Shanghai Zhongdan Information Technology Co. Ltd. (SZIT), established in 2017, was an e-commerce firm focusing on the flash-sales industry. Helping clothing brands clear their inventory quickly, SZIT rapidly attracted a large number of brands and successfully built a business ecosystem that included platforms, brands, shopkeepers, and consumers. To achieve success for all parties, SZIT took a series of measures to empower ecosystem members, such as helping brands build private traffic pools, providing one-stop services for shopkeepers, and reducing financial pressure for shopkeepers. These measures met the needs of different types of stakeholders and enabled SZIT to develop quickly and become a unicorn in the e-commerce industry. To continuously increase user traffic, SZIT developed the Xiang Store WeChat Mini Program to attract public traffic and ease the bottleneck of private traffic. However, SZIT now faced a new problem: determining how to balance the proportion of public traffic and private traffic.

Shanghai Zhongdan Information Technology Co. Ltd. (SZIT), established in 2017, was an e-commerce firm focusing on the flash-sales industry. Helping clothing brands clear their inventory quickly, SZIT rapidly attracted a large number of brands and successfully built a business ecosystem that included platforms, brands, shopkeepers, and consumers. To achieve success for all parties, SZIT took a series of measures to empower ecosystem members, such as helping brands build private traffic pools, providing one-stop services for shopkeepers, and reducing financial pressure for shopkeepers. These measures met the needs of different types of stakeholders and enabled SZIT to develop quickly and become a unicorn in the e-commerce industry. To continuously increase user traffic, SZIT developed the Xiang Store WeChat Mini Program to attract public traffic and ease the bottleneck of private traffic. However, SZIT now faced a new problem: determining how to balance the proportion of public traffic and private traffic.

Shanghai Forest Cabin Biotechnology Co., Ltd. (Forest Cabin) was a skin care product manufacturer and retailer that had focused on developing offline stores. At the beginning of 2020, however, the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic stagnated offline sales activities. Half of Forest Cabin’s offline stores closed at that time, and the existing stores had few customers, slowing the offline sales business. Forest Cabin rapidly initiated live streaming sales based on the digital foundation the company had built in its earlier stages. In this way, the company successfully responded to pandemic-related challenges and gained user traffic to realize revenue growth. However, with COVID-19 slowing down, people were resuming offline activities. Forest Cabin’s offline stores had provided a competitive advantage to the company. But the company had been able to leverage online live streaming, bringing explosive growth and enabling the company to survive a crisis. Should Forest Cabin focus on online development or offline development going forward?

Shanghai Forest Cabin Biotechnology Co., Ltd. (Forest Cabin) was a skin care product manufacturer and retailer that had focused on developing offline stores. At the beginning of 2020, however, the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic stagnated offline sales activities. Half of Forest Cabin's offline stores closed at that time, and the existing stores had few customers, slowing the offline sales business. Forest Cabin rapidly initiated live streaming sales based on the digital foundation the company had built in its earlier stages. In this way, the company successfully responded to pandemic-related challenges and gained user traffic to realize revenue growth. However, with COVID-19 slowing down, people were resuming offline activities. Forest Cabin's offline stores had provided a competitive advantage to the company. But the company had been able to leverage online live streaming, bringing explosive growth and enabling the company to survive a crisis. Should Forest Cabin focus on online development or offline development going forward?

Hisense Group Co. Ltd. (Hisense) was a leading manufacturing enterprise in the Chinese household appliance industry. In 2010, Hisense began to lay out its online channels. At that time, the same products had different prices in different channels, which caused fierce channel conflicts. To solve this problem, Hisense segmented online and off-line products and took a series of actions to help off-line channels improve efficiency and reduce prices. Therefore, Hisense successfully changed from having different prices for the same products to having different prices for different products. However, in early 2020 the new model was challenged again, and channel conflicts soon reappeared. How would Hisense break the recurring channel conflict this time?

Hisense Group Co. Ltd. (Hisense) was a leading manufacturing enterprise in the Chinese household appliance industry. In 2010, Hisense began to lay out its online channels. At that time, the same products had different prices in different channels, which caused fierce channel conflicts. To solve this problem, Hisense segmented online and off-line products and took a series of actions to help off-line channels improve efficiency and reduce prices. Therefore, Hisense successfully changed from having different prices for the same products to having different prices for different products. However, in early 2020 the new model was challenged again, and channel conflicts soon reappeared. How would Hisense break the recurring channel conflict this time?

