London, UK, July 2020. G. Garvin Brown IV, the chairman of Brown-Forman Corporation and 5th generation family shareholder, was preparing to celebrate the firm's 150th anniversary. Despite its current global footprint, a turnover in excess of $3.3 billion and over 4,800 employees worldwide, Brown-Forman had remained in Louisville, Kentucky, close to the Old Forester Distillery, the founding brands' Pre-Prohibition headquarters (1882-1919), on Louisville's historic Main Street, also known as "Whiskey Row". COVID-19, however, had ruined the party, forcing the family to cancel the celebrations. Every family member had received their 150th Anniversary bottles of the limited-edition bourbon, taken from 6 barrels aged for 150 months, as well as a recently published book documenting the amazing history of Brown-Forman through photos, illustrations and artifacts. The pandemic would have a dramatic impact on economies around the world, affecting not only employees' lives but also the livelihoods of partners in the broader hospitality industry. The publicly listed, family-controlled company had weathered worse storms in the past, including Prohibition, which had tested the firm's resilience. Having a long-term-focused, engaged stockholder base and a strong governance system were tremendous advantages in such situations, especially when selling aged products with time-tested brands. Together with the two former CEOs and the board, Brown had painstakingly put together solid company and family governance structures and processes and carefully rebalanced the portfolio in a bid to mitigate the impact of downturns. Still, Garvin could not help wondering how well the delicately crafted system would hold under this real-world "stress test."

Orsières (Valais, Switzerland) April 2020. Opaline, an original juice production company with high social and environmental standards had begun in 2010. It took founder Sofia de Meyer over 10 years to build a responsible and impactful company aligned with her own aspirations, not just a lifestyle venture but one that would capitalize on her deeply rooted values, shared with many in the valley. Opaline was her experiment to prove to the world that a different type of capitalism was possible, one that put human and environmental aspects where they belonged - at the epicenter of a business revolution. De Meyer had regularly been asked in interviews why Opaline was not trying to grow faster, rather than ensuring that its existing suppliers and distributors developed alongside the company. She always replied by drawing an analogy with a growing forest, in which no tree stood much higher than the others or else it would fall, alone, with the next storm. The analogy proved robust but now a more violent storm - a global pandemic - was brewing that was hurting everyone at once. What would it mean for all the projects the team had set out for 2020? And more fundamentally, could Opaline weather this storm as it had already done several times thanks to its strong ecosystem of partners? Would it pay the price for not having extended its roots deep enough when it could?

Orsières (Valais, Switzerland) April 2020. Opaline, an original juice production company with high social and environmental standards had begun in 2010. It took founder Sofia de Meyer over 10 years to build a responsible and impactful company aligned with her own aspirations, not just a lifestyle venture but one that would capitalize on her deeply rooted values, shared with many in the valley. Opaline was her experiment to prove to the world that a different type of capitalism was possible, one that put human and environmental aspects where they belonged - at the epicenter of a business revolution. De Meyer had regularly been asked in interviews why Opaline was not trying to grow faster, rather than ensuring that its existing suppliers and distributors developed alongside the company. She always replied by drawing an analogy with a growing forest, in which no tree stood much higher than the others or else it would fall, alone, with the next storm. The analogy proved robust but now a more violent storm - a global pandemic - was brewing that was hurting everyone at once. What would it mean for all the projects the team had set out for 2020? And more fundamentally, could Opaline weather this storm as it had already done several times thanks to its strong ecosystem of partners? Would it pay the price for not having extended its roots deep enough when it could?

