This article presents a strategic decision-making tool to assist corporate management in analyzing the trajectory of their business model portfolio. The tool provides a robust means of assessing the trajectory of a business model portfolio through the evolution of inter-business model complementarity and intra-business model complexity. The article illustrates the use of the tool through the example of the radical restructuring of Hewlett Packard's (HP) business model portfolio in 2015, which resulted in two smaller, more adaptive corporate entities with distinct business models that could pursue redefined growth opportunities after the split.

On November 2, 2021, Enrique Lores, CEO of HP, Inc., ended the first online huddle of the week with his executive leadership team. The day was an historic one for the Palo Alto-based global company: six years earlier, HP Inc. came into being after the split of the iconic hardware company into two: HP, Inc. and Hewlett Packard Enterprise. As soon as Lores, who had become CEO the year prior, took over the reins at HP Inc., he immediately began to strategize the aggressive transformation of the hallowed company from a product-oriented to a customer experience-oriented company, identifying three areas, each requiring significant innovation: 1. Evolution of core business models to adapt to changing customer needs; 2. Pursuit of adjacencies in relation to the personal computer and print businesses; and 3. Leveraging platforms (capability and asset) and software assets to create new businesses. The broad and deep change initiative that he had charted for HP would require changes in skills, talent, infrastructure, and culture. To communicate what was required of his team, shift their thinking, and achieve a better multiple on their earnings per share, Lores asked his leaders to focus their attention on three key concepts: (1) Advance the business models of HP's core businesses; (2) Disrupt using HP's core assets; and (3) Transform the processes, cost structure, go-to-market capabilities, supply chain and brand of HP. Perhaps unsurprisingly, discussions at the morning meeting centered around the need to harness the past and drive the future. Markets were changing, HP's performance was accelerating and the company was seeing new customer behaviors. In addition, there was an inflection point in the PC stack and importantly, 3D printing, where HP had a great position, was attracting a lot of interest.

On November 2, 2021, Enrique Lores, CEO of HP, Inc., ended the first online huddle of the week with his executive leadership team. The day was an historic one for the Palo Alto-based global company: six years earlier, HP Inc. came into being after the split of the iconic hardware company into two: HP, Inc. and Hewlett Packard Enterprise. As soon as Lores, who had become CEO the year prior, took over the reins at HP Inc., he immediately began to strategize the aggressive transformation of the hallowed company from a product-oriented to a customer experience-oriented company, identifying three areas, each requiring significant innovation: 1. Evolution of core business models to adapt to changing customer needs; 2. Pursuit of adjacencies in relation to the personal computer and print businesses; and 3. Leveraging platforms (capability and asset) and software assets to create new businesses. The broad and deep change initiative that he had charted for HP would require changes in skills, talent, infrastructure, and culture. To communicate what was required of his team, shift their thinking, and achieve a better multiple on their earnings per share, Lores asked his leaders to focus their attention on three key concepts: (1) Advance the business models of HP's core businesses; (2) Disrupt using HP's core assets; and (3) Transform the processes, cost structure, go-to-market capabilities, supply chain and brand of HP. Perhaps unsurprisingly, discussions at the morning meeting centered around the need to harness the past and drive the future. Markets were changing, HP's performance was accelerating and the company was seeing new customer behaviors. In addition, there was an inflection point in the PC stack and importantly, 3D printing, where HP had a great position, was attracting a lot of interest.

This note examines the corporate venture capital (CVC) industry, which has played an increasingly large role in the global innovation ecosystem, especially in Silicon Valley, over the last decade. The contents of the note include: a history of CVC beginning in the early 1960s; a qualitative and quantitative assessment of the industry in the late 2010s; a summary of the primary reasons why large corporations establish CVC arms; a framework for balancing strategic and financial value; profiles of three prominent CVC arms; a discussion of the challenges to realizing strategic value; and a process model to improve strategic collaboration.

