and moved to implement the post-merger integration process, raising a set of issues around structural risks, cultural aspects, and execution skills in a high-stakes, global context of a major post-merger integration effort.

Provides an overview of current trends in the global automotive industry and a description of Daimler-Benz AG and Chrysler Corp. prior to the merger. Describes this first transatlantic merger, raising the issues of strategic positioning, potential tradeoffs, and competitive moves.

Describes the organization of the post-merger integration, cultural issues, and the attempts to align the merged company through a mission/vision statement. Explains the complexity of this merger by highlighting implementation issues (e.g., corporate governance, brand separation, etc.).