Monosha Biotech (MB), a social start-up in Baruipur, West Bengal, India, was founded in 2017 to tackle a significant public health issue: snakebites. India had the highest number of snakebite fatalities globally, and the efficacy of anti-snake venom (ASVs) varied significantly depending on the snake’s location. As the prominent snake-venom manufacturer was headquartered in southern India, the existing ASVs had been customized to provide optimal effectiveness in the southern part of the country, and this left individuals in other regions across the country exposed and in danger when they suffered snake bites, consequently adding to the high fatality rate. MB started commercial snake-venom production in 2021, after getting all the necessary clearance and approval from the authorities. Despite the company’s commercial success, in 2023, the company’s founders had concerns about the future of their market expansion, particularly regarding the company’s scalability and potential for continued growth. Their task was difficult, as they had to confront two significant challenges. First, how could they create an authentic brand with the company’s vision, mission, and value proposition as a social enterprise in mind? Second, what alternative for expansion in the anti-snake-venom market would be suitable to ensure further growth?

Niraj Sharma, Director of Marketing at Airtel, located in India, and his team prepared to launch India’s first telecom convergence product – a single telecom plan that provided mobile, paid TV, and WiFi services under one bill plan. Telecom convergence was expected to be the next big battle against the deep-pocket competitor Jio Telecom. In January 2023, there were three branding options on the table: positioning this convergence plan as a premium offering under the current Airtel brand; using the Airtel Xstream brand; or launching an entirely new brand – Airtel Black that encompassed Airtel mobile and Airtel Xstream services. The company wanted to drive its business growth across different products, including the proposed convergence.

Monosha Biotech (MB), a social start-up in Baruipur, West Bengal, India, was founded in 2017 to tackle a significant public health issue: snakebites. India had the highest number of snakebite fatalities globally, and the efficacy of anti-snake venom (ASVs) varied significantly depending on the snake's location. As the prominent snake-venom manufacturer was headquartered in southern India, the existing ASVs had been customized to provide optimal effectiveness in the southern part of the country, and this left individuals in other regions across the country exposed and in danger when they suffered snake bites, consequently adding to the high fatality rate. MB started commercial snake-venom production in 2021, after getting all the necessary clearance and approval from the authorities. Despite the company's commercial success, in 2023, the company's founders had concerns about the future of their market expansion, particularly regarding the company's scalability and potential for continued growth. Their task was difficult, as they had to confront two significant challenges. First, how could they create an authentic brand with the company's vision, mission, and value proposition as a social enterprise in mind? Second, what alternative for expansion in the anti-snake-venom market would be suitable to ensure further growth?

This case concerns a young MBA from India, Yashovardhan Agarwal (Yash), who, in 2024, contemplated the growth strategy of SVG Fashions Pvt. Ltd. (SVG), his family’s textile business. The company’s vision was to be a one-stop textile solution provider converting “fibre to fashion.” However, changes in the market and competition required significant investments in developing competencies that could make the company future-ready and more profitable. Yash deliberated on whether to expand the current business, build a business-to-business athleisure brand by selling through offline retail channels, or build a direct-to-consumer online athleisure apparel brand. Yash needed to be sure that the choices he made not only offered profitable growth but also built relevant core competencies to sustain SVG’s competitive advantage in the future.

Niraj Sharma, Director of Marketing at Airtel, located in India, and his team prepared to launch India's first telecom convergence product - a single telecom plan that provided mobile, paid TV, and WiFi services under one bill plan. Telecom convergence was expected to be the next big battle against the deep-pocket competitor Jio Telecom. In January 2023, there were three branding options on the table: positioning this convergence plan as a premium offering under the current Airtel brand; using the Airtel Xstream brand; or launching an entirely new brand - Airtel Black that encompassed Airtel mobile and Airtel Xstream services. The company wanted to drive its business growth across different products, including the proposed convergence.

<p align="justify">At the end of December 2022, the chief executive officer of Logic Fruit Technologies (LFT), a product engineering research and development company, was trying to decide which of three partnerships to pursue to double the company’s profit margin percentage by 2025. LFT was headquartered in Gurgaon, India, and provided end-to-end solutions in electronic design outsourcing. LFT’s board of directors wanted to make a decision at its meeting on January 30, 2023.

At the end of December 2022, the chief executive officer of Logic Fruit Technologies (LFT), a product engineering research and development company, was trying to decide which of three partnerships to pursue to double the company's profit margin percentage by 2025. LFT was headquartered in Gurgaon, India, and provided end-to-end solutions in electronic design outsourcing. LFT's board of directors wanted to make a decision at its meeting on January 30, 2023.

