How can a service industry startup in a traditional segment gain a foothold in the market? How do we run standardized operations in an industry where customers desire personalization and uniqueness? The journey of Himo sheds light on these questions. Himo, a China-based studio photography brand, owned the largest number of photo studios in China. When Himo was founded in Hangzhou in 2015, its main business was ID headshots. After eight years of development, it had 600 stores spanning over 80 cities in China. "Light, fast, and simple" was Himo's strategic positioning to appeal to the young people. Based on these three key attributes, it developed a standardized operation process and services, creating a business model completely different from traditional photo studios and thus being dubbed "the new species." How should Himo go from there? To answer this question, during its senior management strategy meeting on November 3, 2022, three different views emerged: one was enhancing the service delivery capabilities of its stores; another one was doubling down on its cosmetic retail business; and finally, one suggested speeding up the opening of innovative themed stores. Which should be Himo's strategic focus for its next phase? Himo's founder, Wu Yuqi, had to think this over.

This case illustrates how ATRenew used digital technology to create a transaction and service platform for second-hand 3C products. ATRenew was established to " Give a second life to all idle goods. It focused initially on consumer electronics recycling (evidenced by its launch of the Aihuishou C2B platform in 2011) before venturing into the B2B business in 2017 via PJT Marketplace (a platform that aims to connect second-hand buyers and sellers) and the B2C business in 2019 by merging with Paipai, JD.com's re-commerce arm. When combining the C2B, B2B, and B2C business into one integrated platform, the company developed standard quality inspection processes, a rating system for recycled products (including mobile phones and other 3C products), as well as a C2B and B2B pricing models that considered ratings, and built operations centers and a supply chain to best serve its entire business ecosystem. These efforts also empowered its partners to get the most out of second-hand items. However, as the company grew, leading one-stop re-commerce platforms, typically highly trafficked, broke into the second-hand 3C business to divide up the pie. In May 2022, the company's management revisited the trade-off between the advantages of competing within existing market space and the advantages of developing new business for the company to achieve lasting success.

What is unique about innovation in a social entrepreneurship setting compared to that of general entrepreneurship? The IngCare case serves as an illustration of these disparities across multiple dimensions, including its founding mission, entrepreneurial methods, organizational mechanisms, and growth trajectories. IngCare's founding mission was to leverage technological tools to enhance the quality of autism rehabilitation and ensure accessibility to professional rehabilitation services for every child. Over eight years on since its establishment, IngCare had undertaken various initiatives, such as developing a cloud classroom for training autism rehabilitation teachers and introducing the VB system for assessing autistic children's skills. However, the VB system faced criticism from many institutions that used it. In response, IngCare established its own rehabilitation centers to showcase and advocate for applying the VB system. This transition marked IngCare's shift from solely a product and service provider to an operator of offline rehabilitation facilities. As of early 2022, IngCare operated two primary business segments: 15 directly operated high-end institutions and external empowerment. Both business segments faced enormous growth opportunities, but the associated challenges were also daunting. Being aware of IngCare's limitations in resources and capabilities when striving for simultaneous excellence in both realms, the founding team found themselves at a strategic crossroads. Should their forthcoming strategic focus revolve around expanding rehabilitation institutions or empowering the industry through selling digital products and services?

Any company might one day face the test of a grave crisis that puts its very existence at risk. How can it survive the darkest moments and rise from the ashes? What is key to a company's longevity? The case of Luckin provides one possible answer. This case illustrated changes in Luckin's corporate strategy, business model, and operations strategy after its accounting fraud scandal. Luckin had previously adopted an aggressive expansion strategy. This approach featured prolific store openings, huge levels of financing, big customer discounts, and operations supported by a data-driven "new retail" system that acquired customers online and delivered products and services offline. This signature system took Luckin years to develop and refine. Customers didn't instantly abandon Luckin the aftermath of the scandal. Instead, customers rushed to Luckin stores to use up all their coupons just in case the company went out of business. While ensuring its stores could continue operating normally to keep up with this surge in demand, Luckin's new management team suspended its previous strategy and pivoted towards business performance. It focused on younger consumers and refined its operations strategy. The company launched new initiatives, including establishing private-domain traffic, introducing new products rigorously, and finetuning store operations to drive continued improvements in business performance. In August 2022, Luckin claimed to have "risen from the ashes and completely reinvented itself" as it announced second-quarter earnings. At that point in time, however, China's coffee segment was witnessing many emerging brands backed by deep-pocketed investors. Could Luckin sustain its growth amid such competition? How could it stay competitive?

