This case looks at the ELYSIS joint venture and the commercialization of its technology for eliminating greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions associated with the electrolysis process in aluminum production. Although Alcoa developed the ELYSIS process, its commercialization is the result of a partnership between aluminum producers Alcoa and Rio Tinto Aluminium (RTA). This partnership was made possible by Apple, which acted as an intermediary, and is supported by the governments of Quebec and Canada. The use of ELYSIS technology has the potential to significantly reduce GHG emissions from aluminum production and to help companies affected by new GHG emission regulations. The success of the technology, however, depends on its widespread adoption, which involves replacing a production method that is over 130 years old.

In 2010, multibillionaire George Soros offered to donate $100 million to Human Rights Watch (HRW) - this would be both the largest donation ever received by HRW and the largest ever made by Soros. Soros, a long-time supporter of the organization, had set several stringent conditions to the offer extended via his Open Society Foundations. HRW had to commit to (1) increasing its international presence, (2) increasing the proportion of donations coming from outside the U.S. to fifty percent of total contributions within five years, (3) diversifying the geographic origin of board members, and (4) raising additional funds to match Soros's donation. While Part A of the case focuses on the original offer, Part B is set in 2020 and summarizes what happened at HRW after it accepted the donation.

In 2010, multibillionaire George Soros offered to donate $100 million to Human Rights Watch (HRW) - this would be both the largest donation ever received by HRW and the largest ever made by Soros. Soros, a long-time supporter of the organization, had set several stringent conditions to the offer extended via his Open Society Foundations. HRW had to commit to (1) increasing its international presence, (2) increasing the proportion of donations coming from outside the U.S. to fifty percent of total contributions within five years, (3) diversifying the geographic origin of board members, and (4) raising additional funds to match Soros's donation. While Part A of the case focuses on the original offer, Part B is set in 2020 and summarizes what happened at HRW after it accepted the donation.

In 2018, Cycles Devinci, a bike manufacturer in Saguenay, Quebec, set itself the ambitious objective of 20% annual growth for the next three years. Simon Brodeur, global brand manager for enduro and downhill bikes, suggested the company expand into Asia Pacific. Intrigued, marketing manager Alain Pedneault asked him to draw up a proposal for selling 1,000 bikes in that region by 2021. Brodeur thus found himself compelled to formulate a proposal for the management team. Providing a stimulating organizational context and actual data, the case puts students in a real-life situation where they must screen markets based on both quantitative (estimated demand, per capita income, demography, tariffs, etc.) and qualitative criteria (political and cultural challenges and international agreements). The case analysis addresses a wide range of strategic dimensions, including business models, competitive advantage, and international marketing. It highlights the challenges faced by a company trying to raise awareness of its brand overseas and by marketing and brand managers at a company with ambitious objectives but limited resources.

This two-part case deals with the events surrounding the monitoring by Human Rights Watch (HRW) of human rights violations targeting Rohingya Muslims in Burma in October 2012. The case focuses on HRW's decision to publish a report of the situation and the impact of that report in Burma and abroad. While most human rights violation investigations are 'business as usual' for HRW, the situation presented in this case was different: the primary material for the investigation was satellite imagery, not the eyewitness reports typically used by HRW. The case is designed to stimulate discussion of value creation by NGOs, the effect of technological development on NGO operations, and the development of new capabilities by NGOs. It also introduces students to human rights issues, a topic rarely discussed in business schools. Part A provides background to address questions concerning (1) whether or not HRW should report the violations and (2) how satellite imagery can provide sufficient evidence to raise awareness of a situation. Part B covers the impact of the report on the situation by looking at the response from the media, the United Nations, the United States, and the Government of Burma. The case also sheds light on the challenges faced by HRW in the fulfillment of its mission.

Supplement to case HEC178. This two-part case deals with the events surrounding the monitoring by Human Rights Watch (HRW) of human rights violations targeting Rohingya Muslims in Burma in October 2012. The case focuses on HRW's decision to publish a report of the situation and the impact of that report in Burma and abroad. While most human rights violation investigations are 'business as usual' for HRW, the situation presented in this case was different: the primary material for the investigation was satellite imagery, not the eyewitness reports typically used by HRW. The case is designed to stimulate discussion of value creation by NGOs, the effect of technological development on NGO operations, and the development of new capabilities by NGOs. It also introduces students to human rights issues, a topic rarely discussed in business schools. Part A provides background to address questions concerning (1) whether or not HRW should report the violations and (2) how satellite imagery can provide sufficient evidence to raise awareness of a situation. Part B covers the impact of the report on the situation by looking at the response from the media, the United Nations, the United States, and the Government of Burma. The case also sheds light on the challenges faced by HRW in the fulfillment of its mission.

In 2015, the City of Montreal issued an international request for interest for the implementation of an all-electric carsharing service. This situation represented both a threat and an opportunity for car2go, a carsharing service company and a subsidiary of Daimler that had successfully operated 29 carsharing systems across Europe and North America. Would it be worthwhile for car2go to respond to the request for interest and, in doing so, adapt its successful business model to fit the needs of the local market? If so, what would be the implications for the overall competitiveness of the firm? Would it be worth the cost to develop a new four-seat vehicle to meet the City of Montreal’s requirements?

In 2015, the City of Montreal issued an international request for interest for the implementation of an all-electric carsharing service. This situation represented both a threat and an opportunity for car2go, a carsharing service company and a subsidiary of Daimler that had successfully operated 29 carsharing systems across Europe and North America. Would it be worthwhile for car2go to respond to the request for interest and, in doing so, adapt its successful business model to fit the needs of the local market? If so, what would be the implications for the overall competitiveness of the firm? Would it be worth the cost to develop a new four-seat vehicle to meet the City of Montreal's requirements?

In May 2011, the Public Bike System Company, based in Montreal, Canada, was preparing to answer a request for proposal by New York City to create a financially self-sustaining public bike-sharing system. Three years earlier, the company, owned by the Montreal Transit Authority, had created Bixi, a service that made bikes available to members through docking stations, powered by solar energy, spread across the city. Although its financial structure was still unproven, it was a promising solution that aimed to revolutionize urban transportation. In partnership with other private bike-sharing organizations, the company had successfully expanded to Minneapolis-St. Paul and Washington D.C. but had experienced problems with its implementations in Melbourne, London and Boston. Furthermore, the system in Montreal could not provide evidence of profitability, forcing the city government to step in by guaranteeing loans and providing additional cash flow. It also did not have a clear business plan as to how, when and where its international expansion should take place. Now, news of its problems in Montreal had made headlines in New York, putting the future of its expansion ambitions in doubt.

In May 2011, the Public Bike System Company, based in Montreal, Canada, was preparing to answer a request for proposal by New York City to create a financially self-sustaining public bike-sharing system. Three years earlier, the company, owned by the Montreal Transit Authority, had created Bixi, a service that made bikes available to members through docking stations, powered by solar energy, spread across the city. Although its financial structure was still unproven, it was a promising solution that aimed to revolutionize urban transportation. In partnership with other private bike-sharing organizations, the company had successfully expanded to Minneapolis-St. Paul and Washington D.C. but had experienced problems with its implementations in Melbourne, London and Boston. Furthermore, the system in Montreal could not provide evidence of profitability, forcing the city government to step in by guaranteeing loans and providing additional cash flow. It also did not have a clear business plan as to how, when and where its international expansion should take place. Now, news of its problems in Montreal had made headlines in New York, putting the future of its expansion ambitions in doubt.