As head of the Technical University (TU) of Brunswick, Professor Schmitz faced demands from the Ministry of Education to accept the appointment of Nazi leader Adolf Hitler as professor at the university. The proposal had exclusively political objectives, specifically to fulfill a legal precondition for Hitler to be able to stand in the forthcoming presidential elections of the country. The professors of the university were appalled by the proposal because it conflicted with their values, but they had no formal power to prevent the appointment. Left formally powerless, the professors need to consider what actions might be possible and appropriate and what informal means they might use to influence the decision.
Volkswagen AG (VW) was global leader in the automotive industry that had made a major commitment to accelerate its manufacture of electric vehicles (EVs). To achieve this, the company had established a subsidiary, PowerCo, which was to build its own battery cell plants. Following the announcement of new industrial policies to support EV manufacturing in the USA by the Biden administration, PowerCo was considering where in North America to build its plant. Options included the US states in which VW was already assembling cars, and suitable opportunities for a plant location were also being offered by the Canadian province of Ontario given the availability of key resources (i.e., land and clean water and electricity supplies) and a favourable federal and provincial government attitude.<br><br>The case provides opportunities to discuss locational advantages that may attract mega manufacturing projects, to analyze policy-related aspects of such locational advantages, and to explore how businesses can negotiate with governments over major investment commitments.
Carlsberg Breweries A/S (Carlsberg) had developed from a local to a global player in the brewing industry, having focused on growth in emerging economies in Europe and Asia. This growth path was against the background of economic transition and political change in Russia—from optimism about opportunities in the new market economy in the 1990s, to increasing regulatory obstacles, political authoritarianism, and increasing local competition in the 2010s. In 2022, Carlsberg, more than other West European consumer goods companies, was exposed to Russia when Russian military forces invaded Ukraine in February. This created complex operational and ethical challenges the company had to address with urgency. The company’s annual general meeting was coming up, on March 14, and by then the executive board had to communicate to shareholders concerned with both the company’s financial performance and its international reputation—as well as to Carlsberg employees across Europe (including both Russia and Ukraine) and the increasingly impatient Danish media—what steps the board would take to address the crisis.
Carlsberg Breweries A/S (Carlsberg) had developed from a local to a global player in the brewing industry, having focused on growth in emerging economies in Europe and Asia. This growth path was against the background of economic transition and political change in Russia-from optimism about opportunities in the new market economy in the 1990s, to increasing regulatory obstacles, political authoritarianism, and increasing local competition in the 2010s. In 2022, Carlsberg, more than other West European consumer goods companies, was exposed to Russia when Russian military forces invaded Ukraine in February. This created complex operational and ethical challenges the company had to address with urgency. The company's annual general meeting was coming up, on March 14, and by then the executive board had to communicate to shareholders concerned with both the company's financial performance and its international reputation-as well as to Carlsberg employees across Europe (including both Russia and Ukraine) and the increasingly impatient Danish media-what steps the board would take to address the crisis.
On May 29, 2020, the World Health Organization launched the COVID-19 Technologies Access Pool (C-TAP) with the aim of making pandemic-related technologies—specifically, vaccines and treatments—available to its participants. Although the initiative was positively received in many developing countries, it was not well received by pharmaceutical companies, who viewed C-TAP as a threat to the patent system and, therefore, as a threat to the companies’ future research and development. Many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) supported the initiative because it was expected to help poorer countries and income groups access a vaccine. Companies, NGOs, and national governments had to decide how to engage in the process.
On May 29, 2020, the World Health Organization launched the COVID-19 Technologies Access Pool (C-TAP) with the aim of making pandemic-related technologies-specifically, vaccines and treatments-available to its participants. Although the initiative was positively received in many developing countries, it was not well received by pharmaceutical companies, who viewed C-TAP as a threat to the patent system and, therefore, as a threat to the companies' future research and development. Many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) supported the initiative because it was expected to help poorer countries and income groups access a vaccine. Companies, NGOs, and national governments had to decide how to engage in the process.
