In February 2020, a social geographer at the University of Victoria was approached by one of the co-founders and managing partners of Raven Indigenous Capital Partners to develop an Indigenous impact measurement framework for the company. Raven Indigenous Capital Partners was founded in 2017 in Vancouver, British Columbia. The founders launched the Raven Indigenous Impact Fund to invest in early-stage growth businesses started by Indigenous entrepreneurs. The ultimate goal was to increase the well-being of Indigenous communities in Canada, but the fund had to demonstrate to non-Indigenous impact investors that they could target, measure, and report their social impact while earning an annual rate of return of 6–8 per cent on their investment. The social geographer faced two key tasks. She had to develop an impact measurement framework that combined Indigenous and non-Indigenous approaches to measuring social and environmental impacts. She also had to engage the Indigenous community in reporting on these outcomes.
As bank executives for over 30 years, Kevin Clark and Troy Wright witnessed countless opportunities to support small businesses being missed. That is what attracted them to the fintech revolution now transforming banking and financial services around the world. In this Ivey Business Journal interview, Ivey Professor Michael King sat down with Clark to discuss his transformation from old-school banker to fintech entrepreneur, not to mention his company’s evolution from industry disruptor to industry partner. Clark considers his firm, Lendified, to be a lending technology company that is taking the pain points out of borrowing for small businesses. Lendified provides a frictionless customer experience through the online application process, the speed of making decisions, and rapid access to capital. Lendified, he says, has effectively built two operating companies, but it did not start that way. Clark and Wright thought they were creating a highly effective lending business, but the credit technology turned out to be a successful software-as-a-service (SaaS) business unto itself. Furthermore, they thought their product would be sold on the basis of its efficiency, and yet what has sold the software is the customer experience.
Canada’s Department of Finance recently began consultations on open banking—a global trend enacted last year in Britain and the European Union and soon rolling out in Australia. Under open banking, you would be able to authorize apps developed by fintech companies to access your bank account in order to provide services you want, such as reporting, budgeting, or forecasting. The issues that need to be addressed to make open banking work for Canadians include scope, security, stages, and literacy. Data security (and privacy) is the #1 issue, and Canada eventually needs to establish both data protection standards and a code of consumer data rights to get the most out of the digital economy. Canada’s proposal does not include a digital identity system to replace physical documents (such as a passport or identity card). The country should adopt two standards to increase security: mandating standardized APIs that third-party developers can use to build banking apps, and mandating PCI DSS-compliance for fintech firms operating in payments. Canada should roll out open banking in stages, and it should be accompanied by a major effort to raise financial literacy—consumers need to be informed and protected.
This note discusses how to analyze a bank from the point of view of an equity analyst or investor. The note begins by reviewing the evolution of North American banks from narrow to diversified financial institutions and then describes the financial ratios used to evaluate a bank's operating and financial performance. The final section provides examples of these ratios applied to a North American bank, and a set of Canadian and U.S. banks.
In December 2016, the founder and chief executive officer of R3 was preparing for an offsite meeting, where his management team would debate what business model to pursue to extract the most value from the company’s new distributed ledger product called Corda. Founded in 2014, R3 was a blockchain technology company with headquarters in New York. R3 was leading a consortium of over 100 banks, financial institutions, and technology companies to develop a distributed ledger technology that could meet the needs of the financial services industry. R3 had run a number of proof of concept tests of existing distributed ledger technologies with its bank members before deciding to develop an enterprise-grade distributed ledger from scratch. R3 was still privately-owned and controlled by the founder, but had financed its research and development by selling memberships in a joint venture to a consortium of over 40 banks. With Corda operational by mid-2016, the founder had to decide what business model to follow to monetize the investment in Corda. A second question was how to finance R3’s future growth.
In 2016, Elixir, a financial technology start-up, was developing a social banking application to provide mobile banking to young adults and other underserved banking customers. Elixir had a social finance business model called MillennialMoney, where existing customers had an opportunity to earn referral fees by introducing new customers. For the banks, Elixir provided a novel marketing solution to attract millennial customers. As a technology company in the social finance space, Elixir could use the strategic and operational advice of an experienced banker to help turn this vision into a reality. One such banker had been in discussions with Elixir’s chief executive officer and the chair of the advisory board. The banker had been conducting due diligence of the company all summer of 2016 and had even gone on sales calls in Malaysia to see what banks thought about Elixir. Now it was time to make a decision. Should he join the management team of Elixir and invest in the start-up?
In late 2003, the managing directors of Quantum Investors Inc., a private equity firm that specialized in distressed investing, needed to decide whether their firm should take action in the restructuring of Stelco Inc., a Canadian steel company on the verge of bankruptcy. Stelco had been unable to adapt to the changing dynamics of the steel industry, due to its high cost structure and low efficiency. Its share values had declined sharply and it had a deteriorating cash position. The managing directors of the private equity firm needed to decide on a potential approach to restructuring, including which securities to purchase, and a strategy for dealing with stakeholders to ensure a successful outcome for its investment.
Spin Master, a children’s toy and entertainment company, was getting ready for an initial public offering (IPO). Its founders were weighing their options with regard to some core issues: What was the right positioning for Spin Master with potential investors? What was the right approach to valuing the business? How did that approach translate into enterprise value, equity value, and share price for the IPO?
In April 2011, a university professor of accounting and finance was examining the financial statements of Pangang Group Steel Vanadium & Titanium Company (Pangang), a leading Chinese steel manufacturer listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Pangang had a dramatic turnaround in its reported net income in 2010 with its share price rising over 60 per cent in a six-month period. The professor suspected that the controlling shareholder of Pangang - Anshan Iron and Steel Group Corporation (Ansteel) - had been manipulating Pangang's earnings to artificially inflate the stock price. The timing coincided with the expiry of put options awarded by Ansteel to minority shareholders as part of a restructuring. Was Pangang manipulating its earnings to influence stock prices? Was there sufficient evidence to expose the fraudulent scheme to the public or report the case to the Chinese securities regulators?
In mid-October 2007, the chief executive officer (CEO) of the TSX Group was contemplating his strategic options. In March 2009, a decade-long non-compete agreement between the TSX Group and the Montréal Exchange would expire. Under this agreement, the former had been the sole exchange for trading senior equities in Canada while the latter had the monopoly on exchange-traded derivative contracts. Afterwards, both exchanges would be able to compete directly in their respective businesses. The CEO believed a merger between the two Canadian exchanges made strategic sense, especially given the current merger wave globally, but his counterpart had rebuffed his advances. What was the best way to bring his rival to the bargaining table? Should the TSX Group make a hostile bid? How much of a premium for shares should be offered?
In January 2001, the chief executive officer (CEO) of Canadian Pacific Limited (CPL) was contemplating the future of his firm. CPL was one of Canada’s oldest conglomerates with operations in railways, shipping, natural resources and hotels. Its stock market capitalization of CDN$13.5 billion reflected a conglomerate discount, estimated at 12 to 35 per cent of the value. In order to eliminate this conglomerate discount and maximize shareholder value, the CEO weighed the pros and cons of asset divestitures or spinoffs. Would it make sense to keep some of the related business together to preserve economies of scale and scope and to maintain synergies? What would be the tax implications of each option? There were numerous operational and legal implications to consider. Knowing he had to make a decision quickly, the CEO looked for the option that would unlock the most value for CPL’s shareholders.