The managing director of Leosb Private Limited has to select a distribution channel for his factory-produced roti (a flat bread popular in India) in the city of Hyderabad, a large metropolitan city in India. In July 2022, he considered the best distribution channel, which would offer access to retail consumers, and be cost effective, easy to scale, and expandable to related product categories. His options were using one or more distributors, selling to modern trade outlets, developing a sales team to sell directly to retail outlets, or selling directly to the consumer through Leosb’s website and mobile app. He was running out of funds, so his time was limited.

The managing director of Leosb Private Limited has to select a distribution channel for his factory-produced roti (a flat bread popular in India) in the city of Hyderabad, a large metropolitan city in India. In July 2022, he considered the best distribution channel, which would offer access to retail consumers, and be cost effective, easy to scale, and expandable to related product categories. His options were using one or more distributors, selling to modern trade outlets, developing a sales team to sell directly to retail outlets, or selling directly to the consumer through Leosb's website and mobile app. He was running out of funds, so his time was limited.

Greenkraft Private Limited (Greenkraft) supplied artisanal products to global clients and was an India-based not-for-profit organization. The company worked to address the socio-economic needs of artisan women. For 800 women workers, the Greenkraft production unit symbolized independence and pride, motivating them to work and deliver quality output. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Greenkraft was compelled to adopt home production to supplement production unit operations to fulfil its supply obligations. With the rapid spread of the COVID-19 Omicron variant in January 2022, Greenkraft’s management had to choose a production and fulfilment strategy in the new normal. They considered adapting production unit operations with the COVID-19-related protocols, changing to complete home-based production, or adopting a hybrid model with part production unit and part home production. The change in the production strategy impacted Greenkraft's business viability and producers’ livelihood, needing careful thought and implementation.

Sharmaji’s Canteen was the only cafeteria on the campus of a prominent management institute in Gurgaon, India. The business had been operating since 1990 and its success depended on a captive residential population of primarily students and staff. The lockdowns imposed by the Government of India in March 2020 to control the spread of the COVID-19 virus led to the closure of the academic programs. During the pandemic, students had become accustomed to more choices offered by online food delivery that they felt Sharmaji’s Canteen did not match. The business was losing sales and profitability was eroding. The owner needed to decide between three different revival strategies based on the data collected.

Greenkraft Private Limited (Greenkraft) supplied artisanal products to global clients and was an India-based not-for-profit organization. The company worked to address the socio-economic needs of artisan women. For 800 women workers, the Greenkraft production unit symbolized independence and pride, motivating them to work and deliver quality output. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Greenkraft was compelled to adopt home production to supplement production unit operations to fulfil its supply obligations. With the rapid spread of the COVID-19 Omicron variant in January 2022, Greenkraft's management had to choose a production and fulfilment strategy in the new normal. They considered adapting production unit operations with the COVID-19-related protocols, changing to complete home-based production, or adopting a hybrid model with part production unit and part home production. The change in the production strategy impacted Greenkraft's business viability and producers' livelihood, needing careful thought and implementation.

Sharmaji's Canteen was the only cafeteria on the campus of a prominent management institute in Gurgaon, India. The business had been operating since 1990 and its success depended on a captive residential population of primarily students and staff. The lockdowns imposed by the Government of India in March 2020 to control the spread of the COVID-19 virus led to the closure of the academic programs. During the pandemic, students had become accustomed to more choices offered by online food delivery that they felt Sharmaji's Canteen did not match. The business was losing sales and profitability was eroding. The owner needed to decide between three different revival strategies based on the data collected.

FlowerAura.com (FA)—established in 2010 in Gurgaon, India—was an online-first gifting company. FA offered door-to-door delivery of flowers, cakes, and gift items, along with personalized messages, across two hundred cities in India. In early 2022, the co-founder and chief executive officer of FA needed to revitalize the FA brand to drive sales and margins. He debated whether to (a) adopt a more aggressive sales initiative, which would elicit strong competitive retaliation, or (b) build the FA brand, which could increase the gross margins without a competitive response. The bottom line was that he had to make the best decision for his company in the short and long term.

FlowerAura.com (FA)-established in 2010 in Gurgaon, India-was an online-first gifting company. FA offered door-to-door delivery of flowers, cakes, and gift items, along with personalized messages, across two hundred cities in India. In early 2022, the co-founder and chief executive officer of FA needed to revitalize the FA brand to drive sales and margins. He debated whether to (a) adopt a more aggressive sales initiative, which would elicit strong competitive retaliation, or (b) build the FA brand, which could increase the gross margins without a competitive response. The bottom line was that he had to make the best decision for his company in the short and long term.

