Beijing Jieyue United Information Consulting Co., Ltd. (Jieyue), a Chinese peer-to-peer (P2P) company established in mid-2013, offered financial services to investors through wealth management stores and an online service platform—xiangshang360.com. The platform served online customers, while the stores focused on those who had no interest in managing their wealth online. For borrowers, Jieyue provided offline services only, and it also performed credit checking through offline channels. Jieyue believed that the offline channels, particularly in third-, fourth-, and fifth-tier cities, could be the foundation for its sustained development, as well as a barrier for competitors. However, China’s P2P industry was facing the toughest regulatory supervision in history in 2016, and it was estimated that only 10 per cent of P2P companies could survive the increased regulatory supervision. Jieyue needed to make a decision: should it revise its business strictly according to the supervision rules or should it follow its original direction with a few minor adjustments to its business?
In 2014, Jiangsu Huabo Industrial Group Co. Ltd. brought together offline logistics services and an online platform to create Jiangsu PhoneWin Logistics Management Co. Ltd. (PhoneWin). PhoneWin’s purpose was to exploit e-commerce opportunities for phones and related services in small towns and villages in China. Although competition was fierce from several large e-commerce companies in Tier 1 and Tier 2 cities, PhoneWin achieved some success. By November 2015, it had expanded into 13 provinces across China and built partnerships with over 300 suppliers. However, two Chinese e-business giants had started to expand their penetration in rural markets, becoming an inevitable threat to PhoneWin. As an early entrant in this market, how could PhoneWin compete against such powerful giants? Could it sustain its revenue and profit growth in the coming years?
BYD Company Limited (BYD), a Chinese firm that started as a battery manufacturer, produced its first gasoline-fuelled vehicle in 2005. In 2008, BYD then launched its first electric vehicles based on its advantages in battery technology and experience in low-cost research and development. The company expected to gain a strong presence in the automotive market with these electric vehicles; its goal was to secure its place as China’s largest auto manufacturer by 2015, and the world’s largest by 2025. By February 2015, sales of one of BYD’s new energy vehicles, the Qin, accounted for 32 per cent of total new energy vehicle sales in China that month. Yet BYD was ranked 15th among China’s passenger vehicle companies. How could the company climb to number one in terms of sales volume?
Online social network service provider Five One Network Development Co. Ltd. (51.com) was founded in August 2005 and entered the online game industry in 2011, when browser games became popular in China. Although it continuously invested in developing online games, it had failed to reach its goal of becoming one of the top 10 companies in China. The online game industry had seen fierce competition and was finding it difficult to retain talented employees, who were leaving to start their own businesses. This problem, referred to as a “brain drain,” was also increasing the number of emerging profitable start-ups, especially in the mobile game segment. To overcome these internal and external challenges, 51.com decided to apply a new strategic approach: launching a series of new spin-off businesses from within the company. However, competition between the spin-offs seemed unavoidable. How would 51.com manage the relationships between the new spin-off businesses?
Souche had just celebrated its first anniversary in 2014 as a business in China’s used car market. After more than a year of strenuous effort, Souche had achieved considerable objectives. The company’s website had been providing information on used cars for six months, and its physical store had opened in Beijing around the same time. The store’s monthly sales had increased dramatically from 30 cars in the first month to over 231 cars in December 2013, ranking second among used car dealers nationwide. The management team had every reason to feel proud. The company’s founder had been optimizing the operational model for greater efficiency in the previous six months, but it suddenly dawned on him that there was a bottleneck in the latest business model. Was the company on the wrong path? After rejecting yet another business model, what would Souche do next?
Since its founding in 2002, Fengshou Crab Manor had become one of the top brands in China’s mitten crab sector by using a distinctive gift voucher model. The company had attracted over 100,000 loyal customers from companies and non-profit institutions in Beijing and Shanghai. At the beginning of 2013, however, the government’s Central Committee unveiled an eight-point code of conduct to reduce bureaucracy and boost ties with the public, which adversely affected sales of Fengshou Crab Manor’s gift vouchers. Throughout 2013, sales revenues plummeted by over 30 per cent. In such a critical moment, Fengshou Crab Manor began to ponder the limitations of the gift voucher model, coupled with a rising quantity of fresh foods sold online. Would the Internet mindset help the company survive the current crisis? What e-commerce marketing strategy should the company adopt to win over more users?
As a newcomer in the automobile industry, Tesla Motors had distinguished itself by redefining automobiles and rewriting some of the rules of the automobile industry. Ten years after its founding, it had begun to make inroads into China — a totally different market from Europe and the United States — and commenced its globalization efforts. China had set “new energy” as its major strategy for sustainable development and national security. Which path should Tesla follow to make China its second-largest market? How can Tesla’s director for China overcome the company’s strategic challenges in innovating in the Chinese market?