Innovation is all about finding and filling people's unmet needs. But even innovators and organizations renowned for their scanning capabilities often have trouble perceiving and correctly interpreting those needs. Drawing on their work as researchers, teachers, and consultants, the authors outline a four-part framework to help innovators diversify how and where they look. It involves two main strategies: improving your vision (seeing in greater detail) and challenging your vision (looking at people other than mainstream users). Within each you can adopt a narrow focus or take a wider view. You can zoom in on individual mainstream users and their everyday experiences (what the authors call a microscope strategy) or pull back to discover patterns in their aggregate behavior (a panorama strategy). Likewise, you can take a look at users outside your core (a telescope strategy) or seek a broader view of the patterns they exhibit as a group (a kaleidoscope strategy). For each of the framework's four parts, the authors describe how digital technologies can augment more-traditional ways of looking. Used together, the approaches they present will enable entrepreneurs to look further afield and on a larger scale than ever before.

Innovators can be their own worst enemies, derailed by personal traits, such as confidence and optimism, that are essential to creativity but can be toxic when taken to an extreme, and by emotions such as fear, doubt, regret, and frustration, which are typical when trying something new but can too easily stall or destroy entrepreneurial efforts. And although practical advice abounds on how to innovate, in-depth guidance on conquering these mental challenges is harder to find. The authors draw on published interviews, videos, and speeches to describe the obstacles encountered by some high-profile entrepreneurs and illuminate the paths by which they moved forward. They explore practical tactics for overcoming the fear of getting started, the frustration of setbacks, an excess of creativity, and a tendency to go into hyperdrive. Innovators must become mindful of their habitual ways of thinking and behaving, the authors argue. Thus armed, they can reach out for feedback or mentoring--for help in becoming a more skillful version of themselves.

Innovators who experiment solely to validate their idea are making a dangerous mistake, and the authors point to the inventor of the Segway as a prime example. The purpose of experimentation should always be twofold, they say: to test an assumption and learn from the testing, so you can decide whether to persevere, pivot-or pull out. They show how 'radical innovators' use experiments to validate and investigate. Their investigation is a more open-ended form of experimentation, designed to illuminate overlooked factors or preferences. Most importantly, it leaves room for unexpected insights to emerge along the journey to product launch.

Digital advances in the past two decades have enabled more people than ever before to express creative intelligence. Yet apart from the transformation of services powered by mobile apps and the internet, few sectors have seen spectacular surges of innovation--and only 43% of companies have what experts consider a well-defined process for it. In this article the authors present a five-part framework to guide the development and ensure the survival of breakthrough ideas: Focus attention closely and with fresh eyes, step back to gain perspective, imagine unorthodox combinations, experiment quickly and smartly, and navigate potentially hostile environments outside and within the organization. The elements of this framework are not unique, but collectively they capture the critical role of reflection in conceiving opportunities, the ways in which digital tools can advance them, and the level of organizational reinvention needed in the final push to market.

Narrow-mindedness holds back many organizations in their efforts to turn global presence into a real source of competitive advantage. In this article, the authors explore the manifestations and costs associated with what they call the "headquarters knows best"syndrome, as well as ways companies can address the problem. Many of the things companies have done are fairly predictable, such as decentralizing global responsibilities, changing the reporting relationships, internationalizing senior management, and creating cross-national teams. At Irdeto B.V., a Dutch developer of security software for digital media, the remedy was more extreme: It elected to create two headquarters, one in the Netherlands and the other in China. While this was expensive -and something the CEO's successor ultimately did away with in 2015 -the decision to operate out of dual headquarters helped the company realign its focus, and it had significant positive effects on Irdeto's performance. The authors argue that many corporate executives aren't aware that the "headquarters knows best"syndrome exists. Typically, top executives interact with executives from the subsidiaries that are closest to headquarters (in terms of geography, economic development, and culture); the executives'frame of reference is based on subsidiary managers who benefit from ample attention, autonomy, or influence. Executives from peripheral subsidiaries are the ones who are most likely to be affected and least likely to be heard. In addition, the value of missed opportunities and lost talent is hard to assess, and headquarters executives can easily invoke contextual factors (such as competition for labor) to explain problems. They can also try to pin blame on the local entities. After establishing its dual headquarters in 2007, the authors note, Irdeto saw measurable improvements on four fronts: increased top management attention, greater subsidiary contributions, richer lateral exchanges,

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. At some point in their careers, most executives -even the most talented -will face a power deficit. Regardless of their titles and nominal responsibilities, they will confront situations in which they have insufficient influence and authority to get their job done effectively. Fortunately, two strategies can almost always help the sidelined executive capture more clout and build an enduring power base. A variety of situations can lead a manager into a power deficit. Demographics (race, ethnicity, gender or age) can contribute to the power-deficient executive's predicament, as can inexperience, poor reputation, personality, background, training or outlook. It can happen to people with high potential. It can even happen to executives who are already high performers. Typically, an executive winds up with a power deficit because he or she lacks one or more of the following power sources: legitimacy, critical resources or networks. The high level of interaction between these three sources of power means that a shortage in one can easily produce shortages in the other two. The authors argue that, generally, executives who have a power deficit can solve the problem in one of two ways: they must either play the game more effectively or change the game by, for instance, reshaping their role in the organization. The authors offer examples and recommendations and provide a short questionnaire to help managers identify potential power deficits. The good news is that the odds of success are good. The authors report that in their coaching work with 179 executives who wrestled with power deficits, only four failed to improve the situation.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Historically, most managers equated innovation primarily with the development of new products and new technologies. But increasingly, innovation is seen as applying to the development of new service offerings, business models, pricing plans and routes to market, as well as new management practices. There is now a greater recognition that novel ideas can transform any part of the value chain -and that products and services represent just the tip of the innovation iceberg. This shift of focus has implications for who "owns"innovation. It used to be the preserve of a select band of employees -be they designers, engineers or scientists -whose responsibility it was to generate and pursue new ideas, often in a separate location. But increasingly, innovation has come to be seen as the responsibility of the entire organization. For many large companies, in fact, the new imperative is to view innovation as an "all the time, everywhere"capability that harnesses the skills and imagination of employees at all levels. Making innovation everyone's job is intuitively appealing but very hard to achieve, but many companies have tried -and nearly all believe that's it's critical to continue trying. To understand these challenges, and to identify the innovation practices that work, the authors spent three years studying the process of innovation in 13 global companies. Many of the standard arguments for how to encourage innovation in large organizations were confirmed, but some surprises were uncovered as well. In this article the authors focus on the key insights that emerged from their research, organized around five persistent "myths"that continue to haunt the innovation efforts of many companies. The five myths are: (1) The Eureka Moment; (2) Built It and They Will Come; (3) Open Innovation Is the Future; (4) Pay Is Paramount; and, (5) Bottom Up Innovation Is Best.