Beijing’s Palace Museum was facing the threat of becoming irrelevant and obsolete. A former imperial palace, it housed thousands of priceless cultural relics of historical importance and was once a destination in high demand. However, over time, the museum found its popularity with modern youth was waning. To address this problem, the Palace Museum chose to follow in the footsteps of other global museums and in 1998, launched a digital transformation. By June 2020, the museum had made steady progress in its digitalization over the previous two decades. It formed partnerships with online media platforms and experimented with innovative technology in key areas of its systems and structures. However, this transformation did not come without criticism. Was the museum sacrificing its integrity and its cultural import by leaning too heavily on science and technology? If people could access the collections online, would anyone still bother to visit? The museum was challenged to weigh the risks and benefits of digital transformation.

Beijing's Palace Museum was facing the threat of becoming irrelevant and obsolete. A former imperial palace, it housed thousands of priceless cultural relics of historical importance and was once a destination in high demand. However, over time, the museum found its popularity with modern youth was waning. To address this problem, the Palace Museum chose to follow in the footsteps of other global museums and in 1998, launched a digital transformation. By June 2020, the museum had made steady progress in its digitalization over the previous two decades. It formed partnerships with online media platforms and experimented with innovative technology in key areas of its systems and structures. However, this transformation did not come without criticism. Was the museum sacrificing its integrity and its cultural import by leaning too heavily on science and technology? If people could access the collections online, would anyone still bother to visit? The museum was challenged to weigh the risks and benefits of digital transformation.

Between 2015 and 2018, competitors in China's two-wheel e-vehicle industry were embroiled in a price war. Yadea Group Holdings decided to differentiate its brand from competitors and move away from further price reductions, opting instead to raise prices and adopt a distinctive high-end product strategy. It planned to offer its products to Tier 1 and Tier 2 cities in China, and to expand into the international market. With upgraded product and service offerings, the company was becoming a market leader in China's two-wheel e-vehicle industry. However, its founder was well aware that competitors would soon imitate the company's high-end product strategy and could potentially overtake its market position. In the current Internet-based business environment, new sales and rental models were constantly emerging, which meant Yadea Group Holdings risked losing market share to both domestic competitors and international investors. Therefore, the founder decided that the company needed to choose between two potential five-year plan options for the future: take advantage of the existing market or take the lead in a new high-end market.

Between 2015 and 2018, competitors in China's two-wheel e-vehicle industry were embroiled in a price war. Yadea Group Holdings decided to differentiate its brand from competitors and move away from further price reductions, opting instead to raise prices and adopt a distinctive high-end product strategy. It planned to offer its products to Tier 1 and Tier 2 cities in China, and to expand into the international market. With upgraded product and service offerings, the company was becoming a market leader in China's two-wheel e-vehicle industry. However, its founder was well aware that competitors would soon imitate the company’s high-end product strategy and could potentially overtake its market position. In the current Internet-based business environment, new sales and rental models were constantly emerging, which meant Yadea Group Holdings risked losing market share to both domestic competitors and international investors. Therefore, the founder decided that the company needed to choose between two potential five-year plan options for the future: take advantage of the existing market or take the lead in a new high-end market.

Launched in 2010, CredEx Fintech Co. Ltd. (CredEx) operated until 2017 as a mobile credit platform, connecting lenders and borrowers in the Chinese small- and microcredit market. In 2017, the Chinese government introduced a regulation to address misconducts in the credit market. As a result, CredEx needed to transform by utilizing mobile credit technology to enable and support licensed financial institutions to explore mobile credit markets. In 2018, however, this change posed many challenges, such as how to add a new business model that served enterprise consumers as well as how to manage dual business models.

Launched in 2010, CredEx Fintech Co. Ltd. (CredEx) operated until 2017 as a mobile credit platform, connecting lenders and borrowers in the Chinese small- and microcredit market. In 2017, the Chinese government introduced a regulation to address misconducts in the credit market. As a result, CredEx needed to transform by utilizing mobile credit technology to enable and support licensed financial institutions to explore mobile credit markets. In 2018, however, this change posed many challenges, such as how to add a new business model that served enterprise consumers as well as how to manage dual business models.

Before 2013, Shandong Four Seasons Minghu Hotel Co. Ltd. was a high-end restaurant and food service company. In December 2012, the Chinese government implemented the Eight-Point Regulation that prohibited government officials from indulging in luxury banquets and high-end meals. The new government policy had a negative effect on many companies across the high-end food service industry, whose customer base consisted mainly of government officials. In response to the new government policy, Shandong Four Seasons Minghu Hotel Co. Ltd. made some strategic changes that eventually led the company to recover and survive. However, fierce competition created many challenges. The company had to determine whether to explore other markets and how to better satisfy the needs of consumers.

