In late 2021, Darius Adamczyk, Chairman and CEO of Honeywell is considering the changes he has made to the company since he took over the top leadership position in 2017. The company he had inherited from his predecessor, David Cote, was seen by most as a high-performing, successful operation. Rather than rest on that success, however, Adamczyk had made a series of major moves-spinouts, exits, mergers, and reorganizations to refocus and reposition Honeywell. Against the backdrop of the breakup of GE, which many considered to be Honeywell's peer, Adamczyk wonders if he has done enough to prepare Honeywell to compete in the 21st century.

This case examines the leadership of Corie Barry, the new CEO of Best Buy, with a focus on actions the company took in 2020 to adapt to the COVID-19 pandemic. The case includes a history of Best Buy's strategy and leadership, including the transitions between the company's founder and the subsequent four CEOs. In particular, the career trajectory of CEO Corie Barry is described in detail. Regarding Best Buy's response to COVID-19, the case details the company's scenario planning and operational adjustments, including the temporary closure of all stores followed by the rapid establishment of curbside-pickup customer-order-fulfillment operations at roughly 1,000 store locations in the U.S. The case also attends to leadership's decisions to furlough more than 51,000 frontline employees, suspend in-home services, and subsequently resume in-store services under modified operating procedures.

Following the March 10, 2019, crash of Ethiopian Airlines flight 302, en route to Nairobi, Kenya and the October 29, 2018, downing of Lion Air flight 610 as it took off from Jakarta, Indonesia, Boeing's 737 Max jet, the model flown in both instances, was grounded by the Federal Aviation Administration and regulators all over the world. During its 20-month grounding, airline customers cancelled or put in question more than 1,000 orders for the Max. By the time regulators allowed the 737 Max to fly again, in November 2020, Boeing faced challenges due to the negative effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on air travel in 2020 and the negative medium and long-term outlook for the airplane manufacturing industry. This case examines the challenges faced by Boeing and CEO David Calhoun as the company sought to recover from the financial consequences of the grounding and the pandemic and to re-gain the trust of passengers, airlines, regulators, investors, employees, and the media.

This case describes the development of the Boeing 737 Max airplane model and the events leading up to two tragic plane crashes, in which a total of 346 people died: the crash of Lion Air flight 610 on October 29, 2018, in Indonesia, and the crash of Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 on March 9, 2019, in Ethiopia. The evolution of Boeing's organization and management is described, focusing on the span from Boeing's 1997 merger with rival McDonnell Douglas through the development of the 737 Max and the crashes. The case examines the antecedents and possible causes of the crashes, both through the lens of industry and competitive dynamics and through the lens of corporate culture and development processes at Boeing. The development of the 737 Max is described in detail, including the factors and decisions that led to the development of the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), the system that ultimately led to the crashes. Information about Boeing's response and actions during the period between the two crashes is also included in the case.

This case describes Kraft Heinz Company's (KHC) February 2017 unsolicited $143 billion takeover offer to acquire Unilever. The offer was made to Unilever CEO Paul Polman by KHC chairman Alexandre Behring, who was also co-founder and CEO of Brazilian-based 3G Capital (3G). Since being acquired by 3G in 2013, KHC profit margins had increased by more than half, to 28%, well above food industry averages, as its share price rose 24%. The case examines the divergent approaches to value creation embraced by 3G and Unilever, respectively. 3G had a well-earned reputation for immediate return to shareholders by cutting costs in its acquired companies, creating rapid increases in earnings and cash flow. Under the leadership of co-founder Jorge Paulo Lemann, 3G had teamed with Warren Buffet's Berkshire Hathaway in recent years on the acquisitions of Burger King, which then bought Tim Horton's in Canada, and H.J. Heinz, which subsequently acquired Kraft Foods. Under Polman's leadership, Unilever focused on long-term shareholder value accretion with a multi-stakeholder approach that emphasized global growth in revenues and earnings through deep penetration in rapidly growing emerging markets and creation of competitive advantage through sustainability. In Polman's eight years at the helm, Unilever had delivered a 190% return to its shareholders. The case presents Polman's dilemma: a takeover of Unilever by KHC/3G could erode the company's commitment to sustainability and a multi-stakeholder model, and the 18% premium of KHC/3G's offer undervalued Unilever and its long-term value creation strategy. However, 3G's emphasis on efficiency could enhance Unilever's profitability, and Polman was obliged to give serious consideration to the KHC offer and whether it would drive near-term value creation for Unilever shareholders.