Planet Milk produced and distributed A2 milk in Bhubaneswar, the capital city of the state of Orissa, in India. Despite the best efforts of its founder, Planet Milk had remained unprofitable since the COVID-19 pandemic struck in March 2020. In January 2022, the founder considered three broad alternatives to revive his milk business. The first was to change the milk’s packaging from glass bottles to Tetra Pak cartons. This change in packaging would increase the milk’s shelf life, allow wider customer reach, and improve revenues. The second alternative was to introduce an online order management option for consumers, which would increase the visibility of demand and thereby increase the operational efficiency of the business, reduce wastage and logistics costs, and increase profits. However, these options also required significant capital investments that would potentially not be recouped if the desired increase in sales did not occur. The third option was to target institutional buyers or retail channel partners, which would potentially increase sales but also decrease margins and increase credit. The founder had three months to implement a revival plan; if it proved unsuccessful, he could sell the business.

Planet Milk produced and distributed A2 milk in Bhubaneswar, the capital city of the state of Orissa, in India. Despite the best efforts of its founder, Planet Milk had remained unprofitable since the COVID-19 pandemic struck in March 2020. In January 2022, the founder considered three broad alternatives to revive his milk business. The first was to change the milk's packaging from glass bottles to Tetra Pak cartons. This change in packaging would increase the milk's shelf life, allow wider customer reach, and improve revenues. The second alternative was to introduce an online order management option for consumers, which would increase the visibility of demand and thereby increase the operational efficiency of the business, reduce wastage and logistics costs, and increase profits. However, these options also required significant capital investments that would potentially not be recouped if the desired increase in sales did not occur. The third option was to target institutional buyers or retail channel partners, which would potentially increase sales but also decrease margins and increase credit. The founder had three months to implement a revival plan; if it proved unsuccessful, he could sell the business.

Mantra Ayurveda (Mantra), established in India in 2020, manufactured and marketed luxury Ayurvedic skin care and hair care products. The brand’s equity in the Indian market was low, its performance marketing efforts were not leading to expected revenue gains, and the revenue from direct-to-consumer (DTC) initiatives had experienced a negligible uptick in financial year (FY) 2020–21. In April 2021, the chief executive officer would have to convince the board and investors about his plans for achieving fourfold revenue growth from the DTC channel in FY 2021–22. He needed to propose a choice that would build the brand for long-term sustenance while delivering on short-term revenue goals, considering key strategic pillars: an international DTC market launch to expand; offline marketing to increase brand awareness; in-house and outsourced performance marketing to optimize digital efforts; and discounts, promotions, and the launch of smaller package sizes to drive trials. Making the right choice could lead to an expanded international brand presence and deeper penetration into the Indian luxury market. However, the wrong choice could mean an early exit of a major investor, leaving the company cash-starved and plunging both the company and the future of his career into uncertainty.

Mantra Ayurveda (Mantra), established in India in 2020, manufactured and marketed luxury Ayurvedic skin care and hair care products. The brand's equity in the Indian market was low, its performance marketing efforts were not leading to expected revenue gains, and the revenue from direct-to-consumer (DTC) initiatives had experienced a negligible uptick in financial year (FY) 2020-21. In April 2021, the chief executive officer would have to convince the board and investors about his plans for achieving fourfold revenue growth from the DTC channel in FY 2021-22. He needed to propose a choice that would build the brand for long-term sustenance while delivering on short-term revenue goals, considering key strategic pillars: an international DTC market launch to expand; offline marketing to increase brand awareness; in-house and outsourced performance marketing to optimize digital efforts; and discounts, promotions, and the launch of smaller package sizes to drive trials. Making the right choice could lead to an expanded international brand presence and deeper penetration into the Indian luxury market. However, the wrong choice could mean an early exit of a major investor, leaving the company cash-starved and plunging both the company and the future of his career into uncertainty.

In December 2020, White House Industries (White House), a manufacturer of aerosol aluminum cans for deodorants and other consumer products, including sanitizers and pain relief sprays, received customer order forecasts of 30 per cent more than its maximum production capacity. Unless White House invested in a third production line, which represented a significant capital investment and required almost a year's lead time, it would be unable to fulfil several customer orders with its existing manufacturing lines. Some customers had long-term relationships with White House, some were newly acquired, and some had a global-level tie-up with White House's parent company. In addition, the demand from some customers was already large, while others had immense future potential. White House's board and management team had different views regarding which customers the company should retain and which it should decline. This customer selection issue was a pressing and challenging problem that needed to be solved immediately. How should White House resolve its customer selection conundrum?