Is there any space for startups in a fully matured market where market incumbents are embroiled in cut-throat competition? And if so, how can new entrants carve out a niche? Through its own experience, ApiYoo has come up with an answer of its own. As a 4-year-old startup in consumer goods, ApiYoo has distinguished itself from others in the sense that while most startups begin by concentrating on just one single brand, ApiYoo established seven brands in different market segments. For every new entry, it has adopted a strategy of appearance differentiation. After four years of development, in 2020, it achieved an annual operating revenue of ¥1.2 billion, against its larger ¥10 billion goal for an annual revenue by 2025. Although its strategy of appearance differentiation has borne some fruit, the aesthetic preferences of consumers are subjective and, therefore, highly volatile. How can ApiYoo maintain its competitive advantage? What challenges will it face in realizing an 8-fold growth within five years? Students are expected to answer these questions from the perspective of Zeng Rui, ApiYoo's Founder and CEO.

This case describes how Qinheyuan Group Co., Ltd. (hereinafter "Qinheyuan") created shared value by solving pain points associated with traditional elderly care. In addition to providing elderly care services, Qinheyuan also sought to address the psychological needs of senior citizens-specifically, to give them a sense of self-worth by making them feel needed or able to help others. In the late 2000s, Qinheyuan pioneered an upscale, membership-based elderly care model that sought to give the elderly sufficient freedom and respect while engaging them in creating and sharing value. This model was implemented in its two retirement communities, namely Kangqiao Apartments (dubbed "Version 1.0", with a 95% occupancy rate) and Yingfeng Apartments ("Version 2.0", with a 90% occupancy rate). The company's founder Xi Zhiyong subsequently decided to develop an improved version of the company's elderly care model (dubbed "Version 3.0"). This coincided with claims by parent company Yihua Healthcare that Qinheyuan had failed to meet its performance targets for 2019. As a result, Yihua Healthcare demanded compensation of ¥81.7 million and required Qinheyuan to ramp up efforts to market its existing apartments. Despite these pressures, Xi insisted that Qinheyuan should continue to work on its new model. Could Xi turn a blind eye to the demands of Qinheyuan's parent company, and if not, could he find a compromise?

Firms in mature industries often find themselves at a strategic crossroads, forced to choose between consolidating their position in existing market segments or breaking into new markets. At SAIC-GM-Wuling Automobile Co., Ltd. (hereinafter "Wuling"), the scales tipped in favor of the latter option: the company challenged the status quo by developing the Hongguang MINIEV (hereinafter "MINIEV"), a model featuring a minimalist design and no redundant features. The company also encouraged customization to adapt to shifting user preferences, turning the MINIEV into a fashion statement. By doing so, Wuling could avoid fighting for existing market share and break into the mass market for customized cars. In April 2021, nine months after its launch, the MINIEV was China's best-selling electric vehicle (EV) for the eighth consecutive month. It also topped the global EV sales rankings in January and April 2021. Despite its success, the MINIEV did not bring a sense of safety for Wuling's general manager Shen Yang and deputy general manager Xue Haitao. Instead, the two worried about how long the sales momentum would last, what sort of product strategy Wuling should adopt in the future, and which path to take-specifically, to tap into the higher-end segment with upgraded products or to consolidate its position in the value-for-money segment.

This case explores two dimensions of organization and human resource management (HRM). First, the case illustrates how Xibei evolved from an unknown northwest Chinese cuisine restaurant into one of the country's leading restaurant chains in a fiercely competitive catering market. Specifically, it describes how Xibei developed an organization and HRM system that supported strategic implementation, such as rapid expansion and product innovation. Second, the case expounds on how Xibei's founder and executive team responded to change. In particular, the case illustrates Xibei's paradox when reinforcing strategic implementation, such as the perspective of top-down versus bottom-up innovation, and centralization versus decentralization. It also stimulates discussion on organizational rigidity during growth, taking the chance on a Covid-19 outbreak.

