Aimee Schulhauser, a serial entrepreneur in Regina, Saskatchewan, was contemplating how best to regrow her original trio of culinary businesses to their pre-COVID profitability levels. Her early successful entrepreneurial business decisions were led by a combination of gut instinct, watching trends, and seizing opportunities, but her more recent start-ups in 2018 and 2020 were more calculated business decisions that ultimately failed. In June 2023, the original trio of “sister businesses,” as she referred to them, were improving in both sales and profitability, but it had not been easy. Customers’ buying behaviours had changed significantly, and with six months before the federal government’s Canada Emergency Business Account loan was due to be paid, Schulhauser’s focus had shifted from growing through new businesses to how best to regrow the core businesses.
<div style="font-size: 0.94em; line-height: 1.4;"><p align="justify">Ivey Business School Professor Emeritus Glenn Rowe has learned a lot about leadership by studying decision-making in the private sector, but his most valuable leadership lesson was learned as the officer-in-charge of Patrol Boat Standoff in the mid-1980s, when Rowe was a staff officer at a Canadian naval reserve division. On his first day as officer-in-charge, Rowe made an error that led to his ship’s grounding—a cardinal sin in any navy. This article—which Rowe co-authored with Ken Nason, another former Canadian naval officer with a second career in business—examines how failure can drive leadership development by highlighting how it positively affected Rowe’s career. Although we often hear that failure is not an option, this is a costly perspective. After all, failure shapes our character, restores focus, renews motivation, and teaches us about accountability, transparency, responsibility, adaptability, and ownership. Learning from failure, however, can’t happen unless one embraces failure as a teacher. When Rowe grounded his patrol boat, he learned the value of staying calm during a crisis and discovered that he had command ability. Earlier in his career, when approaching HMCS Preserver’s commanding officer to discuss issues tied to his performance, he didn’t save his job, but by admitting to himself and navy authorities that his performance was less than ideal, he avoided the “ostrich effect.”
In March 2021, the newly appointed senior vice-president of the Alfa Romeo brand in North America, headquartered in Auburn Hills, Michigan, was facing the main task of rebuilding the brand to increase sales. Since its inception, the company had seen inconsistent sales in its efforts to capture the high-end exotic auto market. The brand’s origins in the high-performance and competitive world of auto racing emphasized its true essence of excitement, spirit, performance, seductive design, technical advancements, and seamless interface between driver and machine. Contributing to the company’s sales volatility were numerous factors, including macroeconomic forces, consequential effects of past brand managerial decisions rooted in infidelity to the brand’s origins, and a notable lack of consistent brand management or leadership that had witnessed the appointment of four brand managers over the previous decade. Alfa Romeo’s brand building success was inextricably tied to effective marketing communication. The senior vice-president had to find a way to communicate and instill the brand’s desired exotic and exciting mystique in the minds of consumers.
In January 2024, Ben & Jerry's Homemade Holdings Inc. (Ben & Jerry's), a subsidiary of Unilever, was facing several critical decisions. It had been over a year since the company had been sued by its independent board about the company's decision to sell its Israeli business to a long-time licensee in that country. That situation was resolved with the court ruling against the independent board. However, guiding principles had to be developed to prepare for similar situations in the future. Specifically, the Ben & Jerry's management team had to work with its independent board to help avoid such incidents from reoccurring. Ben & Jerry's also had to achieve a balance among the perspectives and demands from various stakeholders, which were sometimes in conflict with each other.
In January 2024, Ben & Jerry’s Homemade Holdings Inc. (Ben & Jerry’s), a subsidiary of Unilever, was facing several critical decisions. It had been over a year since the company had been sued by its independent board about the company’s decision to sell its Israeli business to a long-time licensee in that country. That situation was resolved with the court ruling against the independent board. However, guiding principles had to be developed to prepare for similar situations in the future. Specifically, the Ben & Jerry’s management team had to work with its independent board to help avoid such incidents from reoccurring. Ben & Jerry’s also had to achieve a balance among the perspectives and demands from various stakeholders, which were sometimes in conflict with each other.
In March 2021, the newly appointed senior vice-president of the Alfa Romeo brand in North America, headquartered in Auburn Hills, Michigan, was facing the main task of rebuilding the brand to increase sales. Since its inception, the company had seen inconsistent sales in its efforts to capture the high-end exotic auto market. The brand's origins in the high-performance and competitive world of auto racing emphasized its true essence of excitement, spirit, performance, seductive design, technical advancements, and seamless interface between driver and machine. Contributing to the company's sales volatility were numerous factors, including macroeconomic forces, consequential effects of past brand managerial decisions rooted in infidelity to the brand's origins, and a notable lack of consistent brand management or leadership that had witnessed the appointment of four brand managers over the previous decade. Alfa Romeo's brand building success was inextricably tied to effective marketing communication. The senior vice-president had to find a way to communicate and instill the brand's desired exotic and exciting mystique in the minds of consumers.
