In March 2021, the founder of Hampstead Tea, a specialty-tea processor based in London, United Kingdom, found herself at a crossroads. Since 1995, the founder had been exporting packaged tea to countries in the European Union (EU) as well as selling it locally in the UK market. But effective December 31, 2020, the United Kingdom had exited the EU; in 2021, companies in the two regions could no longer buy and sell goods freely across their borders. Uncertainty had gripped the flow of trade during the first three months of the new year. In March 2021, the founder was examining three options going forward: (1) divest the EU operations and focus on the UK market; (2) continue to cater to both the home market and the UK market, as before; and (3) relocate to a geography within the EU to focus on EU markets. The case offers a useful and engaging way of presenting to students the principles of effectuation as it relates to business entrepreneurship.
In late 2020, Maria Judice and the other members of the senior leadership team of Code Tenderloin (CT), a Black-led, nonprofit community support organization based in San Francisco, were wrestling with several challenges, especially around hiring to expand the senior leadership team and restocking the organization’s advisory board, which had been sorely depleted following the COVID-19 pandemic. Judice knew that CT was at an inflection point: the decisions they made about hiring and how to reshape their service offerings to a troubled and varied clientele would determine CT’s path for years to come.
In March 2020, Canadian-based venture Braze Mobility was experiencing growth challenges. The company had commercialized an anti-collision system to enable safe wheelchair navigation, which had been well received by the US market following a fruitful collaboration with the US Department of Veterans Affairs. The chief executive officer of Braze Mobility was now facing some big decisions. Should the company continue to expand its current export model, diversify into the Canadian market, or tap into growing online demand directly from consumers? Compounding the complexity of the problem was the departure of a key member of the team and the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Braze Mobility was well positioned for growth, but its next steps would be crucial to its success or failure.<br><br>Related case: Academic Entrepreneurship: Navigating Commercialization Challenges, product number W28370.
In September 2015, Pooja Viswanathan, a post-doctoral research scientist, emerged perplexed after a meeting with her post-doc supervisor. The purpose of the meeting had been to debrief on Viswanathan’s progress in response to the unexpected multi-stakeholder feedback received on the outcome of her six years of research: a prototype of an anti-collision system that enhanced wheelchair users’ mobility. To her considerable surprise and confusion, there seemed to be no consensus on the commercial viability of her prototype. Viswanathan stood in the corridor outside the meeting room and pondered her next steps. One option was to return to the post-doc bench and continue to develop her academic work and publish her findings. Alternatively, she could try to address the feedback she had received and start up her own venture, whereby she could commercialize a solution with stronger market potential. Viswanathan knew she had reached a fork in the road and now had to make a decisive career choice.
The founder of Cheekbone Beauty, an Indigenous enterprise in the Niagara Region of Ontario, was driven by the goal of becoming “the first Indigenous woman to create a unicorn beauty brand from Canada.” In early 2021, she was seeking resolution to an ongoing entrepreneurial dilemma: How should she identify the fledgling company’s unique strengths and build them into sustainable competitive advantages?<br><br>The Ivey Business School gratefully acknowledges the generous support of Pierre Lapointe, MBA ’83, in the development of this case.
Alicia Soulier, owner of Capelli Salon Studio, a hair salon in Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, has developed an application (app) that can help save hair salons thousands of dollars per month in hair colour costs. However, she is struggling to recruit enough subscribers to her new software as a service (SaaS) company, SalonScale. With the diversion of her attention from her hair salon to the app threatening her core business, Soulier must soon decide on a customer acquisition strategy.
Viral Nation, a six-year-old company based in Ontario, was North America's leading influencer marketing company. In March 2020, as the global COVID-19 pandemic struck, the founders of the company were assessing their venture's future growth prospects. Having just received three competing acquisition offers for their company, they needed to make a decision: Should they accept any of the offers, and if so, which one? Or, should they instead continue to grow organically in an increasingly uncertain market environment?
