Over its 17 years in existence, Tesla had redefined people's view of electric cars, and in 2020, the company saw its stock rise by more than 700% to became the most valuable carmaker in the world. In December 2020, Tesla celebrated its fifth consecutive quarter of profit and joined the S&P 500. However, in 2021 competition in the electric vehicle space was rapidly heating up. In January, General Motors announced that it would phase out gas-powered vehicles to sell only vehicles with zero emissions by 2035. A week later, Ford announced that it would invest $22 billion on electric vehicles (including hybrids) and $7 billion on autonomous vehicles by 2025. Meanwhile, BMW was developing electrified versions of all its models, and the Volkswagen Group had announced a new strategic plan with the specific aim of catching up with Tesla. Tesla's run had defied the skeptics, but with competition revving up, would Tesla be able to dominate the market in the years to come?
This case describes the history of Uber, its business model-including the ways it differed from that of the traditional taxi industry-and its competition with Lyft. The case is set in 2017, a year in which Uber was plagued by even more scandals than usual, though its behavior had frequently sparked controversy ever since its launch in 2010. By June 2017, Uber had a valuation of $70 billion, making it the most valuable venture-funded tech startup in the world, but a shadow hung over its reputation, due in part to recent revelations about its toxic and sexist corporate culture, and to its tendency to ignore local regulations when expanding into new markets. In June 2017, Uber's co-founder and CEO Travis Kalanick resigned, and in August 2017, Dara Khosrowshahi, formerly the CEO of Expedia, was hired in his place. Meanwhile, Lyft, which presented itself as the "nice guy" alternative to Uber's bad-boy image, seemed to be gaining ground. The case asks what Khosrowshahi might do to fix Uber's broken culture and improve its public image, and how he could best ensure Uber's dominance in the years to come.
This case describes revelations of fraud at Luckin Coffee, beginning with an anonymous report in January 2020 and continuing with the company's admission in April 2020 that it had inflated its revenues by 2.2 billion RMB ($310 million), almost half its reported revenue, in the last three quarters of 2019. It was later found that Luckin had arranged false transactions at many of its stores, and that it had sold tens of millions of cups of coffee (through coffee vouchers) to corporate customers with ties to Luckin chairman Charles Lu. It had also falsified supplier payments, creating a loop of fraudulent transactions that inflated both its sales and expenses.
This case describes the founding of Chinese coffee chain Luckin Coffee in 2017 and its path to surpassing Starbucks as the largest coffee chain in China (by number of stores) in 2019. Unlike Starbucks stores, which were designed to be welcoming "third places" for customers to gather away from their homes or offices, most of Luckin's stores were small and bare, reflecting its mission to provide convenient takeout or delivery coffee to busy customers. With its app-based ordering, cashierless stores, and "smart," cloud-connected kitchen equipment, Luckin positioned itself as a technology company, rather than just a coffee shop, and attracted a number of big-name investors.<br/> However, Luckin used deep discounts on its products to attract new customers, and as of 2019, it had yet to be profitable on a company level. The case asks whether Luckin's business model could be sustainable, even in the absence of these promotional prices, and whether Luckin's focus on takeout and delivery (soon to be expanded through a network of vending machines and express coffee machines) was enough to differentiate it from competitors.
This case is an abridged version (part 2 of 2) of "Walmart's Omnichannel Strategy: Revolution or Miscalculation?", HBS Case 720-370. The (B) case describes Walmart's omnichannel strategy in 2018 as it battled Amazon for online retail market share. Walmart aimed to integrate its enormous brick and mortar footprint with its growing ecommerce business, e.g., through merchandise and grocery delivery and order online, pickup in store options. It also followed a two-part acquisition strategy that included specialty retailers such as Shoes.com and digitally native vertical brands that developed their own products and sold them directly to consumers, such as ModCloth and Bonobos. In 2016, it acquired the ecommerce retailer Jet.com. In addition to building its online marketplace, Walmart hoped to leverage its existing assets, such as its massive network of retail stores and thriving grocery business, in the fight against Amazon. The case poses the question: Could Walmart successfully compete against Amazon and other online retailers in areas such as grocery delivery, product selection, shipping costs, and delivery times?