In April 2017, BMW AG (BMW) faced a big decision regarding which plant should receive the mandate to produce the first electric version of BMW’s iconic Mini car. The leadership team of BMW’s UK operations was determined to keep the Mini at its historical home base in the United Kingdom. However, given the uncertainty arising from the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union—a move commonly known as “Brexit” —how would the team be able to convince corporate headquarters?
In April 2017, BMW AG (BMW) faced a big decision regarding which plant should receive the mandate to produce the first electric version of BMW's iconic Mini car. The leadership team of BMW's UK operations was determined to keep the Mini at its historical home base in the United Kingdom. However, given the uncertainty arising from the United Kingdom's decision to leave the European Union-a move commonly known as "Brexit" -how would the team be able to convince corporate headquarters?
<p style="color: rgb(197, 183, 131);"><strong> AWARD WINNER - Emerging Chinese Global Competitors Award, European Foundation for Management Development (EFMD) Case Writing Competition</strong></p><br>In 2012, the Chinese state-owned oil corporation China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) acquired Nexen, a Canadian oil exploration company, in what was the largest-ever acquisition abroad by a Chinese company. The Chinese economy had become increasingly dependent on imported energy and the aim of this acquisition was to secure access to natural resources around the world. The deal received intense media attention and its merits for Canada were widely discussed in the media. Eventually, it was approved by the Canadian government after CNOOC made substantial commitments regarding Nexen’s future operations. However, after the acquisition, Nexen experienced considerable challenges regarding its financial performance and its health, safety, and environment processes. Financial performance was undermined by a sharp drop in the price of oil from 2014 onward. Moreover, Nexen’s operations were disrupted by a pipeline leak, a closure of pipelines by the regulator, and a plant explosion. Each event challenged the Chinese and Canadian leadership of Nexen to face the media and minimize reputational damage and safeguard its health and safety record. How could the company cut its losses and downscale its engagement in Canada? Did it need to refocus its Canadian operations to use its assets in a different way?
In 2016, Bossard AG was a leading wholesaler and supply chain service provider for fasteners. Its business model aimed to improve the efficiency of clients’ manufacturing operations by applying Industry 4.0 technologies to integrate the delivery of the highest quality screws, nuts, and bolts with logistics solutions for supply chains, and technical solutions for product designs using fasteners. Bossard’s key selling point was its ability to enhance its clients’ consumable parts management, thus reducing their total costs of ownership. Bossard had been successful in Europe, but found the Chinese market difficult to penetrate. The company was looking for better ways to deliver value to Chinese industrial customers.
In 2016, Bossard AG was a leading wholesaler and supply chain service provider for fasteners. Its business model aimed to improve the efficiency of clients' manufacturing operations by applying Industry 4.0 technologies to integrate the delivery of the highest quality screws, nuts, and bolts with logistics solutions for supply chains, and technical solutions for product designs using fasteners. Bossard's key selling point was its ability to enhance its clients' consumable parts management, thus reducing their total costs of ownership. Bossard had been successful in Europe, but found the Chinese market difficult to penetrate. The company was looking for better ways to deliver value to Chinese industrial customers.
The Dalian Wanda Group Co. Ltd. (Wanda) was a fast-growing real estate imperium in China, built by Jianlin Wang, the wealthiest man in China. In 2010, Wang transformed Wanda into an entertainment conglomerate and initiated an ambitious international growth strategy. His ambitions knew few limits; however, one of his acquisitions—the Edificio España in Spain, an iconic historical building in the centre of Madrid—ran into difficulties due to conflicts with the local authorities. Wang’s refurbishment plans for Edificio España envisaged a comprehensive renovation and upgrade of the building’s commercial spaces, which required approvals from the Local Historical Heritage Commission. Initially, politicians expressed their support for Wang’s plan, but the application progressed slowly through the formal process and became entangled in local politics. A local election mid-process resulted in a new party gaining control of the city council—a governing party that was not supportive of Wang’s plans. Should Wang cut his losses and sell the building, or persist and reboot his project management?
