In early 2021, PepsiCo Inc. (PepsiCo), one of the world’s largest food and beverage companies, was undergoing immense criticism for its role in global health issues including obesity, diabetes, heart disease, malnutrition, and cancer. As far back as 2010, executives at PepsiCo had recognized that “society, people, and lifestyles have changed” and that PepsiCo had no choice but to move in healthier directions. Although PepsiCo had made impressive strides in reducing the negative health impacts of some of its products, criticism persisted that it was not going far enough.
Meridian Credit Union (Meridian) was a financial co-operative (i.e. credit union) in Ontario, Canada. In its effort to shift from being a niche to a mainstream market player in the financial-services sector, Meridian attempted to challenge the oligopoly of Canada’s big banks. It tried to do this through a responsible, consumer-centric business strategy that aimed to address many of the problems with the financial sector in Canada and around the world. Owned by its customers, Meridian represented a marked counterpoint to the traditional shareholder-owned bank in Canada at a time of increased awareness about the conflict between consumer and shareholder objectives. In March 2018, Meridian’s executive team was reflecting on the credit union’s recent growth and the changes that had resulted. As they considered where Meridian should go next, they faced a series of questions: Should the credit union become more focused? Should it expand and diversify its service offerings? What were the risks of these strategies? What were the opportunities and threats of financial technology? Were there other growth options Meridian should consider in light of these trends?
In the summer of 2013, the managing director of Tata Chemicals Magadi, Africa’s largest soda ash manufacturer and one of the oldest and largest export earners in Kenya, was wondering how he was going to respond to a growing number of challenges. As a producer of a commodity product, the company was vulnerable to escalating energy costs, oversupply and economic cycles. Global growth had been sluggish since the 2008 economic recession and competition was intense, especially since the emergence of Chinese producers. Magadi Township, where the company’s production facility was located, was one of the poorest in the country, subject to droughts and without many of the basic public services typically provided by government such as roads, health care, electricity, water and education. To address these needs, the company migrated from a top-down, paternal, ad hoc and resource-intensive approach to a bottom-up, collaborative, holistic and resource-sharing style that focused on community capacity building and self-governance. However, the issue now is how to best balance the strong need to reduce costs while remaining committed to the sustainability of the surrounding community.
The co-founder and president of an environmentally friendly moving supply company faces the challenge of expanding his company’s brand. The company, which provides plastic, reusable moving bins and other moving supplies, has branded itself as providing a convenient, affordable and eco-friendly alternative to cardboard moving boxes. The company can expand by setting up additional corporate stores or by selling individual franchises. The co-founder and president also contemplates focusing his efforts on dominating and revolutionizing the Canadian moving industry. He also remains open to the possibility of eventually selling the company to a larger organization. In considering all options, he wants to sustain the integrity and success of the brand he has built and to ensure that any future expansion maintains his commitment to providing consumers with value, high quality and superior customer service.
The Canadian Boreal Forest Agreement (CBFA) had two primary purposes: (1) to protect Canada’s boreal forest from harmful logging practices; and (2) to improve and protect the reputation of Canada’s forest industry and companies. But the CBFA’s ambitious plans overlooked the fundamental challenges associated with the agreement’s implementation. Two years after its signing, the agreement suffers from a severe lack of funding, the withdrawal of one signatory and major hurdles at the regional working group level. The CBFA’s secretariat needs to develop a plan of action to realize the full potential of the agreement but faces numerous issues in terms of implementation: (1) the CBFA’s exclusion of First Nations communities; (2) funding issues; (3) disagreement at the local regional levels and among some signatories; (4) slow pace of implementation and (5) limited concrete signs of success thus far.
Pure Organic Food and Juice Bar (Pure) is a restaurant located in Collingwood, Ontario specializing in raw, organic and vegan foods. The company’s strategy is to tap into the growing demand for food that is associated with a healthy and more sustainable lifestyle. However, the difficulty of attracting customers in a small town with seasonal fluctuations in the number of residents/visitors, combined with competition from “green” products provided by competing restaurants and grocery stores and the lack of a focused strategy have resulted in weak profit levels. The co-founders are wondering what needs to be changed to tap into the lucrative mainstream market. Students are pushed to think about how Pure should change its strategy, what sorts of marketing approaches it should use and, most importantly, how the co-founders can tap into the mainstream market without compromising their original values.
The owner of South Side Restaurant, a mid- to upper-class restaurant located in Chicago, Illinois, must decide which of three bottles of wine to add to the restaurant’s wine list. Given that the restaurant prides itself on its environmental and social positioning and that its consumers have come to expect performance in this area, the wine’s carbon footprint represents an important decision criterion. South Side Restaurant is a for-profit restaurant and the owner must balance this environmental criterion with short- and long-term financial returns.
In the midst of massive growth in the oil sands, Suncor’s chief executive officer (CEO) is growing concerned about the local government’s inability to cope with unprecedented growth of oils sands development in Fort McMurray, Alberta. Crime, prostitution, drug use, social inequality, and ecological deterioration have begun to cripple Fort McMurray and the surrounding area largely because the local government has been unable to support the massive growth with appropriate public services and environmental protection. As part of a major oil and gas company in the region, the CEO is aware of the harsh lessons learned by Shell in Nigeria in 1995, where the company’s reluctance to get involved in political activities led to a massive boycott and tarnished reputation. The CEO is concerned that inaction may make Suncor complicit in the social and ecological issues in the region.
The director and co-founder of Honey Care Africa (Honey Care) looks back over the six years of operations and describes the original business model and several sequential changes based on feedback from rural communities, partner organizations, and learning by doing through field operations. Increasing international recognition highlights the potential impact of the model on inspiring sustainable grassroots ventures in the agriculture sector in Kenya. For Tanzania and other developing countries, he ponders the potential opportunities and challenges in replicating the Honey Care model elsewhere. The case also tackles alternative routes for scaling up the model in East Africa. Students are presented with several specific challenges which illustrate the growing tension between Honey Care's original commitment to the farmers and its prospects for international take-off, and are asked to propose alternative model reconfigurations to resolve this tension.
The founding entrepreneur of Honey Care Africa revitalized Kenya’s national honey industry by focusing on small-holder farmers across the country. Central to success was an innovative business model: a synergistic partnership between the development sector, the private sector, and rural communities that drew on the core competencies of each party as well as their complementary roles. This tripartite model was combined with local manufacturing of beehives, effective beekeeping training, a guaranteed market for small-holder farmers through forward contracts, and prompt payments. Four years later, Honey Care had achieved a 68 per cent market share in Kenya and distributed several brands of organic, fair-trade honey internationally, and was a lead distributor of beeswax. The business model had been successfully replicated in neighbouring Tanzania, and there were plans to expand to Uganda and Sudan.