This (B) case describes the aftermath of Unilever's February 2017 rejection of Kraft Heinz Company's (KHC)/3G Capital's (3G) unsolicited $143 billion takeover offer. In an effort to defend itself against future attempts by KHC/3G or other suitors, Unilever announced on April 4, 2017, a program of enhancing its long-term shareholder value with a series of aggressive restructuring moves. The program included targeted improvements to its operating margin, a significant stock repurchase, aggressive new savings targets, and other measures. The case allows for discussion of the takeover offer's role in catalyzing Unilever's announcement and the divergent approach to value creation embraced by Unilever and KHC/3G.

Royal DSM CEO Feike Sijbesma was pondering the challenges of shifting DSM's global organization from the constant transformations of the past 100 years to creating organic growth. When Sijbesma took the helm as CEO in 2007, he further pushed and completed the company's final moves away from commodity chemicals and toward more sustainable businesses whereby DSM could create value with differentiated offerings. Sijbesma emphasized innovation and moving into "sunrise" businesses that would fuel future growth by playing a positive role in the broader society. Sijbesma asked himself, did DSM's current portfolio in life sciences and materials sciences provide sufficient growth opportunities to sustain consistent and superior performance? Would DSM's 21,000 employees worldwide embrace the DSM Strategy 2018: "Driving profitable growth through science-based sustainable solutions," anchored via the Lead & Grow support and development program for key managers of the company? Should DSM continue making moves in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) to complement organic growth, or could its growth goals be achieved by focusing on organic growth for now, followed later by M&A activities again? What new markets should it look to in order to ensure sustainable growth? Sijbesma felt that after a decade of transformations (divestments and acquisitions), it would be healthy for the company to focus fully on organic growth for several years. During that period the company had already indicated it would divest three of its major holdings in joint venture (JV) companies, which would generate the financial capacity for M&A activities again in later years. In the meantime, Sijbesma wanted the company to prove it could grow organically as well.

In 2014, Medtronic was about to execute a $50 billion acquisition of Ireland-based Covidien. Medtronic CEO Omar Ishrak was committed to building the largest medical technology company in the world while broadening its ability to fulfill its mission of "alleviating pain, restoring health, and extending life" for millions more patients every year. The acquisition plan might change when, in September 2014, U.S. Secretary Jacob Lew issued new rules for American companies seeking to change their legal domicile through mergers with foreign companies - so-called tax inversion.Should Medtronic proceed with the acquisition? What would be the challenges of integration for both organizations?

On December 1, 2014, Medtronic announced that it had completed a $17 billion bond sale to finance the Covidien acquisition, officially completed on January 26, 2015. Medtronic's legal headquarters moved to Ireland, while its operational headquarters remained in Minneapolis, Minnesota. In this case study, Medtronic CEO Omar Ishrak reflects back on the integration progress since the deal's completion and offers his perspective as a global leader.

Novartis, the world's leading healthcare company, was formed in 1996 out of a merger of two very different, mid-tier Switzerland-based pharma companies. The case traces the company's evolution over the past 17 years, as it transformed into a truly global enterprise with 127,000 employees of 153 nationalities in 140 countries generating $56.7 billion in 2012 revenues and $9.6 billion in net income, making the firm one of the world's largest and most profitable companies. CEO since 2010, Joe Jimenez had taken over from one of the merger's architects and visionary legacy CEO Daniel Vasella. He recognized that the global health care environment would create severe challenges for Novartis in the years ahead and that Novartis needed to make sure it had the right strategy, structure, talent and spirit to live up to its ambitions.

