By May 2024, Dollar Tree Inc. (Dollar Tree), led by Rick Dreiling, was receiving criticism from stakeholders for Dollar Tree’s failed integration with Family Dollar Stores Inc. (Family Dollar) owing to net operating losses. It had acquired Family Dollar in 2015 for US$8 billion. In early 2024, after strategic evaluation, Dreiling decided to close 1,000 Family Dollar stores. Analysts suggested that Dreiling would need to make a call on divestment steps for Family Dollar, referring to it as a “problem child” for Dollar Tree. While Family Dollar’s gross profit increased between 2022 and 2023, it reported net losses. Should Dreiling divest Family Dollar? If so, what strategic options does he have for divestiture? How can Dreiling ensure the growth of Dollar Tree?

In early 2024, The Body Shop International Ltd. (Body Shop) filed for administration, the UK equivalent of a bankruptcy. Aurelius Group (Aurelius), a private equity firm, owned Body Shop and, soon after acquiring it, filed for Body Shop’s bankruptcy. Experts have criticized private equity firms for destroying the value of firms, especially in the retail industry. The FRP Advisory Group (FRP), which Aurelius appointed to oversee the administration, asserted that it was “exploring all options to take the business forward.” The British high-street fashion chain Next was intending to acquire Body Shop. Experts also recommended that Body Shop appeal to younger shoppers to compete with companies like Lush and other competitors that offered a similar value proposition as Body Shop. Should FRP have considered selling the restructured Body Shop to Next or back to Aurelius? Which company could provide better corporate parenting advantages? How could Body Shop be revived?

In March 2023, Gopuff, a player in the quick commerce (Q-commerce) industry, was experiencing intense competition and was also unprofitable. Gopuff's vertical integration model was different than other e-commerce or marketplace companies like Amazon or Instacart, as it purchased products directly from consumer product companies and wholesalers and stored them in micro-fulfillment centres for quick delivery on demand. The company intended to achieve profitability by reducing spending, scrapping off its lower-performing warehouses, and emphasizing higher-margin revenue streams like advertising. Did Gopuff have a feasible business model? Could it earn a competitive advantage over its competitors? What strategies could its co-founders consider to make Gopuff financially feasible?

In March 2023, Gopuff, a player in the quick commerce (Q-commerce) industry, was experiencing intense competition and was also unprofitable. Gopuff’s vertical integration model was different than other e-commerce or marketplace companies like Amazon or Instacart, as it purchased products directly from consumer product companies and wholesalers and stored them in micro-fulfillment centres for quick delivery on demand. The company intended to achieve profitability by reducing spending, scrapping off its lower-performing warehouses, and emphasizing higher-margin revenue streams like advertising. Did Gopuff have a feasible business model? Could it earn a competitive advantage over its competitors? What strategies could its co-founders consider to make Gopuff financially feasible?

In March 2024, Boeing Company’s (Boeing) chief executive officer, Dave Calhoun, and chair of the board, Larry Kellner, announced their departure from the company by the end of 2024. Their resignations came in part owing to several safety issues experienced by Boeing’s 737 Max aircraft, and the decline of Boeing's market capitalization owing to internal and collaborative problems with suppliers like Spirit AeroSystems and regulators. Experts advised reintegrating Spirit AeroSystems with Boeing and considering filing for bankruptcy for the commercial division or nationalizing. How can Boeing resolve both leadership and operational challenges? Should it reintegrate Spirit AeroSystems? What strategic choices can Boeing pursue?

By August 2023, Byju Raveendran, chief executive officer of Think & Learn Private Limited (doing business as BYJU'S), was facing corporate governance and ethical challenges, resulting in regulatory authorities scrutinizing the company. BYJU'S valuation also declined from a high of $21.2 billion in March 2023 to $5.1 billion by June 2023. Critics accused Raveendran of leveraging aggressive growth strategies, resulting in a decline in the company's performance. And Raveendran was increasingly pressured by stakeholders and critics to step down from BYJU'S board. Should Raveendran step down as chief executive officer? How can he undo the wrongdoing with different stakeholders? What could have driven him to pursue aggressive growth at the cost of ethics and governance?

By August 2023, Byju Raveendran, chief executive officer of Think & Learn Private Limited (doing business as BYJU'S), was facing corporate governance and ethical challenges, resulting in regulatory authorities scrutinizing the company. BYJU'S valuation also declined from a high of $21.2 billion in March 2023 to $5.1 billion by June 2023. Critics accused Raveendran of leveraging aggressive growth strategies, resulting in a decline in the company's performance. And Raveendran was increasingly pressured by stakeholders and critics to step down from BYJU'S board. Should Raveendran step down as chief executive officer? How can he undo the wrongdoing with different stakeholders? What could have driven him to pursue aggressive growth at the cost of ethics and governance?