In February 2017, the chief executive officer of Conexus Credit Union, a local credit union headquartered in Regina, Saskatchewan, was preparing to meet with the board of directors. He would be pitching his plan to build, staff, and operate a start-up venture program to be called the Cultivator. The Cultivator would create a stream of new regional high-technology businesses that would be well-placed, both for Conexus to serve and its members and the wider community to benefit from. The real question was how to operationalize this model: Should Conexus use the template of existing for-profit start-up accelerator programs to launch companies quickly and optimally to fail or scale? Or considering its community mandate, should Conexus take a different route?
In early January 2019, the founders of STMNT (pronounced “statement”) a Canadian peer-to-peer clothing rental platform, were reviewing the performance of their venture. The sisters had formally launched STMNT in November 2018 and wondered whether they had implemented the right business model for their venture or if they needed to pivot. The rental transaction process was taking too long for customers and required too much of the founders' time to make scaling up a possibility. The sisters needed to take stock of their progress to date and chart the next steps for their venture.
In January 2019, a second-year master of business administration student has come up with an idea for a new venture: sourcing products from her social contacts, using Instagram to direct traffic to her company website, and utilizing the postal service to deliver goods. Does a viable business opportunity really exist, or are there too many unknowns?
Yuser Inc. (Yuser) was a new social networking start-up based in London, Ontario. Well-established social media platforms like Facebook and YouTube had begun to restrict social media influencers’ monetization of their user base, and this had opened an opportunity for a new social media network to make three-way interactions among users, social media influencers (SMIs), and corporate sponsors completely stable and transparent. Yuser granted SMIs freedom in terms of the content they posted, allowing companies to identify influencers who helped their marketing efforts and to financially reward them using Yuser’s cryptocurrency. Rather than facilitating two-way relationships, as most platforms did, Yuser would help build triangular relationships among companies, target markets, and SMIs. However, Yuser’s business concept was complex, making it difficult for the company’s chief operations officer to pitch Yuser’s value proposition to external investors. In June 2018, she needed to find a delicate balance that would allow her to inform investors of the venture’s potential without overwhelming them in a sea of confusing details.
In January 2018, the three founders of Lighting Enhancement Corporation (Lightenco), a Canadian turnkey lighting solutions enterprise, were at a crossroads. After building a successful business enterprise over seven years by relying entirely on internal financial sources, the founders of Lightenco now faced a difficult decision. Energy subsidies from the provincial governments of Quebec and Ontario had underpinned part of Lightenco’s value proposition to customers, but these subsidy schemes were facing imminent termination in both provinces. Moreover, the financing option that Lightenco’s three founders had deployed—relying on internally generated funds and not taking external capital—no longer seemed tenable, and moving to the next level of growth seemed to necessitate new and innovative financing options. Should the founders persist with the bootstrapping that had now become part of their entrepreneurial mindset? Or should they scale the business by either giving up equity or subsuming their operations in a merger with a larger firm? The founders were at a tipping point and had to decide which option to take.
In June 2018, the co-founder of a work-integration social enterprise in Calgary, Alberta, called CMNGD (Commongood) Linens, took stock of the impact her venture had on helping homeless people get back on their feet and into meaningful employment. Her ambition was to expand into other Canadian cities, but she was worried that scaling CMNGD might place so much strain on the venture that its viability could be thrown into question and its core mission put at risk. She knew that a lot was at stake, not only financially, but also for the vulnerable people she was trying to help. She and her husband had to carefully weigh the options and decide on the best way forward.
In late 2015, the chairman of Sofame Technologies Inc. (Sofame), a Montreal-based manufacturer and marketer of energy-recapture systems, faced a dilemma. The firm, which transformed the waste heat generated by hot water and exhaust gases into usable energy, had struggled for more than a decade as it coped with low gas prices and a failed carbon credits management subsidiary. Sofame had just been delisted from the stock market and was precariously close to bankruptcy. However, the chairman continued to see value in Sofame and was considering a restructuring plan that involved the acquisition of a New York–based boilermaker that could save the firm. In addition to the financial viability of the acquisition and the difficulty of raising funds, he also needed to consider other issues, including the fact that, as the chairman of a Canadian Crown corporation, he could not preside over a firm undergoing the bankruptcy process.