This case expounds on the operating model and achievements of Ant Forest. Ant Forest not only heralded a new model for protecting the environment but also generated unique business value for payments app Alipay and its parent company Ant Financial. Ant Forest is a classic example of how a business can create economic value by delivering social value. In just over three years of operations, Ant Forest chalked up two distinctive achievements: First, it functioned as a green initiative and public benefit platform accessible to any individual, company, public welfare organization, and public benefit corporation (PBC). It offered tangible incentives (planting new trees) to reward low-carbon lifestyles, creating a mutual incentive closed-loop system. Second, it encouraged users to use Alipay by rewarding them with green energy points. Therefore, it delivered a social networking function, a historic key competitive weakness of Alipay, helping to boost the app's usage frequency and user stickiness. It also enabled the creation of personal carbon accounts, a key step in the implementation of Ant Financial's green finance strategy. However, Ant Forest still relied primarily on investments from Ant Financial to survive until early 2020. Zu Wang, Ant Forest's product manager, was keen to overcome this dependence. So, how could Ant Forest become a self-sufficient entity, and how could it build a sustainable environmental protection platform?

This case describes Ant Financial's pursuit of innovation and landmark achievements in the field of finance. These innovations not only made up for its shortcomings in traditional financial services by providing inclusive finance, but also created new segments such as credit leasing. These new services posed a great challenge to traditional financial institutions and, by doing so, helped these institutions become more competitive. However, despite all these achievements, Ant Financial also faced many challenges. As a trailblazer in uncharted territory, it faced great technical uncertainties and had to overcome numerous hurdles, including regulatory blind spots, pressure from competitors, and the need to define new boundaries in innovation. Ant Financial's senior management had always been aware of these challenges: in May 2019, they held a two-day meeting to discuss the sustainability and boundaries of innovation, seeking to answer questions about the meaning of sustainable innovation today, what legacy Ant Financial would leave for posterity, and why.

This case describes the development of Natural Factory's social e-commerce model, the role of CSR in the founding of that model, as well as its successes and limitations. In 2018, Natural Factory boasted a turnover of more than ¥600 million, and by January 2019, it had accumulated nearly 6 million purchasing users and over 27 million followers. Despite the impressive growth, Natural Factory was struggling to acquire new users. Marketing products directly to end-consumers would allow the company to break through this bottleneck quickly but at the expense of the small-scale merchants to whom the company owed its success. Founding CEO Su Lujiang faced a serious dilemma: how could the company continue to acquire new users without alienating the old ones?

By creating shared value (CSV) for stakeholders, Xibei, a 31-year-old catering company, managed to hold on to the number one spot in the Chinese food and beverage market in 2019. Founder and Chairman Jia Guolong said that the company's creation of shared value for stakeholders was not a noble gesture, but a bid to generate higher business returns and rival other restaurant giants around the world. Over the past 31 years, this business model created a virtuous circle for Xibei, helping to continuously boost competitiveness. As of June 2019, Xibei ran 350 stores in 56 cities across China and had plans to expand into other markets. However, Jia recognized that it would be challenging to implement the CSV business model in the global market, which would test his and Xibei's ability to capture and deliver value. If Xibei shared value but did not reap the returns, then the model would not work. So, how would Jia adapt the CSV model for the international market?

This case mainly describes how Shanghai Phoenix Bicycle Co., Ltd. (abbreviation: Phoenix), with a history of over 100 years, was disrupted and changed after multiple impacts brought on by the Internet and e-commerce, especially the bike-sharing business model and related new technologies. Phoenix evolved over time not only by opening up e-commerce channels, but also by extending its product offering from a single bike to multiple ones through vertical and horizontal diversification. It also formed a strategic partnership with ofo, a bike-sharing company, to participate in the design and manufacture of shared bikes and acquired resources and capabilities that were beneficial to the Phoenix brand's development throughout the process. As the President of Phoenix presiding over its difficulties, Wang Chaoyang had come to realize more and more clearly that the changes brought by bike-sharing to the bike industry would be disruptive. This disruptive change would eventually lead to the redefinition of bike products. And this redefinition would lead to the failure of the traditional business model in the bike industry. As a result, Phoenix had undergone fundamental changes in marketing, products, and manufacturing. However, how should Phoenix respond effectively? What resources and capabilities should Phoenix prepare in order to respond successfully? In July 2019, Wang Chaoyang had been facing these problems for a while.

