Shanghai Zhongdan Information Technology Co. Ltd. (SZIT), established in 2017, was an e-commerce firm focusing on the flash-sales industry. Helping clothing brands clear their inventory quickly, SZIT rapidly attracted a large number of brands and successfully built a business ecosystem that included platforms, brands, shopkeepers, and consumers. To achieve success for all parties, SZIT took a series of measures to empower ecosystem members, such as helping brands build private traffic pools, providing one-stop services for shopkeepers, and reducing financial pressure for shopkeepers. These measures met the needs of different types of stakeholders and enabled SZIT to develop quickly and become a unicorn in the e-commerce industry. To continuously increase user traffic, SZIT developed the Xiang Store WeChat Mini Program to attract public traffic and ease the bottleneck of private traffic. However, SZIT now faced a new problem: determining how to balance the proportion of public traffic and private traffic.
Shanghai Forest Cabin Biotechnology Co., Ltd. (Forest Cabin) was a skin care product manufacturer and retailer that had focused on developing offline stores. At the beginning of 2020, however, the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic stagnated offline sales activities. Half of Forest Cabin’s offline stores closed at that time, and the existing stores had few customers, slowing the offline sales business. Forest Cabin rapidly initiated live streaming sales based on the digital foundation the company had built in its earlier stages. In this way, the company successfully responded to pandemic-related challenges and gained user traffic to realize revenue growth. However, with COVID-19 slowing down, people were resuming offline activities. Forest Cabin’s offline stores had provided a competitive advantage to the company. But the company had been able to leverage online live streaming, bringing explosive growth and enabling the company to survive a crisis. Should Forest Cabin focus on online development or offline development going forward?
Hisense Group Co. Ltd. (Hisense) was a leading manufacturing enterprise in the Chinese household appliance industry. In 2010, Hisense began to lay out its online channels. At that time, the same products had different prices in different channels, which caused fierce channel conflicts. To solve this problem, Hisense segmented online and off-line products and took a series of actions to help off-line channels improve efficiency and reduce prices. Therefore, Hisense successfully changed from having different prices for the same products to having different prices for different products. However, in early 2020 the new model was challenged again, and channel conflicts soon reappeared. How would Hisense break the recurring channel conflict this time?
Beijing’s Palace Museum was facing the threat of becoming irrelevant and obsolete. A former imperial palace, it housed thousands of priceless cultural relics of historical importance and was once a destination in high demand. However, over time, the museum found its popularity with modern youth was waning. To address this problem, the Palace Museum chose to follow in the footsteps of other global museums and in 1998, launched a digital transformation. By June 2020, the museum had made steady progress in its digitalization over the previous two decades. It formed partnerships with online media platforms and experimented with innovative technology in key areas of its systems and structures. However, this transformation did not come without criticism. Was the museum sacrificing its integrity and its cultural import by leaning too heavily on science and technology? If people could access the collections online, would anyone still bother to visit? The museum was challenged to weigh the risks and benefits of digital transformation.
Between 2015 and 2018, competitors in China's two-wheel e-vehicle industry were embroiled in a price war. Yadea Group Holdings decided to differentiate its brand from competitors and move away from further price reductions, opting instead to raise prices and adopt a distinctive high-end product strategy. It planned to offer its products to Tier 1 and Tier 2 cities in China, and to expand into the international market. With upgraded product and service offerings, the company was becoming a market leader in China's two-wheel e-vehicle industry. However, its founder was well aware that competitors would soon imitate the company’s high-end product strategy and could potentially overtake its market position. In the current Internet-based business environment, new sales and rental models were constantly emerging, which meant Yadea Group Holdings risked losing market share to both domestic competitors and international investors. Therefore, the founder decided that the company needed to choose between two potential five-year plan options for the future: take advantage of the existing market or take the lead in a new high-end market.
Launched in 2010, CredEx Fintech Co. Ltd. (CredEx) operated until 2017 as a mobile credit platform, connecting lenders and borrowers in the Chinese small- and microcredit market. In 2017, the Chinese government introduced a regulation to address misconducts in the credit market. As a result, CredEx needed to transform by utilizing mobile credit technology to enable and support licensed financial institutions to explore mobile credit markets. In 2018, however, this change posed many challenges, such as how to add a new business model that served enterprise consumers as well as how to manage dual business models.