The case documents the original mattress leasing program initiated by François Pugliese, the owner of premium mattress firm Elite in Etoy (Switzerland). Since the beds he sold targeted the higher end of the market, it quickly dawned on him that customers could be tempted by a leasing offer instead of a standard purchase arrangement. In 2012, François launched the Smart Lease program: Mattresses were equipped with connected pressure sensors that could identify occupancy and relayed the information to a centralized system that monitored mattress usage and invoiced the client accordingly. Smart Lease was an immediate hit, earning some distinguished innovation awards in the process. On the financing side, though, François faced a dilemma. Smart Leasing was so successful that it created serious issues in his finances, made worse by the fast growth of his flagship stores. How could he raise a large, flexible line of credit to finance these strategic endeavors without diluting himself? He engineered a very original affinity financing solution, a convertible loan program offered to friends and family, with conversion possible under conditions to non-voting participating shares. DAMICI was a triple win: Money raised at favorable variable interest rates, a chance for friends and supporters of the firm to get involved in its future success, and a balance-sheet strengthening move. The case documents in great detail the operational and financial features of the Smart Leasing program and the DAMICI affinity financing model used to provide the funding both for leasing and for general growth options for the company. It offers rare insights into an original financial engineering montage that offered cheap, flexible financing to a high-growth entrepreneur.

MUNICH, GERMANY, JANUARY 2019. Bastian Nominacher pondered how much Celonis had changed from its start in 2011, when he and his two co-founders were coding in a crammed 15-square-meter room in his flat. Reaching unicorn valuation felt "like driving a car at 250 kilometers per hour while changing the wheels," he liked to say. It had been quite a ride. The journey had entailed sending a thousand hand-written letters to leads, dropping in (uninvited) to a fancy golf club to pitch Celonis to an enterprise resource planning (ERP) tycoon, bootstrapping without external funding for seven years, despite the prevailing view that technology startups should aim to scale as fast as possible ... and a few even less glamorous activities that sounded quite surreal today. Graduating into the unicorn club had attracted the attention of prospects, current clients and competitors alike. The surge in leads required not only growing the sales team but also tightening the ties with SAP's sales team. Current clients were asking for increasingly complex projects requiring tighter integration with their information systems; hence, Celonis' younger management team had to pitch to more senior executives. Finally, the focus on scaling prompted Celonis to undergo a technological shift towards a cloud-based platform model and Celonis launched the Intelligent Business Cloud in October 2018. Was that not too much for the client base? Would the company culture survive the fast growth? And would the founders' leadership team survive the transformation?

The case walks the readers first through the Cambridge Analytica scandal, eliciting its effect and presenting an overview of the analysis the infamous company did. Readers are then introduced with simple steps on how a similar approach may be used today - running surveys on inconspicuous questions very affordably and quickly, and creating simple analytical models (linear and logistic) to infer respondents' age and gender. The raw survey data is available upon request to the co-authors.

The case, based on extensive interviews with Retail Rocket's co-founders (Nikolay Khlebinsky and Andrey Chizh), several employees and one of the start-up's investors, documents the genesis and rapid growth of the company. Launched in 2012 in Moscow, Russia, Retail Rocket was a big data-based personalization platform for e-commerce and omnichannel retail identifying the needs of customers based on their online behavior and, thanks to artificial intelligence, offering personalized product recommendations through the website, e-mail and other marketing channels, increasing the conversion rate, average order value and retention rate of its clients. In effect, it makes available to small and mid-sized online firms the same website optimization functionalities associated with powerhouses such as Amazon or Yandex. Its value proposition included superior shopping-pattern prediction algorithms and value-based pricing using randomized A/B testing. What would it take to monetize and grow its exceptional IT competencies?

Ukrainian founder Aleksandr Stepura wants to grow his civilian drone-manufacturing startup Skyeton. Thanks to a local pool of aeronautical expertise inherited from the Soviet period, Stepura rapidly reached product excellence, technically on par with global powerhouses such as Boeing and other manufacturers coming from the military Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) space. Coming from a market approach focused solely on addressing the needs of governmental entities (police, border patrol, coast guards...), Stepura wants to expand the activities to regular B2B sales, for which the sales cycle is much shorter and less dependent on political connections. But moving from B2G to B2B was no easy feat operationally. The startup also had to make other decisions: selling products (drones, as flying platforms or complete systems) or services? Where to re-locate the company? What business model to pursue? How much financing was required? What needs to change in the management team to go from startup to scaleup effectively?