On March 5, 2022, Ronni Kahn sat at her desk in Sydney, Australia, reflecting on what she was going to share at an international conference on leadership. Kahn was the founder and chief executive officer of the food rescue organization OzHarvest, a charity with the goal to nourish Australia through redistributing food and food waste to those in need. Kahn’s work involved a combination of running OzHarvest and being an international ambassador for and keynote speaker on sustainable food practices and living with purpose and meaning. As Kahn reflected on the work that had been done over the last eighteen years, what were the leadership lessons she had learned that she could share with others?
On March 5, 2022, Ronni Kahn sat at her desk in Sydney, Australia, reflecting on what she was going to share at an international conference on leadership. Kahn was the founder and chief executive officer of the food rescue organization OzHarvest, a charity with the goal to nourish Australia through redistributing food and food waste to those in need. Kahn's work involved a combination of running OzHarvest and being an international ambassador for and keynote speaker on sustainable food practices and living with purpose and meaning. As Kahn reflected on the work that had been done over the last eighteen years, what were the leadership lessons she had learned that she could share with others?
The Procter & Gamble Company (P&G) was facing a proxy attack from Trian Fund Management, L.P. (Trian) after Trian declared a US$3.5 billion position in P&G, equivalent to a 1.5 per cent shareholding, in February 2017. The fund manager called for a reorganization of the company to improve its performance and for a seat on P&G’s board of directors for Trian’s co-founder Nelson Peltz. Over the next few months, both parties discussed Trian’s proposals, but the negotiations broke down in July 2017, and the conflict became public. Trian announced it would put its demands to a vote during the annual shareholder meeting in October. A month before the meeting, P&G CEO David Taylor had to make a recommendation to the board: should the company accept or rebuff Trian’s attempt at gaining influence?
The Procter & Gamble Company (P&G) was facing a proxy attack from Trian Fund Management, L.P. (Trian) after Trian declared a US$3.5 billion position in P&G, equivalent to a 1.5 per cent shareholding, in February 2017. The fund manager called for a reorganization of the company to improve its performance and for a seat on P&G's board of directors for Trian's co-founder Nelson Peltz. Over the next few months, both parties discussed Trian's proposals, but the negotiations broke down in July 2017, and the conflict became public. Trian announced it would put its demands to a vote during the annual shareholder meeting in October. A month before the meeting, P&G CEO David Taylor had to make a recommendation to the board: should the company accept or rebuff Trian's attempt at gaining influence?
In 2021, Rogers Communications Inc. (Rogers), one of the largest telecommunications companies in Canada, suffered a leadership crisis amid conflict between members of the Rogers family controlling the company. A decision by board chair Edward Rogers to oust chief executive officer Joe Natale triggered a chain of events that pitted Edward Rogers against his mother and two sisters (all board members). The company’s complex governance model, which consisted of a dual-class share structure and the Rogers Control Trust representing the majority shareholders on the company’s board, made it unclear who had effective decision-making power. In the light of this uncertainty, investors owning Rogers Class B non-voting shares had to decide whether to hold on to, sell, or purchase more shares.
In 2021, Rogers Communications Inc. (Rogers), one of the largest telecommunications companies in Canada, suffered a leadership crisis amid conflict between members of the Rogers family controlling the company. A decision by board chair Edward Rogers to oust chief executive officer Joe Natale triggered a chain of events that pitted Edward Rogers against his mother and two sisters (all board members). The company's complex governance model, which consisted of a dual-class share structure and the Rogers Control Trust representing the majority shareholders on the company's board, made it unclear who had effective decision-making power. In the light of this uncertainty, investors owning Rogers Class B non-voting shares had to decide whether to hold on to, sell, or purchase more shares.
In May, 2020, Rio Tinto PLC, a global mining company, blasted a 46,000-year-old Aboriginal site in the Juukan Gorge, an area in Western Australia. While Rio Tinto’s actions were legal, the company was nonetheless widely criticized for its blasting of the sacred site, which contained remains and artefacts dating back tens of thousands of years. Furthermore, investigations revealed that Rio Tinto had knowledge of the sacred nature of the site. Internal investigations also revealed that the company had earmarked the site as being important to the Aboriginal peoples. The reaction to the blast was swift and unforgiving.