The first Freshippo store opened in Shanghai, China in January 2016. It was not until nine months later that the second store was opened. However, from that point on, Freshippo stepped up its nationwide expansion by opening a new store every six days, on average. By June 2018, Freshippo owned 46 stores in 13 cities and had set a target of operating over 100 stores by the end of 2018. When entering a Freshippo store, customers not only saw an array of fresh produce that reminded them that they were in a supermarket, but they also saw food being prepared, people dining, and meals being packaged and sorted in bags for customers to pick up and take home to eat. Although the number of services were impressive, flaws had started to surface in the evolution of Freshippo’s business model, such as store management issues, poor service, and long wait times for food preparation. Freshippo had to make some decisions regarding expanding and exploring new business models, or instead resolving problems and making improvements. Which option was a higher priority?

The first Freshippo store opened in Shanghai, China in January 2016. It was not until nine months later that the second store was opened. However, from that point on, Freshippo stepped up its nationwide expansion by opening a new store every six days, on average. By June 2018, Freshippo owned 46 stores in 13 cities and had set a target of operating over 100 stores by the end of 2018. When entering a Freshippo store, customers not only saw an array of fresh produce that reminded them that they were in a supermarket, but they also saw food being prepared, people dining, and meals being packaged and sorted in bags for customers to pick up and take home to eat. Although the number of services were impressive, flaws had started to surface in the evolution of Freshippo's business model, such as store management issues, poor service, and long wait times for food preparation. Freshippo had to make some decisions regarding expanding and exploring new business models, or instead resolving problems and making improvements. Which option was a higher priority?

This case mainly illustrates how Freshippo created an innovative business model to cross the online-offline boundary by means of big data and emerging technologies. The reason why Freshippo could cross the boundary was that it combined technologies like mobile Internet, cloud computing, big data, and artificial intelligence to create a new business model based on "omni-channel supermarkets" as well as mobile e-commerce. In this way, it strengthened online and offline interaction anytime, anywhere between consumers and stores. With the arrival of the 5G era, how should Freshippo leverage emerging technologies to evolve into a more sustainable and profitable platform?

This case study describes how restaurant operator Wowprime, known for its brand creativity, implemented a diversification strategy in China's mainland. Having been present in the market for 14 years, Wowprime set out plans in August 2016 to expand from 149 restaurants to 1,000 by 2022. In a market where demand for customized offerings is gaining traction, should Wowprime maintain its fixed-menu-based diversification strategy for growth, or should it focus on core brands and priority markets? The case invites class participants to step into the shoes of Wowprime decision-makers and consider strategic options to achieve the 2022 goal while taking into account resource constraints as well as local market trends.

Beijing Jieyue United Information Consulting Co., Ltd. (Jieyue), a Chinese peer-to-peer (P2P) company established in mid-2013, offered financial services to investors through wealth management stores and an online service platform-xiangshang360.com. The platform served online customers, while the stores focused on those who had no interest in managing their wealth online. For borrowers, Jieyue provided offline services only, and it also performed credit checking through offline channels. Jieyue believed that the offline channels, particularly in third-, fourth-, and fifth-tier cities, could be the foundation for its sustained development, as well as a barrier for competitors. However, China's P2P industry was facing the toughest regulatory supervision in history in 2016, and it was estimated that only 10 per cent of P2P companies could survive the increased regulatory supervision. Jieyue needed to make a decision: should it revise its business strictly according to the supervision rules or should it follow its original direction with a few minor adjustments to its business?

BYD Company Limited (BYD), a Chinese firm that started as a battery manufacturer, produced its first gasoline-fuelled vehicle in 2005. In 2008, BYD then launched its first electric vehicles based on its advantages in battery technology and experience in low-cost research and development. The company expected to gain a strong presence in the automotive market with these electric vehicles; its goal was to secure its place as China's largest auto manufacturer by 2015, and the world's largest by 2025. By February 2015, sales of one of BYD's new energy vehicles, the Qin, accounted for 32 per cent of total new energy vehicle sales in China that month. Yet BYD was ranked 15th among China's passenger vehicle companies. How could the company climb to number one in terms of sales volume?