This case is an abridged version (part 1 of 2) of "Walmart's Omnichannel Strategy: Revolution or Miscalculation?" HBS Case 720-370. The (A) case discusses Walmart's early forays into online retail, as well as improvements made under Doug McMillon beginning in 2014. The case describes Walmart's physical stores, delivery options, grocery business, online marketplace, and distribution system. It also discusses the ecommerce startup Jet.com, which Walmart was considering purchasing in 2015. The case poses the question: How could Walmart best use its existing resources to compete against major ecommerce players like Amazon? Should it focus on its in-store business, build up its web-to-store capabilities, or compete head-on with pure ecommerce players in web-to-home sales? Alternatively, should it consider an omnichannel strategy, attempting to grow all these aspects of the business at once?
This case discusses the alternative social media site Steemit, including the principles it was founded on in 2016 and the challenges it faced in 2019. Steemit was a blockchain-based platform that aimed to differentiate itself from other social media companies by returning power to its users, rather than centralizing control among company executives. Steemit rewarded its users with cryptocurrency for posting, commenting on, and upvoting content on the site. Although it championed itself as a bastion of free speech, in January 2019, it banned a user for soliciting funds in exchange for the release of conspiracy-theory-related documents. This ban called into question the degree to which Steemit was willing to exert control over the content posted to its site. In addition to these censorship issues, Steemit's developers had to weigh a number of strategic considerations about the future of the site. Questions they faced included how to avoid alienating potential users with Steemit's complex features (such as its intricate payment system) and how to prevent certain users (e.g., those who had been kicked off of other sites) from becoming overly dominant on its platform.
This case describes Airbus's February 2019 announcement that it was ending production of the A380, with the last delivery scheduled for 2021. The announcement followed an order cancellation by Emirates, a major customer of the A380. The A380 had faced significant competition from Boeing's Dreamliner, and airlines had difficulty filling their A380s enough to make them fuel efficient and cost effective. Since the plane's launch, Airbus had sold far fewer A380s than it initially predicted.
This case describes the October 2018 and March 2019 crashes of Boeing MAX 8 jets, which together killed over 300 passengers. The planes involved in both crashes shared a problem with a software system called MCAS, which Boeing had revamped at the last minute prior to selling the planes, but had failed to mention in its pilot manuals until after the first crash. As of July 2019, the MAX 8 remained grounded worldwide. As the investigation into the MAX 8 continued, a simultaneous investigation into a Boeing 787 factory found that the company had repeatedly ignored reports of manufacturing defects and debris left on 787s from the factory.
This case describes Airbus's partnership with the Montreal-based aircraft manufacturer Bombardier beginning in 2017. The two companies partnered on the C Series of aircraft (later named the A220 Family), which consisted of small aircraft with 100-150 seats. The case also describes Boeing's 2018 joint venture with the Brazilian aerospace company Embraer, which produced the E2 Family of planes (97-120 seats).
This case describes Airbus and Boeing developments in 2016, including Airbus's delivery of the first A320neo and Boeing's work on the 737 MAX and 777X programs. It also notes Airbus's restructuring in 2016.
This case describes the introduction of Airbus's A350XWB (Xtra Wide Body) in 2015. It also describes Airbus and Boeing's current endeavors in 2015, including Airbus's development of the A330neo, Boeing's work on the 737 MAX, and Boeing's announcement of the 777X.
This case describes an issue with the batteries of Boeing's 787 Dreamliner planes overheating and sometimes catching fire in 2013. The planes were grounded for several months until Boeing introduced new safety measures. The case also discusses a problem with cracks on the wings of Airbus's A380 superjumbo, which required the company to make a costly fix to a particular wing component.
This case describes the first commercial flight of Boeing's 787 Dreamliner in 2011, three years after originally planned, as well as the first commercial flight of Airbus' superjumbo, the A380, in 2007. It also describes the companies' current endeavors in 2011, including Airbus' work on the A350 and A320neo (new engine option) and Boeing's development of the 737 MAX. Boeing originally considered replacing the 737 with a completely new and redesigned ("clean-sheet") plane, but utlimately (in part due to pressure from the A320neo) decided to modify the 737 instead.