It was a crisp autumn day in London in 2012. Brynne Kennedy and Steve Black, the co-founders of MOVE Guides, were huddling with their lead software developer, Peter Almasi, and their lead angel investor, Kevin Eyres. Their fledgling business had come a long way since its July launch, with pilot programmes underway at Amazon, Tesco and Oliver Wyman. With limited resources in terms of cash and people, they were wrestling with a crucial decision about how best to proceed with their dream of taking the hassle out of the process of corporate moves - hassle that was acutely felt not only by those moving, but also by the HR professionals tasked with administering the moves.

It was August 2014. The MOVE Guides team had successfully converted two of their initial pilot clients into paying customers whose employees were delighted with the company's support of their moves. Brynne Kennedy and her team were successfully closing a couple of additional lump-sum clients regularly. But customers old and new were asking MOVE Guides to offer managed moves, too. Was such a strategy scalable? What sort of business model would be sustainable long term? Could MOVE Guides take on the established competitors in the managed-moves segment? Her team, including her investors and her closest and most trusted advisor, was divided. Was this the right thing to do?

Having decided to go where her customers wanted to take her, CEO Brynne Kennedy had led MOVE Guides into the managed-moves market segment, in addition to the lump-sum moves segment that had given her company its start. By any measure, the company had grown: in top-line revenue, in head count, and (to her dismay) in the amount of cash it was now burning!

The case analyses the scenario facing Paddy McGiness, the sole founder of Breathe coffee shop in Hays, Kansas, as he seeks to launch his new business without seeking any external financing. The case explores the various mindsets that characterise many entrepreneurs and uses Mullins' texts 'The Counter-Conventional Mindsets of Entrepreneurs' and 'Use Customer Cash to Fund Your Startup' to examine customer-funded business models.

Tonya Lanthier tucked her twin 13-year-old girls Teagan and Ramsey into bed and gave each of them a big hug. She considered herself blessed to have two happy children and a fast-growing business that enabled dentists to find well-matched auxiliary staff, and for dentists, dental assistants, hygienists and front-office staff to find jobs they loved. Her company, DentalPost, was by all accounts thriving. Earlier in the week, however, she'd attended a workshop on product and service innovation and a couple of her fellow participants had suggested ways that what they had learned could be put to use in Tonya's business. "We've got the most comprehensive solution in our industry," she thought to herself, "and we've been making it even better - one step at a time - for more than a decade. There's always been an opportunity for us to innovate and that's probably still true, even now. So, I wonder what our next innovation should be?"

Thanks to its somewhat whimsical yet measurement-driven culture, its unusual customer-funded business model, and its committed community of winemakers and wine 'angels', NakedWines had grown rapidly, from a standing start in 2008 to a substantial presence in three of the world's most attractive markets for wine - the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States. Now, however, in September 2014, it was becoming clear that the company's long-time principal investor WIV was no longer able to fund Naked's future growth. Assembled in the Birthday Suit conference room in the company's office in Napa, California, were the key individuals who had brought the company to this juncture. Founder and CEO Rowan Gormley, co-founder and IT Head Derek Hardy, COO and American Managing Director Benoit Vialle, Australian CEO Luke Jecks, UK Managing Director Eamon Fitzgerald, Chief Financial Officer James Crawford, Chief Winemaker Matt Parish, and board member and CEO of WIV Andres Ruff, had gathered to decide what they should do about this difficulty. They had spent the morning developing a set of criteria for choosing among the various alternative ways forward. The afternoon's agenda was clear, to determine a strategy for continuing to fund the company's growth. Should they seek a private equity investor? Should they ask their customers - the band of nearly 300,000 'angels', as they called them, whose monthly subscriptions funded Naked's winemakers - to buy a stake in the business, or even pursue an independent public offering (IPO) of the company's shares? Should they seek a trade investor? Or should they wait, doing nothing for now, and maintain the status quo until the time for one of the other moves made more sense? By the end of the afternoon, the group had agreed, they would reach a decision on a strategy for financing the continued growth of the business.

This is part of a case series. 'Everyone says entrepreneurship is about risk-taking. But it's not: it's about minimising risks and taking careful risks.' Terry Rhodes' own words resonated with him as he reflected on the most critical decision of his career at Celtel International. Since its inception in March 1998, Celtel, a wireless service provider, set out to change the way business was done in Africa and to prove the transformative effects business could have on the continent and its people. Rhodes, Co-Founder and Chief Strategy Officer of Celtel, had successfully mitigated the risks and overcome the challenges that deterred other businesses from investing in and contributing to the region. 'We were lucky that our business - mobile telecommunications - was seen as raising money in the West to bring to Africa and build infrastructure,' he explained. As Celtel expanded and moved into more and more markets across Sub-Saharan Africa, its corporate values were continually tested. Up until now, Rhodes had managed to avert corrupt situations using simple but creative tactics. However, the market entry into Guinea in late 1999 had posed a different story. Despite his multiple efforts, negotiations with the Guinean government were now at a standstill and it had become clear to Rhodes that the government expected substantial bribery payments for the deal to move forward. It was now late September 2001 and to add to the dire situation, Celtel's CFO had informed him that losing the Guinea deal might lead the company towards bankruptcy. Rhodes now sat outside the door of the boardroom, waiting to be called in and present his recommendation to the Board concerning the Guinea deal. As he reflected on his available options, Rhodes knew he would have to defend his decision to the Board and would need their full support.

Supplement to case LBS116. This is part of a case series. 'Everyone says entrepreneurship is about risk-taking. But it's not: it's about minimising risks and taking careful risks.' Terry Rhodes' own words resonated with him as he reflected on the most critical decision of his career at Celtel International. Since its inception in March 1998, Celtel, a wireless service provider, set out to change the way business was done in Africa and to prove the transformative effects business could have on the continent and its people. Rhodes, Co-Founder and Chief Strategy Officer of Celtel, had successfully mitigated the risks and overcome the challenges that deterred other businesses from investing in and contributing to the region. 'We were lucky that our business - mobile telecommunications - was seen as raising money in the West to bring to Africa and build infrastructure,' he explained. As Celtel expanded and moved into more and more markets across Sub-Saharan Africa, its corporate values were continually tested. Up until now, Rhodes had managed to avert corrupt situations using simple but creative tactics. However, the market entry into Guinea in late 1999 had posed a different story. Despite his multiple efforts, negotiations with the Guinean government were now at a standstill and it had become clear to Rhodes that the government expected substantial bribery payments for the deal to move forward. It was now late September 2001 and to add to the dire situation, Celtel's CFO had informed him that losing the Guinea deal might lead the company towards bankruptcy. Rhodes now sat outside the door of the boardroom, waiting to be called in and present his recommendation to the Board concerning the Guinea deal. As he reflected on his available options, Rhodes knew he would have to defend his decision to the Board and would need their full support.