Since its founding in the late 1990s, JetBlue Airways has been known as an innovator in the U.S. airline industry. This case explores how in the mid- to late-2010s, JetBlue sought to drive further innovation by setting up a corporate venture capital arm. Led by Bonny Simi, a long-time JetBlue executive, commercial airline pilot, former U.S. Olympian, and Stanford alumna, JetBlue Technology Ventures (JTV) seeks to bring external innovation in house. The case relates the history of JTV's establishment, details its investment decision-making criteria and processes, and examines the governance structures put in place to ensure strategic alignment with its corporate parent. Considerable attention is also paid to the ways in which JTV helps integrate into JetBlue Airways new technologies developed by the start-ups it invests in. Overall, the case assesses how JTV tries to achieve both financial and strategic objectives, which has historically been a challenge for corporate venture capital arms set up by other large companies across a variety of industries.

Supplement to case SM298A. Jonas Spangenberg, CEO of BoKlok, an entrepreneurial industrialized construction venture focused on providing low-cost housing to a sharply defined, relatively low-price market segment, must identify and manage forces within three contexts as he develops and guides BoKlok's growth strategy: the residential construction industry, and Skanksa and IKEA, BoKlok's parent companies. Students are asked to consider Spangenberg's strategic actions in relation to the external context-an industry beginning to feel the impact of information technologies (digitalization) in the design, manufacture and assembly phases of construction-and in relation to the company's internal context: parent companies Skanska and IKEA. Organizationally, BoKlok was nested within Skanska, one of the top ten construction companies in the world, and was dependent on Skanska for BoKlok's continued growth and development. Yet, historically, culturally, and from a brand perspective, BoKlok was patterned after IKEA, the low-cost furniture retailer. Spangenberg's most direct strategic challenges relate to fine-tuning BoKlok's business strategy in light of industry turbulence and, with the support of Skanska, developing a strategy for entering the U.K. market, and preparing his organization for executing the U.K. strategy. The first case can be used on its own to develop a deep understanding of the conditions that led to the founding of BoKlok and to clearly identify its novel business strategy and the success that it has been able to achieve by January 2018. The second case is set in September 2018, at the time that the Swedish housing market entered a downturn and BoKlok and parent company Skanska were dealing with the effects of contraction in their home market while preparing for BoKlok's expansion into the United Kingdom.

Jonas Spangenberg, CEO of BoKlok, an entrepreneurial industrialized construction venture focused on providing low-cost housing to a sharply defined, relatively low-price market segment, must identify and manage forces within three contexts as he develops and guides BoKlok's growth strategy: the residential construction industry, and Skanksa and IKEA, BoKlok's parent companies. Students are asked to consider Spangenberg's strategic actions in relation to the external context-an industry beginning to feel the impact of information technologies (digitalization) in the design, manufacture and assembly phases of construction-and in relation to the company's internal context: parent companies Skanska and IKEA. Organizationally, BoKlok was nested within Skanska, one of the top ten construction companies in the world, and was dependent on Skanska for BoKlok's continued growth and development. Yet, historically, culturally, and from a brand perspective, BoKlok was patterned after IKEA, the low-cost furniture retailer. Spangenberg's most direct strategic challenges relate to fine-tuning BoKlok's business strategy in light of industry turbulence and, with the support of Skanska, developing a strategy for entering the U.K. market, and preparing his organization for executing the U.K. strategy. The first case can be used on its own to develop a deep understanding of the conditions that led to the founding of BoKlok and to clearly identify its novel business strategy and the success that it has been able to achieve by January 2018. The second case is set in September 2018, at the time that the Swedish housing market entered a downturn and BoKlok and parent company Skanska were dealing with the effects of contraction in their home market while preparing for BoKlok's expansion into the United Kingdom.

The purpose of this case is to look at Autodesk's cultural, organizational and technological challenges as the company undergoes a recent leadership transition. The case examines the strategic agenda enacted under Autodesk CEO Andrew Anagnost: the company's shift to a subscription business model, the digitization of the company's internal technology infrastructure and shift to cloud computing, and the disruptive convergence of the company's construction and manufacturing end-markets. Students will also be introduced to different methodologies regarding the optimal organizational design for technological innovation and product development. Students will additionally gain an understanding of the challenges a leader of a large, complex corporation faces to improve the company's culture and become a mission-driven organization.

