China's companies have long been acclaimed for their manufacturing prowess and, more recently, for their pragmatic approach to innovation. Now it's time to recognize how they are reinventing the role of management through an approach the authors call "digitally enhanced directed autonomy," or DEDA. These companies use digital platforms to give frontline employees direct access to shared corporate resources and capabilities, making it possible for them to organize themselves around specific business opportunities. Autonomy is not complete, nor is it given to everyone. It is directed exactly where it is needed, and what employees do with their autonomy is carefully tracked. The approach contrasts with the Western model of empowerment, which gives employees broad autonomy through reduced supervision. This article describes the three core features of the DEDA approach: granting employees autonomy at scale, supporting them with digital platforms, and setting clear, bounded business objectives. It offers examples of how companies are using those features and draws lessons for Western companies.
The Economist opened 2021 with a cover story headlined "Why Retailers Everywhere Should Look to China." It's not hard to see why. China is both a large and a fast-growing retail market--worth about $5 trillion in 2020--and highly digitized. And the pandemic has made digital every retailer's strategic priority. The authors draw from their research on Chinese retailers to explain five lessons that Western companies can learn from China as they develop their own digital market offerings: 1) Create single entry points where customers can access all their potential purchases. 2) Embed digital evaluation in the customer journey. 3) Don't think of sales as isolated events. 4) Rethink the logistical fundamentals. 5) Always stay close to the customer.
A few Chinese companies recently have challenged the R&D strategies of foreign companies and offered lessons on how to make ideas commercially viable. But another, less obvious force to be reckoned with in China are the thousands of innovative companies that are quietly disrupting numerous industries and developing new products and new business models.
This is an MIT Sloan Management Review Article. For large global companies, forging effective partnerships with high-potential startups is easier said than done. The very traits that make such startups potentially complementary as partners also make it difficult for large companies to engage with them in the first place. Multinational corporations often struggle even to identify promising potential startup partners; startups, for their part, find it difficult to identify and reach the relevant decision makers within the often-confusing hierarchies of gigantic multinational companies. The challenge, for both sides, is all the more vexing in emerging markets. Furthermore, most academic studies of the challenges that large companies and entrepreneurial ventures face in partnering - and the solutions the studies suggest - focus on mature markets, such as the United States and Europe. Far less is known about how multinational corporations should engage with startups in emerging markets such as China and India. To understand how multinational companies have partnered successfully with startups in emerging markets, the authors undertook a study in three major emerging market economies: India, China, and South Africa. Their research uncovered four key factors, and they suggest a strategy for addressing each factor. The first key factor, the authors say, is the immaturity of the entrepreneurial ecosystem. Specifically, most emerging markets are afflicted by constraints and "voids" in their institutions. The authors recommend that multinational companies address this factor through programs that compensate for the immaturity of the entrepreneurial ecosystem, and they provide examples such as an IBM Corp. program that provides training, mentoring, and events for startups in China.
In this age of tough, global competition, companies in business-to-business markets need to rethink the way they manage their customer portfolio and interact with their customers. Customer managers with mainly sales- or relationship-oriented roles cannot leverage their business relationships with customers who seek co-creation. For such co-creation relationships, companies need to install network-oriented managers who systematically create value and reduce risk together with the customer. This article distinguishes three customer asset management perspectives (i.e., sales, relationship, and network) that may be employed by customer managers at the supplier-customer interface. Following an explication of the evolving network perspective, it describes how firms can nurture the network perspective and the corresponding customer manager role in terms of mindset, context, and competence.
This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Companies that are able to radically change their entrenched ways of doing things and then reclaim leading positions in their industries are the exception rather than the rule. Even less common are companies able to anticipate a new set of requirements and mobilize the internal and external resources necessary to meet them. Few companies make the transformation from their old model to a new one willingly. Typically, they begin to search for a new way forward only when they are pushed. This raises two important questions for corporate managers: (1) Is decline inevitable? (2) Do companies really need a financial downturn to galvanize change, or can they adopt new ways of doing things when not under pressure? Management theorists have observed that decline, while perhaps not inevitable, is at least very likely after a period of time. For this reason, the authors argue, it's important for organizations to develop new dynamic capabilities deliberately rather than relying entirely on their historic capabilities. In their attempt to understand what makes for successful organizational transformations, the authors studied 215 of the United Kingdom's largest public companies. The article focuses on three companies that transformed themselves-Cadbury Schweppes in packaged goods, Tesco in grocery retail and Smith & Nephew in medical devices. It compares them with three other companies from similar industries that were also successful but hadn't been required to make a dramatic shift. The authors found that the companies that transformed themselves had three fundamental advantages over their peers. First, they were able to build alternative coalitions with management. Second, they were able to create a tradition of constructively challenging business as usual. And third, they were able to exploit "happy accidents"to make strategic changes. Together these advantages helped them establish a virtuous cycle of strategic transformation.