Before 2013, Shandong Four Seasons Minghu Hotel Co. Ltd. was a high-end restaurant and food service company. In December 2012, the Chinese government implemented the Eight-Point Regulation that prohibited government officials from indulging in luxury banquets and high-end meals. The new government policy had a negative effect on many companies across the high-end food service industry, whose customer base consisted mainly of government officials. In response to the new government policy, Shandong Four Seasons Minghu Hotel Co. Ltd. made some strategic changes that eventually led the company to recover and survive. However, fierce competition created many challenges. The company had to determine whether to explore other markets and how to better satisfy the needs of consumers.
In December 2017, during the celebrations of the third anniversary of his company, the founder and president of Dami Technology Co. Ltd. (Dami) reflected on the success of his entrepreneurship efforts since 2014. Using mobile Internet, Internet of things, and artificial intelligence technologies, Dami implemented a new rice supply chain from farm to table by developing smart kitchenware, such as rice buckets and rice cookers. Dami was the first company to accomplish this goal in the Chinese rice industry. By the end of 2017, Dami had created its own market in more than 30 of China’s major cities, including Beijing and Shanghai. Having achieved great success, Dami had two main options for its next phase of growth: (1) build a complete smart kitchen ecosystem using all available resources, or (2) partner with a Chinese home appliances giant and join a smart kitchen ecosystem.
Handu Group was an online fast fashion apparel brand established in 2006 with headquarters in Jinan, China. The company had successfully adjusted its business models since 2006, transitioning from an unknown seller on the shopping website Taobao into a leading enterprise that owned over 20 subsidiary brands. However, in 2015, fierce competition in the fast fashion apparel market had intensified, with an increasing number of traditional garment companies establishing online channels. Online brands without physical stores, such as Handu Group, lost their primary competitive advantage. Faced with a bottleneck in development, the founder of Handu Group had to consider another innovation in the corporate business model. Zhao was considering three options: continuing multi-brand expansion, building brick-and-mortar shops to open offline channels, or opening operating platforms to serve other brands.
After recognizing numerous opportunities in the global market, Xiaomi Technology Corporation Ltd. (Xiaomi), based in Beijing, charted its overseas market strategy in 2013. However, opportunities came with challenges, and during the internationalization process, Xiaomi encountered many problems. By 2016, after three years of hard work, Xiaomi had gained more experience than profits. Compared with Xiaomi’s domestic success, Xiaomi’s internationalization strategy was unsatisfactory. How could Xiaomi meet its international goals? Should it establish international strategic alliances, develop its firmware operating system, or consider other options?
After several years of effort, Dalian Zhongding Information Co. (DZI) had become the leading prepaid card distributor in Liaoning Province. When government regulations and the rise of online third-party payment options sent the prepaid card business into decline, DZI transformed itself into an online intermediary by building a regional e-commerce platform offering fast home delivery, mainly of supermarket products. Despite its marketing efforts, the company faced fierce competition, difficulty attracting users, and a low secondary purchase rate. In 2015, the company needed to adjust its development strategy. What practices should this regional e-commerce platform adopt to obtain traffic, increase purchasing conversion rate, and increase visitor retention?
Jiemo.net (Jiemo), an Internet-based study-abroad consultant agency headquartered in Dalian, China, began in 2010 by providing application support to customers who wished to apply to study abroad. In 2014, the company discovered that profit existed in providing services to students once they had been accepted to study abroad. Jiemo changed its traditional pricing model, used social media marketing, and collaborated with other agencies to establish an ecosystem for these students. The result was that Jiemo acquired customers by providing free Internet-based application support (“front end” services), and reaped profits by providing services that those customers needed once they were studying abroad (“back end” services). However, as Jiemo grew, the designed profit model was not supporting growth. Jiemo had to modify the model. Should it improve the back end services to reduce costs and gain more profit from existing customers, or explore the needs of potential customers and add new services?
