This case expounds on how Global Technology was established as a supplier in the upstream automotive industry chain and how it competed in a monopolistic market - the Chinese chassis-by-wire market with high technical barriers to entry and already dominant players such as Bosch and Continental enjoying combined share over 90%. It turned out that Global Technology, which epitomized the many tech firms aiming to produce local substitutes, managed to gain a market footing. The case first provides information about the automotive chassis-by-wire industry, ranging from relevant policies and technologies to market size and competitive landscape. It introduces the histories and businesses of major international giants, providing a glimpse into the market environment in which Global Technology was operating. The case also describes the founder Liu Zhaoyong's work experiences and motivations for entrepreneurship and explains why Liu entered the chassis-by-wire arena long dominated by international giants. It then illustrates how Global Technology progressed from 0 to 1 by creating great products to gain customer trust. It ends with a question on the company's current challenge: How should Global Technology compete with established giants in the future?

This case describes how EVCard, a car-sharing business in China, was created from scratch using a lean startup approach through observing overseas peers, analyzing market opportunities, building a startup team and conducting feasibility studies. The company formed at a time when the commercialization of new energy vehicles (NEVs) in the country was in its infancy, public awareness was low, and viable domestic models did not exist. The case describes how EVCard first developed a minimum viable product and improved on it incrementally through closed testing and a pilot. The firm eventually expanded its Shanghai model to 64 cities across the country, offering more than 42,000 vehicles from more than 13,000 stations to four-million-plus members. They generated nearly 100,000 daily reservations as of November 2018. EVCard's entrepreneurial journey will show students that in a changing market environment, startup companies can develop competitive advantage through rapid learning and product iteration.

This case study discusses the entrepreneurial story of FreshFresh Trade and Commerce (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. ("FreshFresh" for short), showing the continuous improvements and innovations it has made to develop a profitable model in the fresh food industry. At the end of 2013, its two founders, Leo (Bin) Shen and Baiyuan Fang, first got the idea of creating an online platform to provide fresh food. Since then, they have constantly tested the business model of FreshFresh. After two years of effort, its model became recognized by users and capital markets. By the end of June 2016, over 700,000 users have registered, and nearly 50% of them have purchased products on its platform at least once. The repeat purchase rate (at least twice) is around 45%. In March 2016, FreshFresh announced that it had raised US$20 million in Series A financing. On June 30, the company won the 2016 Top Digital award, making it the only fresh food e-commerce platform to win a prize at that year's innovation launch ceremony for China's telecommunication, media, and technology industries. However, just like 99% of companies in this sector, it has not yet managed to establish a profitable model. In 2015, it suffered losses of around ¥20 million, representing 20% of its operating revenue. After a series of improvements, the company hoped to make a profit in the first half of 2016, and to expand its business to other cities. But when Shen receives the performance report in July 2016, he decides to abandon this plan. He imagines fresh food e-commerce to be like running a marathon, and he wonders how FreshFresh can make a profit and achieve sound development by rationally allocating its strategic resources.

Beijing Jieyue United Information Consulting Co., Ltd. (Jieyue), a Chinese peer-to-peer (P2P) company established in mid-2013, offered financial services to investors through wealth management stores and an online service platform—xiangshang360.com. The platform served online customers, while the stores focused on those who had no interest in managing their wealth online. For borrowers, Jieyue provided offline services only, and it also performed credit checking through offline channels. Jieyue believed that the offline channels, particularly in third-, fourth-, and fifth-tier cities, could be the foundation for its sustained development, as well as a barrier for competitors. However, China’s P2P industry was facing the toughest regulatory supervision in history in 2016, and it was estimated that only 10 per cent of P2P companies could survive the increased regulatory supervision. Jieyue needed to make a decision: should it revise its business strictly according to the supervision rules or should it follow its original direction with a few minor adjustments to its business?

Beijing Jieyue United Information Consulting Co., Ltd. (Jieyue), a Chinese peer-to-peer (P2P) company established in mid-2013, offered financial services to investors through wealth management stores and an online service platform-xiangshang360.com. The platform served online customers, while the stores focused on those who had no interest in managing their wealth online. For borrowers, Jieyue provided offline services only, and it also performed credit checking through offline channels. Jieyue believed that the offline channels, particularly in third-, fourth-, and fifth-tier cities, could be the foundation for its sustained development, as well as a barrier for competitors. However, China's P2P industry was facing the toughest regulatory supervision in history in 2016, and it was estimated that only 10 per cent of P2P companies could survive the increased regulatory supervision. Jieyue needed to make a decision: should it revise its business strictly according to the supervision rules or should it follow its original direction with a few minor adjustments to its business?