Global account management (GAM)--which treats a multinational customer's operations as one integrated account, with coherent terms for pricing, product specifications, and service--has proliferated over the past decade. Yet according to the authors' research, only about a third of the suppliers that have offered GAM are pleased with the results. The unhappy majority may be suffering from confusion about when, how, and to whom to provide it. Yip, the director of research and innovation at Capgemini, and Bink, the head of marketing communications at Uxbridge College, have found that GAM can improve customer satisfaction by 20% or more and can raise both profits and revenues by at least 15% within a few years of its introduction. They provide guidelines to help companies achieve similar results. The first steps are determining whether your products or services are appropriate for GAM, whether your customers want such a program, whether those customers are crucial to your strategy, and how GAM might affect your competitive advantage. If moving forward makes sense, the authors' exhibit, "A Scorecard for Selecting Global Accounts," can help you target the right customers. The final step is deciding which of three basic forms to offer: coordination GAM (in which national operations remain relatively strong), control GAM (in which the global operations and the national operations are fairly balanced), and separate GAM (in which a new business unit has total responsibility for global accounts). Given the difficulty and expense of providing multiple varieties, the vast majority of companies should initially customize just one--and they should be careful not to start with a choice that is too ambitious for either themselves or their customers to handle.
A number of models have attempted to prescribe how companies should internationalize. Here, the best of these models is synthesized in a "Way Station" approach. It is tempting to take the "Low Road" (short-term, low-cost) approach in planning the trip, selecting the mode of transport, dealing with road blocks, and making a commitment. But success is most often achieved by taking the High Road. The Low Road is defined by relying on anecdotal evidence, responding only to immediate markets, exporting labor to low-cost markets, choosing markets based solely on cultural similarities, not exerting ownership control, relying on a few obvious customers, reacting to challenges with untested responses, falling into price wars instead of competing on value, and not investing in the venture as part of a global portfolio. The High Road, by contrast, emphasizes thorough market research, anticipating future customers and their needs, leading with strengths, defining success broadly, maintaining more than 50% control, diversifying the customer base, taking a long-term view, treating the new foreign venture as an integral piece of global strategy, and capitalizing on new technology in the foreign venture by feeding it back into domestic operation. Even smaller firms can take the High Road.
Provides a framework for developing global strategies for service businesses. Integrates existing, separate frameworks on globilization and on service businesses, analyzes how the distinctive characteristics of service businesses affect globalization and the use of global strategy, and diagnoses which aspects favor globalization and which do not. Applies the new framework to numerous industry and company examples, with particular emphasis on the role of information technology.
A study of 793 U.S. and Canadian consumer and industrial markets indicates that barriers to entry are surmountable and that direct entry may be a viable alternative to corporate growth through acquisition and to development of present markets. The entrant faces six major classes of barriers: 1) economies of scale, 2) product differentiation, 3) absolute cost, 4) access to distribution, 5) capital requirement, and 6) incumbent reaction. Direct entrants reduce or avoid barriers by taking one of two strategic approaches: 1) reducing barriers by employing the same competitive strategy as incumbents, or 2) avoiding barriers by using a different strategy altogether.
Describes the corporate portfolio of General Foods, Procter & Gamble, and Nestle, thereby placing in context their coffee activities in the United States. The objective of this case is to allow students to evaluate each competitor's commitment to the U.S. retail coffee market and the strategic implications of those commitments.
Set in mid-1978, this case covers all aspects of the U.S. retail coffee market both cross-sectionally and historically. The market is recovering from dramatic price rises and volume drops. The overall issue is the forecast of future market evolution and the implications for the marketing strategy of each major producer. Students have to make explicit 5- and 10-year sales and market share forecasts and draw up BCG-type portfolio matrices. Case is part of a two-day series, beginning with an aggregate view of the entire market and its evolution and narrowing to a view of market strategy for a single brand.
Reveals that the new products executives have decided to recommend national expansion. They have to develop a justification and preliminary marketing plan. Emphasizes consumer and trade promotion options. Students have to complete a five-year projected P&L statement.
To be handed out during class discussion of the (B) case. Reveals that Vicks developed a second name and advertising positioning. Presents results of copy testing, and further test market results. Students have to choose between the two names and positionings, as well as decide whether to recommend national expansion.
Reveals that Vicks chose a multi-condition positioning for the product. Describes testing of name and concept, and extensively reports on a four-city test market. Students are expected to evaluate both the design and results of the test, and face options ranging from termination to going national.
The Vicks Health Care Division lacks a solid form entry in the OTC colds care category and has developed a "me-too" product. The main issues are whether there is an opportunity for the product, and, if so, how it should be positioned. Main teaching objectives are to use market research data as input for assessment of market opportunity and development of product positioning.
Discusses alternative approaches to product portfolio planning, including those of the Boston Consulting Group, General Electric/McKinsey, and the PIMS Program. Examines how portfolio planning can be used in the processes of market selection and setting of business direction within a market.