In 2007, the chairman of Supor Group led the company in a new venture in the sanitary ware industry. Supor Group was the first listed company in the Chinese cookware market, and Supor Sanitary Ware Co., Ltd. (Supor) was Supor Group’s most important industry. Supor established three production bases in Zhejiang and Shenyang, China. Its marketing channels included brand agents and direct-sale stores. The company also opened an online flagship store on Tmall, a Chinese-language website for business-to-consumer online retail. Since its performance on Tmall was poor, the company outsourced this channel to Company X. However, this led to channel conflict between online and offline channels. How could Supor Group resolve the conflict, improve channel performance, and achieve channel synergy?
The number and value of Chinese enterprises’ cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are increasing, but their success rate remains very low. The failure of cultural integration is one of the most important reasons. In 2005, Lenovo Group Ltd., acquired IBM’s PC division in what was called a “snake swallows elephant” acquisition that caused a sensation worldwide. During the ten years after the M&A, Lenovo integrated IBM’s PC division’s culture through several stages of acculturation, which ended with great success. In 2014, Lenovo acquired IBM’s x86 Server. Lenovo faced a challenge: Should the first acquisition’s cultural integration be replayed and copied for the x86 Server acquisition? Or should Lenovo look for a new approach?
BIG PASTURE Animal Husbandry Company (Group) Co., Ltd. (BIG PASTURE) had achieved great success after nearly 10 years of development. It had started as a ready-to-eat food processing factory that supplied individually owned stores and franchises with self-produced food. Since then, its product line was extended to include fresh and processed beef and mutton. At the same time, BIG PASTURE undertook a major shift from company-operated stores to community convenience stores, further fostering its community economy. However, since the rapid development of e-commerce had contributed toward the success of many local sellers in China, BIG PASTURE saw the possibility of a breakthrough. Thus, the major challenges facing the company included creating a national market through e-commerce and developing community economies.
Beijing Xiaomi Technology Co. Ltd. (Xiaomi) had grown into the third-largest cell phone brand in China and the sixth-largest in the world. The company solely deployed online channels, which contributed to its success. In the initial stage, Xiaomi depended on its own online channel to interact with consumers to develop user-friendly products and sell products. Three years after its inception, the company successfully established its flagship store on the largest business-to-consumer e-commerce platform in China. However, Xiaomi was facing a series of challenges, such as competitors’ imitation and consumer complaints regarding services. Xiaomi was at a crossroads: should it stick to its online channels or develop online-to-offline channels?
Shanghai NSE Electric Co. Ltd. (NSE), a medium-sized manufacturer of marine switch panels, had entered into a joint venture with Schneider Electric under which NSE was Schneider’s sole technology licensee in China. NSE felt fortunate because the world shipbuilding market was strong and orders were often full. With comprehensive and close cooperation, NSE was confident in Schneider. Nevertheless, Schneider announced that it would issue a second license to NSE’s outsourcing manufacturer, SaierNico Electric & Automation. This meant that a competitor that produced and sold products of the same brand would emerge in the Chinese market. What was worse, this competitor had been cultivated by NSE. The CEO of NSE believed that NSE had three options: (1) continue to cooperate with Schneider; (2) broaden its business and cooperate with other powerful companies; or (3) invest more in local innovation to develop its own brand.
The general manager of market development for the Dalian International Airport in China was worried. Two years after he had successfully launched the Northeastern Hinterland and Bohai Rim Region Airport Aviation Market Strategic Alliance in 2009, it was facing serious external and internal challenges. Competitors had begun to impact on the alliance by intensively adding flights to regional airports with the support of subsidies from provincial and local governments. And as alliance members gained more air traffic, they began to compete for transport resources, which challenged the organization’s sustainable development. From the beginning, Dalian International Airport, as the core of the organization, had shared its routes and ticket fares with other alliance member airports, had removed landing fees for stopover flights and had organized a trade fair to encourage interactions between small regional airports and the airlines that had ignored them in the past, not recognizing how China’s booming economy was making even remote routes potentially profitable. The general manager had three possible options: utilizing outside help, increasing his airport’s market position and strengthening internal ties to resist external forces. All three options had their pros and cons. What should he do?
Krohne Inc. of Germany separately established a joint venture, a wholly owned sales company and a manufacturer in China. Unfortunately, although the sales channels were different, the product lines of the joint venture and the wholly owned manufacturer overlapped. The two companies were therefore competing and unsure about which company rightfully represented the parent enterprise. In addition, the two investment parties were battling for control of the joint venture.