In May, 2020, Rio Tinto PLC, a global mining company, blasted a 46,000-year-old Aboriginal site in the Juukan Gorge, an area in Western Australia. While Rio Tinto's actions were legal, the company was nonetheless widely criticized for its blasting of the sacred site, which contained remains and artefacts dating back tens of thousands of years. Furthermore, investigations revealed that Rio Tinto had knowledge of the sacred nature of the site. Internal investigations also revealed that the company had earmarked the site as being important to the Aboriginal peoples. The reaction to the blast was swift and unforgiving.
Dual-class share structures offer stakeholders real advantages, but more firms need to follow best practices in deployment to mitigate the risk of abuse. This article highlights four different ways that Canadian firms, including Rogers and Shaw, implement dual-class share structures. It also discusses the related advantages and risks. Advantages include how dual-class shares facilitate the execution of strategy; encourage founders to publicly list stock; insulate the firm and management from short-termism; protect founders from activist shareholders; and protect firms making capital expenditures with long pay-off horizons. Disadvantages include how dual-class shares create agency issues and conflicts of interest, especially when controlling shareholders have minimal economic interest; create an inferior class of shareholders; allow entrenchment of management with directors often elected by controlling shareholders; increase the likelihood of related-party transactions; and reduce the likelihood of independent/non-executive board leadership. The article finishes with some governance considerations, including how the Canadian Coalition for Good Governance developed a dual-class share policy that encourages best practices for companies with dual-class shares. Some of the key principles include subordinated rather than non-voting shares, meaningful equity ownership, and mandatory sunset provisions.
Dual-class share structures offer stakeholders real advantages, but more firms need to follow best practices in deployment to mitigate the risk of abuse. This article highlights four different ways that Canadian firms, including Rogers and Shaw, implement dual-class share structures. It also discusses the related advantages and risks. Advantages include how dual-class shares facilitate the execution of strategy; encourage founders to publicly list stock; insulate the firm and management from short-termism; protect founders from activist shareholders; and protect firms making capital expenditures with long pay-off horizons. Disadvantages include how dual-class shares create agency issues and conflicts of interest, especially when controlling shareholders have minimal economic interest; create an inferior class of shareholders; allow entrenchment of management with directors often elected by controlling shareholders; increase the likelihood of related-party transactions; and reduce the likelihood of independent/non-executive board leadership. The article finishes with some governance considerations, including how the Canadian Coalition for Good Governance developed a dual-class share policy that encourages best practices for companies with dual-class shares. Some of the key principles include subordinated rather than non-voting shares, meaningful equity ownership, and mandatory sunset provisions.
Shareholder primacy has been a widely accepted norm in the business community for decades, leading executives and directors to focus on maximizing profits along with the value of the corporation’s shares. Nevertheless, critics have long questioned whether public companies should prioritize the interests of investors over the interests of other stakeholders. The most recent analysis of the legal standard that dictates the fiduciary duty of directors in Canadian corporate law was issued in 2008 when the Supreme Court of Canada released the BCE v 1976 Debentureholders decision. Some scholars theorized that this decision signalled a shift toward a more stakeholder-friendly model of corporate governance by calling on directors to act in the “best interests of the corporation.” This article provides an overview of the framework governing the fiduciary duty of directors with an analysis of the historical and economic context that has underpinned this area of corporate law since the Great Depression. It then examines what director duties within Canada might look like in the future while offering insights from the landmark BCE decision to help manage the director’s dilemma. The BCE decision suggests that when competing interests arise, the overriding principle for corporate directors should be to act in the best interests of the corporation by making decisions that aim to drive long-term success, as opposed to immediate profits and increased share value.
NorLand Limited (NorLand) was a construction company based in British Columbia, Canada, with operations in Alberta, British Columbia, Quebec, and the United States. Having grown primarily by acquisition, the company was moving toward an ambitious goal: to achieve CA$500 million in revenues and CA$50 million in net operating income (NOI) by 2025—the 500-50-25 goal. The main questions facing Dave Reynolds, NorLand’s chief executive officer (CEO), and his leadership team revolved around not only expanding the business to achieve this target but doing so sustainably, while giving NorLand’s business units the latitude and freedom that had drawn them to join NorLand in the first place.
NorLand Limited (NorLand) was a construction company based in British Columbia, Canada, with operations in Alberta, British Columbia, Quebec, and the United States. Having grown primarily by acquisition, the company was moving toward an ambitious goal: to achieve CA$500 million in revenues and CA$50 million in net operating income (NOI) by 2025-the 500-50-25 goal. The main questions facing Dave Reynolds, NorLand's chief executive officer (CEO), and his leadership team revolved around not only expanding the business to achieve this target but doing so sustainably, while giving NorLand's business units the latitude and freedom that had drawn them to join NorLand in the first place.