In July 2018, Google's Android software platform was fined $5 billion by the EU's Antitrust Commission. This case follows Hiroshi Lockheimer, SVP at Google responsible for Android, Google Play, Chrome and ChromeOS, as he and his team respond to the fine and the challenges of managing Android's increasing ubiquity and success.

Stephen Pratt and Raj Joshi - two veterans of Infosys Consulting - decided in 2016 to launch Noodle Analytics (Noodle.ai) to provide AI capabilities to Fortune 1000 type companies under a SaaS-type business model. The case traces Noodle Analytics from conception through funding, finding product-market fit, and its Series B raise in 2018, looking at issues of strategy, recruiting, business model, developing the product, corporate culture and the larger industry context. As they launched their business in 2016, Artificial Intelligence had moved out of the realm of sci-fi movies and into the mainstream: Technologies like Apple's Siri and Amazon's Alexa brought speech-recognition to mainstream consumers. Driverless cars were being tested on roads in California and elsewhere. Customer-service chatbots - computer programs designed to simulate conversations with human users - regularly interacted with humans on the web, and Google's AlphaGo computer had bested a human world champion in the ancient strategy game of Go. Increasingly, executives were under pressure to incorporate AI into their businesses. An article in the Harvard Business Review warned ominously: "Unlike with the internet, where latecomers often bested those who were first to market, the companies that get started immediately with machine intelligence could enjoy a lasting advantage." A shortage of AI experts and expertise, though, left many enterprises wondering how. Noodle aimed to serve them.

The case describes Xiaomi's IPO application in 2018, which sheds light on the company's finances and indicates a rebound from declining sales two years ago to a period of strong international growth. It also reveals Xiaomi's revenue and profits from Internet services such as advertising and gaming on its MIUI user interface. Additionally, the case shows Xiaomi's performance on the global smartphone market, showing a good year-over-year growth as well as a maintained leading role in India market. On a way to become an "innovation leader", Xiaomi faces challenges such as the management of ecosystem partnership, and the global expansion especially into the high-stakes U.S. market.

Long before Spotify had become a household name, and when Netflix was still mailing off DVDs to customers' homes, Tien Tzuo had foreseen a major transformation in the business world: from one-off sales to subscription business models. He realized that no one was making billing software to serve the complex needs of such companies, so he founded Zuora in 2007 to automate billing, commerce, and finance operations for companies built on a recurring revenue model. Initially, Zuora catered mostly to start-ups, but the world rapidly evolved. By 2017 its customers included companies such as Box, the Financial Times, Ford, GM, GE, Caterpillar, and Zendesk. In 2016, Zuora had crossed a major threshold: $100 million in annual recurring revenue. In 2017, Tzuo could see that Zuora was positioned to hit $300 million, and before then, he believed he would take Zuora public. The company was growing rapidly, and Tzuo had begun that he needed to approach this next phase of scaling more deliberately than he had with Zuora's early growth. "A company that is going from $100 million to $300 million has to be different than a company going from $30 million to $100 million," said Tzuo. "That $30 million to $100 million was a sprint; making the transition from $30 million, we were not so thoughtful. I wanted to be more thoughtful this time." In 2014, Tzuo had identified four major areas in which the company needed to transform: sales, finance, products, and people. Tzuo knew the transformation plan meant he would have to make a wave of leadership changes, managing hirings and terminations. And he would have to change his own leadership style to match the company's increasing size. Meanwhile, he had to think strategically about how Zuora could fend off challenges both from software behemoths like Salesforce.com and Oracle, and nimble upstarts. To successfully IPO, and satisfy investors over the long term, Tzuo knew that Zuora had to deliver consistency and predictability.

This case describes the renewed growth of Chinese smartphone maker Xiaomi in 2017, after suffering bruising setbacks at the hands of local competitors during the past two years. In 2017Q2, the company rejoined the top five rankings of the global smartphone market share. It also matched Samsung's market share in India market in 2017Q3. The case highlights the company's strategic adaptation in the two-year recalibration, with regards to global expansion, R&D accumulation and online business model redefinition. By releasing its own in-house developed chip, the case shows how Xiaomi attempts to fortify its intellectual property position and increase freedom of action in anticipation of entering new geographies, product markets, or technology areas. Besides, the case also presents the company's combination of the online and offline channels, by opening more than 200 Mi Home stores both in domestic and overseas. As Xiaomi embraced a new strategy to fuel growth, this case emphasizes Xiaomi's ecosystem strategy that seeks and invests partners in different niche markets with sizable market and strong user demand. In the end, the case questions the sustainability of the strategy and the internal organizational challenges facing Xiaomi.