Since the 1970s, the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan region (MSP) had outpaced the nation in job creation and income per capita. MSP's diversified base of industry clusters had enabled the region to adapt to economic downturns and an exodus of major corporate headquarters, earning it the accolade "Minnesota Miracle." Starting in 2003, however, MSP lagged the rest of the U.S. in job creation (see Exhibit 1). Alarmed business and civic leaders coalesced around a loose-knit group that congregated annually as the Itasca Project. In 2009 these leaders launched the Itasca Jobs Task Force, and its 2010 report set in motion a series of actions by groups of CEOs and politicians aimed at reversing these trends by creating jobs in all sectors of the economy. In the fall of 2011, however, it was unclear whether these efforts would achieve their intended results (see Exhibit 2), or whether longer-term corrective actions in education and skills training would need to take hold first.

The "Big 3" - Ford Motor Company, General Motors, and Chrysler - were all headquartered in Detroit, Michigan. Born between 1903 and 1928, they dominated the automobile industry in the U.S. for decades until they became complacent. In the 1970s they started losing share to better quality, more fuel-efficient foreign imports. By 2008 they were teetering, and two required federal government assistance to stay afloat. Within three years, remarkably, the Big 3 had turned around by improving competitiveness in quality, design and cost. Ford's Alan Mulally, GM CEO Ed Whitacre, and Chrysler CEO Sergio Marchionne took different approaches to guide their respective companies to improvements in product design, quality, and cost competitiveness that led to sales increases, solid profitability and positive cash flow. From October 2010 to October 2011, GM, Ford, and Chrysler sales increased 1.8%, 6.2%, and 27%, respectively. GM and Ford reported strong profits and better-than-expected sales, and agreed to pay bonuses to unionized workers as part of new contracts. The Big 3 were gaining market share-Ford was now handily outselling Toyota Motor Corp. in the U.S. after falling behind in 2007. Many saw the "Big 3" turnaround as proof that a unionized manufacturing industry could be revived through strong, decisive leadership on multiple fronts and improved union relations.

On October 28, 2011, 1,500 people, including many civic and business leaders, gathered outdoors in a Charlotte, North Carolina city square to celebrate the launch of Envision: Charlotte, a first-in-the-nation smart grid plan aimed at reducing energy use in the central business district. The initiative called for a 20% reduction in energy consumption in the city while promoting the region's burgeoning energy sector by attracting green-minded companies to the urban core and position Charlotte as a highly progressive business center. The idea was to make Charlotte the "new energy hub of America" and diversify away from its historical reliance on banking - a historically volatile industry. Duke Energy CEO Jim Rogers and the other leaders in attendance hoped that rallying around a shared idea and supporting a civic initiative such as Envision was the formula for economic sustainability.

Since the 1970s, the Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan region (MSP) had outpaced the nation in job creation and income per capita. MSP's diversified base of industry clusters had enabled the region to adapt to economic downturns and an exodus of major corporate headquarters, earning it the accolade "Minnesota Miracle." Starting in 2003, however, MSP lagged the rest of the U.S. in job ceation (see Exhibit 1). Alarmed business and civic leaders coalesced around a loose-knit group that congregated annually as the Itasca Project. In 2009 these leaders launched the Itasca Jobs Task Force, and its 2010 report set in motion a series of actions by groupos of CEOs and politicians aimed at reversing these trends by creating jobs in all sectors of the economy. In the fall of 2011, however, it was unclear whether these efforts would achieve their intended results (see exhibit 2), or whether longer-term corrective actions in education and skills training would need to take hold first.

No abstract.

Kent Thiry, CEO of dialysis provider DaVita, is considering how to integrate employees from recently acquired Gambro Healthcare without damaging DaVita's robust, unconventional internal culture. When Thiry joined DaVita in 1999, breaking an important promise to his family in order to do so, he was determined to create a differentiated company with a community-like culture. Over six years, he had engineered an impressive financial turnaround and successfully developed the strong culture he had envisioned. In late 2004, DaVita acquired arch-rival Gambro Healthcare, whose 12,000 employees would nearly double DaVita in size once the integration is completed in fall 2005. Confident that the deal makes business sense but worried about potential adverse impacts of the integration-especially in light of rumors that Gambro employees are suspicious of Thiry's authenticity and critical of DaVita's arguably eccentric culture-Thiry is considering whether to impose DaVita's culture on the new arrivals, or just allow Gambro to operate independently for a period of time.

David Neeleman, founder of JetBlue, is forced to confront a crisis in customer confidence following operational difficulties on February 14, 2007. This becomes a vital test of his leadership.