The Dalian Wanda Group Co. Ltd. (Wanda) was a fast-growing real estate imperium in China, built by Jianlin Wang, the wealthiest man in China. In 2010, Wang transformed Wanda into an entertainment conglomerate and initiated an ambitious international growth strategy. His ambitions knew few limits; however, one of his acquisitions-the Edificio España in Spain, an iconic historical building in the centre of Madrid-ran into difficulties due to conflicts with the local authorities. Wang's refurbishment plans for Edificio España envisaged a comprehensive renovation and upgrade of the building's commercial spaces, which required approvals from the Local Historical Heritage Commission. Initially, politicians expressed their support for Wang's plan, but the application progressed slowly through the formal process and became entangled in local politics. A local election mid-process resulted in a new party gaining control of the city council-a governing party that was not supportive of Wang's plans. Should Wang cut his losses and sell the building, or persist and reboot his project management?
Bayer MaterialScience, a unit of Bayer AG, was a leading provider of polycarbonate, a basic material for plastics. In response to the changes in its client industries, Bayer MaterialScience relocated the business unit headquarters for polycarbonate to Shanghai in order to be closer to customers and other business partners in the Asia-Pacific. Bayer MaterialScience (A) focuses on the laptop industry, where a large number of players influence the selection of material suppliers. Bayer MaterialScience has to re-evaluate its market intelligence and its business-to-business marketing in view of changing global competition. Bayer MaterialScience (B) provides insights into the consequences of relocating a division headquarters to China, and introduces the forthcoming initial public offering of Bayer MaterialScience. The company has to assess how to further develop its organizational structure, its partner relationships, and its industrial marketing strategy under a new brand name; Covestro.
Bayer MaterialScience (BMS), a unit of Bayer AG, is a leading provider of polycarbonate, a basic material for plastics facing rapid change in many of its downstream industries. In response to the changes in its client industries, BMS relocated the business unit headquarters for polycarbonate to Shanghai to be closer to customers and other business partners in Asia-Pacific. Case ‘A’ focuses on the laptop industry, where a large number of players influence the selection of material suppliers. BMS has to revaluate its market intelligence and its business-to-business marketing in view of changing global competition. Case ‘B’ provides insights into the consequences of relocating a division headquarters to China, and introduces the forthcoming initial public offering of BMS. BMS has to assess how to further develop its organizational structure, its partner relationships and its industrial marketing strategy under a new brand name.
In the autumn of 2013, the president and chief executive officer of Schenck Shanghai Machinery Corp. Ltd., a subsidiary of the Dürr Group situated in Shanghai, China, was reviewing his business operations. The Dürr Group was a multinational machine tool manufacturer based in Germany. In emerging economies, the mid-market had become the battleground between foreign and local firms. Traditionally, foreign investors earned healthy margins in the premium segment, but many realized that they were missing out on fast-growing market segments and were facing potential threats from local competitors who were moving up-market. To remain competitive and to ensure future growth and profitability, while not compromising the brand's reputation, the Chinese subsidiary had to ensure continued support from headquarters in Germany.
In 2013, ShangGong Group — a Chinese sewing machine manufacturer — had successfully acquired three German manufacturing companies that were more technologically advanced than it was. The aim of these acquisitions was to help ShangGong catch up to other multinational players in the international market. While the CEO had learned a few lessons from the first acquisition, the strategic and operational challenges were different this time. He needed to act decisively while dealing with the companies’ many stakeholders in Europe and China. One of his goals was to strengthen ShangGong’s market position in China using both its German and domestic brands. Beyond the recent acquisitions in Germany, how could he solidify ShangGong’s leadership in China and eventually challenge the Japanese companies who were leading the global market?
Arçelik, a member of the Turkish Koç Group, had grown from a leading manufacturer of household appliances (also known as ‘white goods’) in Europe’s largest emerging economy to a substantive international player. Yet the company faced new challenges in strengthening its positions in advanced economies, exploiting its competitive advantages across a wider range of emerging economies and in raising the profitability of its international operations. In Western Europe, its Beko brand was often perceived as a low-tier brand, and in most of the region, brand recognition was low. In Eastern Europe, Arçelik’s low-cost strategies matched local demand, but the potential for demand growth was limited. In the Middle East, brand recognition was strong, but political risks remained high. In other emerging economies, Arçelik’s product offering fit local demand patterns well, yet trade barriers inhibited import market penetration. Thus, the firm needed to design and prioritize strategic initiatives for future growth.