In late 2016, the executive director of Free Geek Toronto faced a challenge. Free Geek Toronto was a social enterprise based in Toronto, Ontario. It focused on recycling electronics waste and aimed to use its business profits to expand its scope of operations and deliver on its social mission of both reducing electronics waste going to landfill and employing at-risk and marginalized individuals. As a result, the executive director purposely hired individuals who had severe physical or mental disabilities, or both, and who had recently received, or were currently receiving, disability benefits, had poor health, or experienced general struggles with regular employment. The executive director’s challenges included juggling the financial and social goals of running a work integration social enterprise. In view of the constraints he faced, the executive director began considering whether to call on the assistance of volunteers—people who, despite their well-meaning intentions, might unwittingly disrupt the operation of the enterprise. Should he move forward with recruiting volunteers? If so, how could he ensure that doing so would not adversely affect the organization’s current culture or demoralize the current employees?
In July 2014, the president and co-owner of Sunshine Fresh Inc. (Sunshine), a food service manufacturing company in Totowa, New Jersey, needed to make a decision about the best location for the company’s new West Coast expansion. Sunshine had built a strong reputation on the U.S. East Coast for high-quality refrigerated kosher pickles. Among Sunshine’s most valued clients were several casinos located in Atlantic City, New Jersey, and headquartered in Las Vegas, Nevada. Recently, a food purchaser for one these casinos casually mentioned to Sunshine’s vice-president that his casino’s customers in Las Vegas would love to have Sunshine’s pickles too. This brief exchange led to an expansion plan that required Sunshine to choose a location for its West Coast operation. The company’s managers had visited several cities in the Western United States to explore their options, and had carefully weighed the pros and cons of the two main contenders—Los Angeles, California, and Las Vegas, Nevada—against five essential criteria. Now, they needed a firm decision: Which metropolitan area was the best location for Sunshine’s new pickle plant?
In 2016, the founder and chief executive officer of West Paw Design (WPD) was faced with a growth dilemma: how could he align WPD’s socially responsible ethos with his desire to expand business activities in the growing pet products market? Based in Bozeman, Montana, WPD developed, manufactured, and distributed pet products. The company was a certified “B Corporation,” meaning its social and environmental credentials had been verified by an external organization, B Lab. The founder had to consider his options very carefully, because some of them could undermine or negate WPD’s growth objectives, as well as its cherished B Corporation principles.
In June 2014, the co-founder and chief executive officer of the fast-growing, Shanghai-based online food ordering and delivery service ele.me, was wrestling with multiple growth-related questions. He had lofty ambitions for his venture but was facing the first major competitive threat in the form of a diversifying entrant. In the face of this threat, and with his inexperience as a business manager, he was unsure about how quickly to try to scale up the business, and how exactly he should implement his growth plan for ele.me. The company's success had attracted considerable venture capital financing. Should the company seek growth by sending head office managers to new regional offices, by hiring local regional managers and staff, or by franchising the brand in target cities?
Entravision, a leading Spanish-language broadcasting company in the United States that targets Hispanic Americans, has just set up a digital analytics division called Luminar, which uses Big Data to focus a company’s marketing to a particular set of consumers. The idea of launching Luminar has been mooted by an outsider who is a friend and protegé of the company’s founding chairman. As the incumbent president of the new division, he is grappling with some major issues. How should he secure the buy-in of line and staff managers at Entravision? How should he find a structural fit between Entravision and Luminar? How should he leverage business opportunities beyond digital analytics? What kind of entry barriers can he build so that Luminar retains its first mover advantage?
The chief financial officer at Beijing Automobile Group Co. Ltd., a large Chinese state-owned automobile manufacturer, is weighing up whether the company should purchase an equity stake and/or access to the intellectual property rights and production equipment of Saab Automobile, the troubled Swedish premium automaker owned by General Motors. Previous experience of Chinese technology acquisitions in the auto sector has given him pause for thought. He has to weigh up the likely return on investment, the ability of the company’s workforce to absorb and develop new technology, and the role of competitors in China’s rapidly growing auto market. He has three options: purchase access to Saab’s intellectual property rights alone, purchase an equity stake as well as access to those rights or do neither. If he goes ahead with either of the first two options, and if the gamble pays off, he will enhance his own reputation and that of his company. However, if the gamble fails, not only reputation but potentially a lot of money will be lost and much effort wasted in trying to absorb a foreign product into current operations.