The case describes the journey of Gilles Morel, the VP of Mars Central Europe, as he tries to build a culture of innovation within the organization. It becomes clear that the challenge is not simply about building the proper infrastructure and systems. it is also about getting people to commit to Mars' innovation agenda. How can Gilles Morel make innovation everyone's job?

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. Are corporate social responsibility programs beneficial to companies when they undertake overseas expansion? To address that question, the authors analyzed both financial and corporate social performance data for more than 800 U.S. public companies. In particular, the researchers set out to examine the relationship between corporate social responsibility and profitable international sales. The researchers found that those companies that had low or high levels of corporate social responsibility had significantly greater success internationally than those with moderate levels of corporate social responsibility. The authors suggest that companies with high levels of social performance may benefit internationally from their good reputation for corporate social responsibility, and companies with low levels may attain cost advantages from overseas expansion. However, companies in between may be "stuck in the middle"--and unable to obtain a competitive advantage internationally from their corporate social responsibility programs. Since retrenching from existing corporate social responsibility efforts can be viewed negatively by existing stakeholders, the authors recommend that companies that are "stuck in the middle" rethink their overseas corporate social responsibility programs--either to de-emphasize competitive advantage or to increase the programs' impact.

This is an MIT Sloan Management Review article. For executives running global companies, the challenge of keeping abreast of events in markets around the world is mind-boggling. The problem is not a lack of information--it is having the time and energy to process the information. How should executives prioritize their time to ensure that it is focused on the countries and subsidiaries that need the attention? Which markets should they emphasize, and which ones can they allow to fall off their radar screen? Researches executive attention at global companies for five years, interviewing 50 executives at 30 corporations--including ABB, Dun & Bradstreet, Nestle, and Sara Lee--and finds that executives end up prioritizing a handful of markets at the expense of the others, but they don't always select the most promising ones. Because executive attention is so limited, executives tend to focus on the home market or on "hot" markets, always at the expense of other opportunities. Examines the nature of executive attention and identifies mechanisms by which subsidiary companies attract attention from the top executives. Although attention can be harmful as well as helpful, focuses on the positive aspects, three elements in particular: support, in terms of how headquarters executives interact with and help subsidiary managers achieve their goals; visibility, in terms of the public statements headquarters executives make about how the subsidiary is doing; and relative standing, in terms of the subsidiary's perceived status vis-a-vis other subsidiaries in the organization.

Lingo Media is a leading publisher of English language learning programs in China. But market share leadership hasn't come easily for the Canadian-based company, and doesn't equate with impressive sales or tangible profitability. Described is the company's learning journey in China and looks at the lessons learned on choosing the right alliance partner, tailoring products to unique local Chinese customers, and what unique resources are necessary to successfully do business in 21st century China.

The efforts of Swatch to reposition itself in the increasingly competitive global watch industry are reviewed in this case. Extensive information on the history and structure of the global watch industry is provided and the shrinking time horizons decision makers face in formulating strategy and in responding to changes in the industry are highlighted. In particular, the case discusses how technology and globalization have changed industry dynamics and have caused companies to reassess their sources of competitive advantage. Like other companies, Swatch faces the difficult task of deciding whether to emphasize product breadth, or focus on a few key global brands. It also must decide whether to shift manufacturing away from Switzerland to lower cost countries like India.

Oak Valley Inc. is a $2.1 billion Toronto-based company operating in various consumer markets. In early 1993, the company launched a management development program with the objective of promoting a culture that thrived on best practices. Five years later, the chief executive officer is attempting to evaluate the impact of the program on participants. Hoping to generate new insights that could be applied to similar events in the future, he has asked a team of five past participants to meet to discuss what they learned. This short case deals with the attitudes and behaviors most conducive to individual and group-based learning. The case provides an excellent vehicle for discussing how people learn, how teams can accelerate the learning process, and how companies can create positive learning environments.

Reviews the efforts of Swatch to reposition itself in the increasingly competitive global watch industry. Provides extensive information on the history and structure of the global watch industry and highlights the shrinking time horizons decision makers face in formulating strategy and in responding to changes in the industry. In particular, the case discusses how technology and globalization have changed industry dynamics and have caused companies to reassess their sources of competitive advantage. Like other companies, Swatch faces the difficult task of deciding whether to emphasize product breadth or focus on a few key global brands. It also must decide whether to shift manufacturing away from Switzerland to lower cost countries like India.