LakeDiamond is a company founded in 2015 in Yverdon, close to Geneva, in Switzerland. Its goal was to leverage an industrialized method of producing high-purity diamonds through a process called "micro-wave chemical vapor deposition" (CVD). Such diamonds are much purer than diamonds obtained through mining, allowing for novel industrial uses for diamonds, such as in watchmaking or in developing military applications. An initial funding round allowed LakeDiamond to demonstrate its ability to grow such diamonds in an industrial reactor. In 2017, LakeDiamond's founder Pascal Gallo started seeking new funding to scale up the operation. At the same time, the hype around blockchains had started to drive a surge in startup funding through Initial Coin Offerings (ICO). As Gallo was reluctant to dilute his ownership and control over the venture, he decided to raise the money needed for LakeDiamond's expansion through an ICO. Despite significant press coverage regarding blockchains, ICOs remained at the time relatively niche investments. Therefore, to target a wider base of investors, Gallo partnered with Swissquote, a prominent Swiss online bank that was at the forefront in offering to layman investors access to crypto-currencies. The ICO did raise sufficient funds for new reactors to be purchases and production to start. However, LakeDiamond's sales never really picked up afterwards and by early 2020 the company was filing for bankruptcy. Framed from the perspective of a small investor assessing the opportunity of investing in LakeDiamond's ICO, the case is based on publicly released information by the company, and especially on its ICO. Extensive interviews with ICO experts who assessed the LakeDiamond fundraising at the time were also conducted.

ZURICH (SWITZERLAND), MAY 2018 - Cristian Grossmann arrived early in the office that day. It had not been a breeze for Beekeeper to reach its current situation: a quickly expanding company with over 130 employees across the world, with a plethora of large clients. It was not so long ago that he had started a side-project with a university friend to develop an anonymous flirting platform for students. Several pivots later, the project had started getting a lot of traction and disrupting the hospitality industry's way of working. The last 12 months had been much more turbulent than expected, and Grossmann was mulling over how the next 12 months would look like. It was crucial for Beekeeper to continue growing, yet there were more and more indications of the organization's rapid growth leading to overwhelming complexity. So how could Grossmann steer the company towards even more growth while staying agile and exciting?

Samsung is a Korean conglomerate (or chaebol) founded in 1938. Once a sole trading company, it has grown into a myriad of companies generating over $380 billion globally in industries as varied as construction, semiconductors, shipbuilding, banking and entertainment. Like most Korean conglomerates, an unusual feature of Samsung is that it has no overarching holding company; it is a constellation of companies sharing a common name and tightly interwoven cross-ownership ties. This ownership structure allows the third-generation descendant of the family business, Jae-Yong Lee, to control the conglomerate with shares in only a few affiliates. The case focuses on three pivotal moments of the Lee family's leadership of the Samsung Group: the leadership transmission from the founder Byung-Chul to the second generation; the hospitalization of the visionary leader Kun-Hee and the succession to the third generation; and Jae-Yong's arrest and later conviction, causing a leadership vacuum within the group.

François Pugliese acquired Elite Beds in Etoy in a small buy-in in 2006 and then proceeded to re-invent completely its business, first by pivoting its business model and introducing Smart Leases and then by digitizing it, turning the mattress into a true technology platform, with dozens of innovative projects in the pipeline. As he proceeded to the conference room for the Board meeting in April 2017, François wondered whether it would help to prioritize the projects, and if so how? Did these projects effectively represent another pivot for the company again? Was it time to force change again? Learning objective: Managing growth, engineering a buy-in, financing deals, strategic pivots, business model changes, innovation management, digitalization of the mattress, technology platforms, growth management, innovation portfolio management.