In December 2021, Steven Cahillane, chief executive officer of The Kellogg’s Company, was facing worker unrest and a union strike. After several rounds of discussion between the workers' union and management, an amicable settlement could not be reached related to abolishing the two-tier pay system that Kellogg's introduced in 2015. After negotiations unfolded and management and the union still could not reach a conclusion, the union launched a strike on October 7, 2021. How could Cahillane improve relations with the workers' union? How could he bring the strike to an end? Does Kellogg’s management have more bargaining power than workers?

In December 2021, Steven Cahillane, chief executive officer of The Kellogg's Company, was facing worker unrest and a union strike. After several rounds of discussion between the workers' union and management, an amicable settlement could not be reached related to abolishing the two-tier pay system that Kellogg's introduced in 2015. After negotiations unfolded and management and the union still could not reach a conclusion, the union launched a strike on October 7, 2021. How could Cahillane improve relations with the workers' union? How could he bring the strike to an end? Does Kellogg's management have more bargaining power than workers?

By early November 2022, Elon Musk, the new owner of the social media platform Twitter, had fired approximately 75 per cent of the company's workforce. The decision regarding which employees to dismiss was based both on low performance criteria and unwillingness to commit to a new demanding corporate culture. Twitter had mainly incurred losses since its launch in 2006. Musk acquired the company after several glitches in the purchase agreement regarding the accuracy of verified versus fake (spam) Twitter accounts. Musk's new corporate vision, which he termed "Twitter 2.0," would require employees to work long hours at Twitter's offices. This plan was in stark contrast to the work-from-home policy that had been established by the company's previous leaders. Musk also fired large numbers of employees without appropriate notice. Understandably, these actions generated negative responses from fired employees. But there were also concerns from observers regarding the damaged brand image of Twitter under Musk's leadership. Could Musk lead a positive change in Twitter's culture? Could he improve the company's employer brand value? What traits and strategies should he consider to become a more responsible leader?

By early November 2022, Elon Musk, the new owner of the social media platform Twitter, had fired approximately 75 per cent of the company’s workforce. The decision regarding which employees to dismiss was based both on low performance criteria and unwillingness to commit to a new demanding corporate culture. Twitter had mainly incurred losses since its launch in 2006. Musk acquired the company after several glitches in the purchase agreement regarding the accuracy of verified versus fake (spam) Twitter accounts. Musk’s new corporate vision, which he termed “Twitter 2.0,” would require employees to work long hours at Twitter’s offices. This plan was in stark contrast to the work-from-home policy that had been established by the company’s previous leaders. Musk also fired large numbers of employees without appropriate notice. Understandably, these actions generated negative responses from fired employees. But there were also concerns from observers regarding the damaged brand image of Twitter under Musk’s leadership. Could Musk lead a positive change in Twitter’s culture? Could he improve the company’s employer brand value? What traits and strategies should he consider to become a more responsible leader?

In June 2021, the chief executive officer of Hallmark Cards Inc., a leading US greeting cards and gifts company, faced challenges as the digitalization of cards was gaining pace. This growing trend forced the company to overhaul its operations. Although it tried to cope with the changing business environment, the company suffered both in revenue and profit marking. The chief executive officer took efficiency-increasing measures and laid off employees from the greeting cards division, retail business, and corporate support functions. He also invested in greeting card digitalization and innovation efforts, but was wondering if he should focus more on efficiency or innovation measures to achieve turnaround for the company’s operations. What innovation strategies should he pursue to make Hallmark Cards Inc. relevant to changing consumer preferences?

In June 2021, the chief executive officer of Hallmark Cards Inc., a leading US greeting cards and gifts company, faced challenges as the digitalization of cards was gaining pace. This growing trend forced the company to overhaul its operations. Although it tried to cope with the changing business environment, the company suffered both in revenue and profit marking. The chief executive officer took efficiency-increasing measures and laid off employees from the greeting cards division, retail business, and corporate support functions. He also invested in greeting card digitalization and innovation efforts, but was wondering if he should focus more on efficiency or innovation measures to achieve turnaround for the company's operations. What innovation strategies should he pursue to make Hallmark Cards Inc. relevant to changing consumer preferences?

By January 2022, approximately 100 employees from Microsoft Corporation’s (Microsoft) HoloLens division, which had pioneered augmented reality (AR), quit. Most joined Meta Platforms Inc. (formerly Facebook), despite the company’s recent controversies. Meta was seeking talent for metaverse technology that required AR and virtual reality (VR) expertise. Metaverse talent was scant industry wide. Meta offered double salaries to poach talent from Microsoft, its partner for different projects. The executives leaving Microsoft were key employees of the HoloLens division. Microsoft’s choice to not hire more engineers after the US Army contract led employees to question Microsoft’s commitment toward HoloLens, a part of metaverse technology. However, Satya Nadella, chief executive officer of Microsoft, confirmed Microsoft’s commitment toward metaverse technology, though some employees disagreed. What could Nadella do to retain HoloLens employees? With an increasing demand for metaverse-related skills, how could Nadella attract more talent? Was Meta’s employee poaching likely to bring any good news for Microsoft?