Xiaomi, the Chinese smartphone company founded in 2010, had quickly become an industry leader in the Chinese market. By 2016 it had started to expand internationally, and this case lays out the company's globalization strategies and challenges moving forward. Hugo Barra, a top Android executive, had left Google a few years earlier to lead Xiaomi's international growth. Xiaomi's founder and CEO, Lei Jun, said the company's ultimate goal was "making good but cheap things," a low pricing strategy that had succeeded in China. The company sold over 70 million mobile phones in 2015-while aggressively building out a robust ecosystem. However, Xiaomi had expected to sell 80 to 100 million units that year; it was facing a declining domestic market and increased competition. Therefore, international expansion had become an important part of the company's overall strategy. But expanding to other countries would be a challenging road. For one, it would take considerable time and effort to tailor the company's Android-based MIUI operating system for diversified markets-and obtain market-access qualifications. Xiaomi's patent portfolio was thin compared to those of large competitors, and it ran the risk of lawsuits from companies that held patent rights in the countries it wanted to enter. Other challenges included building out sales channels, output capacity, and cross-culture management development. Xiaomi's international plan included ten countries in Asia, Europe, and Latin America. The next year or two would be critical for Xiaomi-and it needed to make the right strategic decisions to succeed in its globalization efforts.

In 2016, Deutsche Telekom's CEO Tim Hottges was steering the 69 billion euro telecom incumbent in new directions and seeking to disrupt the industry from within. The company's tagline was "Life is For Sharing." Its goal was to be Europe's leading digital communication services company that was most trusted by consumers and business customers for safely sharing content. Hottges wanted to achieve this by having the best network, the best service, the best products, and the best customer experience. The company also aimed to be the preferred provider for business customers. A major part of Deutsche Telekom's strategy involved building up the company's core business-its network-by increasing infrastructure investment 20 percent. Hottges described this as his "big bet," saying the network was the basis for everything the company did. Even as it built out the network, an ongoing challenge was finding the right software talent to support the growing software IT components of the network infrastructure. With that in mind, Deutsche Telekom was also developing capabilities on top of network connectivity, such as security, device management, privacy, and global reach capability. While focusing its innovation on advanced network capabilities, Deutsche Telekom was shifting resources away from efforts to internally innovate in competition with Internet-based players. Instead, it was now intent on winning by partnering with companies like Microsoft, Spotify, and BMW to bring new capabilities, innovations, and services to customers. European and German regulations created significant constraints, and external competition remained fierce from both telecommunications companies and so-called "Over the Top" companies such as Google, Facebook, and WhatsApp. These companies had diverted billions of dollars away from traditional telecommunications companies, enabled by telco companies' infrastructures. To counter that, Deutsche Telekom needed to strongly align strategy and execution.

As of 2016, Mathias Döpfner, chief executive officer (CEO) of Axel Springer SE, had successfully transitioned the German publishing house through a major digital transformation in the world of journalism. Given the massive disruption that had occurred over the previous two decades with how people consumed news, this was no small feat. During this time, many newspapers, magazines, and journals failed to keep up with the rapidly changing industry. Historically, print advertising constituted the majority of revenue for large publishers. But the digital revolution in journalism meant that print advertising revenues dropped precipitously. This downward trend in print advertising revenues happened around the globe, with traditional publishers cutting thousands of jobs. Many publishers were forced to declare bankruptcy during this period. In spite of these industry headwinds, Axel Springer was thriving. Döpfner had transformed Axel Springer through a two-stage digital transformation strategy process. Starting in 2006, Axel Springer first focused on organic growth and late-stage digital acquisitions, which infused digitization into Axel Springer's corporate culture. In 2013, the second stage centered around Döpfner's mission to become "The Leading Digital Publisher"; Axel Springer would be defined not by its distribution channels, but by its (content) brands and services. Having successfully transformed Axel Springer from a print-only company to a thriving print and digital media conglomerate, Döpfner wanted to accelerate Axel Springer's growth even further. He believed that Axel Springer was well positioned to succeed not only in their core German market, but also more broadly on the world stage. Yet he knew this path to becoming a global media powerhouse would not be straightforward, especially given the rapid changes occurring within the media and publishing realm. In a world in which people were consuming content from a variety of sources-traditional print