In 2014, Jiangsu Huabo Industrial Group Co. Ltd. brought together offline logistics services and an online platform to create Jiangsu PhoneWin Logistics Management Co. Ltd. (PhoneWin). PhoneWin’s purpose was to exploit e-commerce opportunities for phones and related services in small towns and villages in China. Although competition was fierce from several large e-commerce companies in Tier 1 and Tier 2 cities, PhoneWin achieved some success. By November 2015, it had expanded into 13 provinces across China and built partnerships with over 300 suppliers. However, two Chinese e-business giants had started to expand their penetration in rural markets, becoming an inevitable threat to PhoneWin. As an early entrant in this market, how could PhoneWin compete against such powerful giants? Could it sustain its revenue and profit growth in the coming years?

In 2014, Jiangsu Huabo Industrial Group Co. Ltd. brought together offline logistics services and an online platform to create Jiangsu PhoneWin Logistics Management Co. Ltd. (PhoneWin). PhoneWin's purpose was to exploit e-commerce opportunities for phones and related services in small towns and villages in China. Although competition was fierce from several large e-commerce companies in Tier 1 and Tier 2 cities, PhoneWin achieved some success. By November 2015, it had expanded into 13 provinces across China and built partnerships with over 300 suppliers. However, two Chinese e-business giants had started to expand their penetration in rural markets, becoming an inevitable threat to PhoneWin. As an early entrant in this market, how could PhoneWin compete against such powerful giants? Could it sustain its revenue and profit growth in the coming years?

BYD Company Limited (BYD), a Chinese firm that started as a battery manufacturer, produced its first gasoline-fuelled vehicle in 2005. In 2008, BYD then launched its first electric vehicles based on its advantages in battery technology and experience in low-cost research and development. The company expected to gain a strong presence in the automotive market with these electric vehicles; its goal was to secure its place as China’s largest auto manufacturer by 2015, and the world’s largest by 2025. By February 2015, sales of one of BYD’s new energy vehicles, the Qin, accounted for 32 per cent of total new energy vehicle sales in China that month. Yet BYD was ranked 15th among China’s passenger vehicle companies. How could the company climb to number one in terms of sales volume?

BYD Company Limited (BYD), a Chinese firm that started as a battery manufacturer, produced its first gasoline-fuelled vehicle in 2005. In 2008, BYD then launched its first electric vehicles based on its advantages in battery technology and experience in low-cost research and development. The company expected to gain a strong presence in the automotive market with these electric vehicles; its goal was to secure its place as China's largest auto manufacturer by 2015, and the world's largest by 2025. By February 2015, sales of one of BYD's new energy vehicles, the Qin, accounted for 32 per cent of total new energy vehicle sales in China that month. Yet BYD was ranked 15th among China's passenger vehicle companies. How could the company climb to number one in terms of sales volume?

Online social network service provider Five One Network Development Co. Ltd. (51.com) was founded in August 2005 and entered the online game industry in 2011, when browser games became popular in China. Although it continuously invested in developing online games, it had failed to reach its goal of becoming one of the top 10 companies in China. The online game industry had seen fierce competition and was finding it difficult to retain talented employees, who were leaving to start their own businesses. This problem, referred to as a “brain drain,” was also increasing the number of emerging profitable start-ups, especially in the mobile game segment. To overcome these internal and external challenges, 51.com decided to apply a new strategic approach: launching a series of new spin-off businesses from within the company. However, competition between the spin-offs seemed unavoidable. How would 51.com manage the relationships between the new spin-off businesses?

Souche had just celebrated its first anniversary in 2014 as a business in China’s used car market. After more than a year of strenuous effort, Souche had achieved considerable objectives. The company’s website had been providing information on used cars for six months, and its physical store had opened in Beijing around the same time. The store’s monthly sales had increased dramatically from 30 cars in the first month to over 231 cars in December 2013, ranking second among used car dealers nationwide. The management team had every reason to feel proud. The company’s founder had been optimizing the operational model for greater efficiency in the previous six months, but it suddenly dawned on him that there was a bottleneck in the latest business model. Was the company on the wrong path? After rejecting yet another business model, what would Souche do next?

Since its founding in 2002, Fengshou Crab Manor had become one of the top brands in China’s mitten crab sector by using a distinctive gift voucher model. The company had attracted over 100,000 loyal customers from companies and non-profit institutions in Beijing and Shanghai. At the beginning of 2013, however, the government’s Central Committee unveiled an eight-point code of conduct to reduce bureaucracy and boost ties with the public, which adversely affected sales of Fengshou Crab Manor’s gift vouchers. Throughout 2013, sales revenues plummeted by over 30 per cent. In such a critical moment, Fengshou Crab Manor began to ponder the limitations of the gift voucher model, coupled with a rising quantity of fresh foods sold online. Would the Internet mindset help the company survive the current crisis? What e-commerce marketing strategy should the company adopt to win over more users?

As a newcomer in the automobile industry, Tesla Motors had distinguished itself by redefining automobiles and rewriting some of the rules of the automobile industry. Ten years after its founding, it had begun to make inroads into China — a totally different market from Europe and the United States — and commenced its globalization efforts. China had set “new energy” as its major strategy for sustainable development and national security. Which path should Tesla follow to make China its second-largest market? How can Tesla’s director for China overcome the company’s strategic challenges in innovating in the Chinese market?