By January 2022, approximately 100 employees from Microsoft Corporation's (Microsoft) HoloLens division, which had pioneered augmented reality (AR), quit. Most joined Meta Platforms Inc. (formerly Facebook), despite the company's recent controversies. Meta was seeking talent for metaverse technology that required AR and virtual reality (VR) expertise. Metaverse talent was scant industry wide. Meta offered double salaries to poach talent from Microsoft, its partner for different projects. The executives leaving Microsoft were key employees of the HoloLens division. Microsoft's choice to not hire more engineers after the US Army contract led employees to question Microsoft's commitment toward HoloLens, a part of metaverse technology. However, Satya Nadella, chief executive officer of Microsoft, confirmed Microsoft's commitment toward metaverse technology, though some employees disagreed. What could Nadella do to retain HoloLens employees? With an increasing demand for metaverse-related skills, how could Nadella attract more talent? Was Meta's employee poaching likely to bring any good news for Microsoft?

On October 28, 2021, Mark Zuckerberg, founder, chief executive officer, and chair of Facebook Inc. (Facebook), announced Facebook’s name change to Meta Platforms Inc., reflecting his vision for the company’s transition to metaverse technology. At the same time, Facebook was plagued by multiple scandals related to a data privacy breach, the spread of misinformation on the social media platform, employee whistle-blowing, and surveillance-style marketing and advertising. Trust in Zuckerberg’s leadership was diminishing. Zuckerberg controlled 58 per cent of Facebook’s voting shares, and stakeholders, critics, and regulators were calling for distributed leadership. How could Zuckerberg restore trust in his company and his leadership? What did he need to change to become a more effective leader?</p>

On October 28, 2021, Mark Zuckerberg, founder, chief executive officer, and chair of Facebook Inc. (Facebook), announced Facebook's name change to Meta Platforms Inc., reflecting his vision for the company's transition to metaverse technology. At the same time, Facebook was plagued by multiple scandals related to a data privacy breach, the spread of misinformation on the social media platform, employee whistle-blowing, and surveillance-style marketing and advertising. Trust in Zuckerberg's leadership was diminishing. Zuckerberg controlled 58 per cent of Facebook's voting shares, and stakeholders, critics, and regulators were calling for distributed leadership. How could Zuckerberg restore trust in his company and his leadership? What did he need to change to become a more effective leader?

California-based Intel Corporation (Intel) was one of the world’s leading semiconductor circuit firms. In July 2020, manufacturing delays with Intel’s 10 nanometre (nm) and 7 nm chips were adversely affecting the company’s customers at a time when demand for personal computers and laptops was at its peak. Unlike its competitors, Intel was vertically integrated. Competitors such as Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. had outsourced their chip manufacturing to leading contract manufacturers such as Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Ltd. (TSMC) and were experiencing better market capitalization growth by focusing on designing chips for PCs and other product categories. TSMC had become the leading contract manufacturer for chips globally. Intel’s former chief executive officer (CEO) believed that Intel’s chip quality was the best because its manufacturing facilities were in house. At the same time, geopolitical issues between Taiwan, the United States, and China meant that regulatory authorities in the United States were not in favour of outsourcing critical chip manufacturing. In January 2021, Intel’s newly appointed CEO would have to decide whether Intel should outsource chip manufacturing to a contract manufacturer like TSMC and whether, in the long run, Intel should remain a vertically integrated unit or spin off its manufacturing division.

California-based Intel Corporation (Intel) was one of the world's leading semiconductor circuit firms. In July 2020, manufacturing delays with Intel's 10 nanometre (nm) and 7 nm chips were adversely affecting the company's customers at a time when demand for personal computers and laptops was at its peak. Unlike its competitors, Intel was vertically integrated. Competitors such as Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. had outsourced their chip manufacturing to leading contract manufacturers such as Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company Ltd. (TSMC) and were experiencing better market capitalization growth by focusing on designing chips for PCs and other product categories. TSMC had become the leading contract manufacturer for chips globally. Intel's former chief executive officer (CEO) believed that Intel's chip quality was the best because its manufacturing facilities were in house. At the same time, geopolitical issues between Taiwan, the United States, and China meant that regulatory authorities in the United States were not in favour of outsourcing critical chip manufacturing. In January 2021, Intel's newly appointed CEO would have to decide whether Intel should outsource chip manufacturing to a contract manufacturer like TSMC and whether, in the long run, Intel should remain a vertically integrated unit or spin off its manufacturing division.

In 2015, Sundar Pichai was appointed chief executive officer (CEO) of California-based Google LLC (Google), and by December 2019 had also become the CEO of Alphabet Inc., Google’s parent company. By June 2021, thirty-six vice-presidents out of 400 executives had quit Alphabet Inc., and Pichai faced criticism from the senior leadership team for his risk-averse decision-making style. Senior executives believed Pichai had made Google more bureaucratic in its operations, even though the company’s size and market-based performance had improved under his leadership. In the face of this criticism, what should Pichai do? Should he respond to the criticism? Should he begin to make more risk-aggressive decisions?