Bonnier News was Sweden's leading media group and a paragon in the nation's cultural, economic, and political circles. It was one of six divisions of Bonnier AB, a company founded by Gerhard Bonnier in 1804 that remained wholly owned by the Bonnier family, with 8,000 employees and operations in 15 countries. Bonnier News, which published three major papers in Stockholm, Dagens Nyheter, Dagens Industri, and Expressen and the southern Swedish daily Sydsvenskan, faced a major transition in the spring of 2016 as CEO Gunilla Herlitz prepared to retire. Herlitz's tenure had coincided with momentous upheavals in the newspaper industry, the rise of the digital era, and a period of unending change at Bonnier AB. Indeed, when Herlitz assumed her position, Bonnier was "a company in a financial crisis" struggling to adapt to the constantly changing media and advertising environment. In 2009, its flagship paper Dagens Nyheter lost more than 100 million Swedish kronor (SEK), or 10,780,985 euros (€). However, by 2010, just one year after Herlitz became its editor and CEO, the paper was already showing a healthy profit of 143 million SEK (€15,400,217). By 2014, five years into Herlitz's tenure, DN was again winning awards. Herlitz went on to apply many of the same tactics to the Bonnier News business area and its properties. This case explores the transformation of Bonnier News under Herlitz and considers the overall strategy of its newspapers and the strategic development of its business model going forward.

This case discusses the evolving strategies in the mobile chipset industry in 2014, focusing on Qualcomm, the dominant technology company in the mobile industry and the leading chipset manufacturer. The case begins with the evolution of Qualcomm's communication technology, highlighting the company's consistent ability to lead the market in modem performance by deploying the latest, fastest communication technology. The case then details the competitive dynamics of Qualcomm's strategy, including its technology adoption strategy; its "whole product strategy" (products and services); its mobile carrier strategy; and its modem and CPU (central processing unit) integration strategy. The company decided early on not to sell a "modem-only" chipset, but rather to build an entire mobile chipset solution, eliminating the need for handset manufacturers to incorporate a separate CPU chip, which reduced their costs and improved Qualcomm's competitive position. The case also discusses the transition the mobile market was going through in 2014, driven by several technological and marketplace changes. Those changes included slowing radio link improvements (as the technology approached a performance limit), which could potentially give Qualcomm's competitors an opportunity to catch up to its technology. Other industry changes included the eroding power of mobile carriers and the growth of mobile subscribers in India and China, where demand was dramatically increasing for low-cost handsets. This made room for Taiwanese-based MediaTek to emerge as a strong player in the mobile chipset industry. Qualcomm also faced emerging competition from application processing and graphical processing players such as Nvidia. The case concludes with a discussion of a potential path for Intel to become a rising contender in the mobile chipset industry through its new low-power Atom microprocessor.

As Box continued to mature as a company, the firm fought through the ups and downs of being a highly visible hyper-growth Silicon Valley firm. Box struggled to get its IPO completed, having to deal simultaneously with a volatile stock market and increased scrutiny of its SaaS business model. In parallel, the company worked to aggressively expand its business into large enterprises through a key partnership with IBM, all while working to grow its top line, keep costs in line with targets and retain top talent.

By 2015 Google's Android operating system had been deployed on over one billion units worldwide. The firm had been happy with the high market segment share achieved on mobile phones, but new challenges were arising: advances by traditional competitors such as Apple and Facebook, potential fragmentation of the Android OS, new market dynamics in China and India, and the complexity of managing a large organization which sometimes had diverging goals in different product groups. This case explores how Google confronted the strategic opportunities facing the company around Android, including maintaining strong performance while being nimble enough to expand into new markets.