Before 2013, Shandong Four Seasons Minghu Hotel Co. Ltd. was a high-end restaurant and food service company. In December 2012, the Chinese government implemented the Eight-Point Regulation that prohibited government officials from indulging in luxury banquets and high-end meals. The new government policy had a negative effect on many companies across the high-end food service industry, whose customer base consisted mainly of government officials. In response to the new government policy, Shandong Four Seasons Minghu Hotel Co. Ltd. made some strategic changes that eventually led the company to recover and survive. However, fierce competition created many challenges. The company had to determine whether to explore other markets and how to better satisfy the needs of consumers.

In December 2017, during the celebrations of the third anniversary of his company, the founder and president of Dami Technology Co. Ltd. (Dami) reflected on the success of his entrepreneurship efforts since 2014. Using mobile Internet, Internet of things, and artificial intelligence technologies, Dami implemented a new rice supply chain from farm to table by developing smart kitchenware, such as rice buckets and rice cookers. Dami was the first company to accomplish this goal in the Chinese rice industry. By the end of 2017, Dami had created its own market in more than 30 of China’s major cities, including Beijing and Shanghai. Having achieved great success, Dami had two main options for its next phase of growth: (1) build a complete smart kitchen ecosystem using all available resources, or (2) partner with a Chinese home appliances giant and join a smart kitchen ecosystem.

In December 2017, during the celebrations of the third anniversary of his company, the founder and president of Dami Technology Co. Ltd. (Dami) reflected on the success of his entrepreneurship efforts since 2014. Using mobile Internet, Internet of things, and artificial intelligence technologies, Dami implemented a new rice supply chain from farm to table by developing smart kitchenware, such as rice buckets and rice cookers. Dami was the first company to accomplish this goal in the Chinese rice industry. By the end of 2017, Dami had created its own market in more than 30 of China's major cities, including Beijing and Shanghai. Having achieved great success, Dami had two main options for its next phase of growth: (1) build a complete smart kitchen ecosystem using all available resources, or (2) partner with a Chinese home appliances giant and join a smart kitchen ecosystem.

Handu Group was an online fast fashion apparel brand established in 2006 with headquarters in Jinan, China. The company had successfully adjusted its business models since 2006, transitioning from an unknown seller on the shopping website Taobao into a leading enterprise that owned over 20 subsidiary brands. However, in 2015, fierce competition in the fast fashion apparel market had intensified, with an increasing number of traditional garment companies establishing online channels. Online brands without physical stores, such as Handu Group, lost their primary competitive advantage. Faced with a bottleneck in development, the founder of Handu Group had to consider another innovation in the corporate business model. Zhao was considering three options: continuing multi-brand expansion, building brick-and-mortar shops to open offline channels, or opening operating platforms to serve other brands.

Handu Group was an online fast fashion apparel brand established in 2006 with headquarters in Jinan, China. The company had successfully adjusted its business models since 2006, transitioning from an unknown seller on the shopping website Taobao into a leading enterprise that owned over 20 subsidiary brands. However, in 2015, fierce competition in the fast fashion apparel market had intensified, with an increasing number of traditional garment companies establishing online channels. Online brands without physical stores, such as Handu Group, lost their primary competitive advantage. Faced with a bottleneck in development, the founder of Handu Group had to consider another innovation in the corporate business model. Zhao was considering three options: continuing multi-brand expansion, building brick-and-mortar shops to open offline channels, or opening operating platforms to serve other brands.

After recognizing numerous opportunities in the global market, Xiaomi Technology Corporation Ltd. (Xiaomi), based in Beijing, charted its overseas market strategy in 2013. However, opportunities came with challenges, and during the internationalization process, Xiaomi encountered many problems. By 2016, after three years of hard work, Xiaomi had gained more experience than profits. Compared with Xiaomi's domestic success, Xiaomi's internationalization strategy was unsatisfactory. How could Xiaomi meet its international goals? Should it establish international strategic alliances, develop its firmware operating system, or consider other options?

After recognizing numerous opportunities in the global market, Xiaomi Technology Corporation Ltd. (Xiaomi), based in Beijing, charted its overseas market strategy in 2013. However, opportunities came with challenges, and during the internationalization process, Xiaomi encountered many problems. By 2016, after three years of hard work, Xiaomi had gained more experience than profits. Compared with Xiaomi’s domestic success, Xiaomi’s internationalization strategy was unsatisfactory. How could Xiaomi meet its international goals? Should it establish international strategic alliances, develop its firmware operating system, or consider other options?